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The spectre of block obsolescence of major weapons platforms loomed throughout
the 1980s, facing successive governments with significant challenges as they
worked to make sustainable decisions on replacement or upgraded equipment
for the New Zealand Defence Force.
This book identifies the critical factors that shaped and influenced defence
acquisition decision-making processes from the election of the Fourth Labour
Government in 1984 and the subsequent ANZUS crisis, through to the
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the following ‘war
on terror’. It explores and analyses decision-making processes in relation to six
acquisition decisions which have been made over a 20-year period. These are
the decisions on the ANZAC frigates; the military sealift ship HMNZS Charles
Upham; the second and third decisions on the ANZACs; the lease of the F-16
strike aircraft; the upgrading of the P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft; and the
purchase of light armoured vehicles for the Army—the LAV IIIs.
Whilst many factors are brought to bear, this book outlines how it is that
New Zealand’s own view of the world, external relationships, politics and political
influence, and the timing of decisions are amongst the most significant elements
that impact on the decision-making process, whilst individual actors play a
significant part in shaping the process. Although there has been a great deal of
publicity in recent years about rivalry between the Services and the place of
bureaucratic politics, this book argues that nonetheless officials continued to
work with rigour over time to provide the best judgement and advice possible
to Ministers. Three out of six of the case studies which have been analysed—the
ANZAC frigates, the upgrade of the P-3 Orions and the LAV III—have been
implemented or are in the process of successful implementation. In each case,
officials worked to ensure that they provided the Government of the day with
the most appropriate advice upon which to base decisions, although that advice
has not always been popular. Each case study demonstrates key aspects of the
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In February 1942, facing a Japanese invasion, the New Zealand Prime Minister
pleaded with Washington for arms. New Zealand, he pointed out, was virtually
unarmed: “This, we feel, is not our fault.” It is hard to see who else’s it was; it
is a mark of independent countries to take care of their own security.
The risk of invasion has since become very remote, but for almost two decades
the effectiveness of the country’s Defence Force has been plagued by obsolescent
equipment and seemingly interminable arguments over its replacement. Some
of this is endemic in democracies unthreatened and at peace. In New Zealand’s
case the problem was exacerbated by ‘block obsolescence’—the remarkably
successful burst of procurement in the late 1960s meant that ships, aircraft and
army transport all came up for replacement in the 1990s.
Overcoming this was not helped by a defence budget which fell steadily after
1989. From a post-war average of 1.8 per cent of GDP, spending on defence fell
by almost half—to under 1 per cent of GDP. This sharpened the need to make
choices, and it also sharpened the inter-Service and political lobbying for what
was left.
This is the background against which the author analyses six acquisition
decisions made since 1984. Importantly he studies the politics as well as the
processes involved in the selection of these major acquisitions. On the whole the
processes have worked well, with no evidence of corruption (always a risk given
the huge sums at stake). Cost overruns, that other universal curse of defence
procurement, have also been limited by the philosophy of wherever possible
buying only established technology. Where this had to be stretched, as in
integrating the separate systems in the Anzac frigate build, I can confess that at
least one Secretary of Defence was gripped by some anxious moments.
New Zealand’s main difficulties, Dr Greener demonstrates, came in the politics
of procurement. Buying ships, aircraft or armoured personnel carriers brings
out in every democracy the armchair strategists and lobbyists for particular
equipment and even brands. In this country the size of the sums involved
brought political divisions. It was not that large items like frigates or combat
aircraft cost more for New Zealand than for other countries—in many cases they
cost less—but that in the recent international climate many New Zealanders
could not see the need to buy them at all.
In this climate a broad bipartisanship in Parliament over defence policy broke
down. In the course of the past three decades defence and its equipment became
intensely politicised, reflecting the deeper divisions over New Zealand’s foreign
policy and position in the world. Our inability as a nation to make up our minds
on what we want the Defence Force to do has, as this analysis gently points out,
xix
in some cases been costly, in some cases damaging to effectiveness, and in most
confusing to those serving in the forces.
Deployments of aircraft and ships to the Middle East (and the equipment
needed to support them) have been decried, withdrawn and reinstated. Lessons
about the value of interoperable maritime patrol aircraft and the need for military
sealift have been forgotten and expensively relearned. Political fashions come
and go, but they are not the most desirable way of choosing major equipment
which will be used by the Defence Force for thirty or more years.
An unsettled defence strategy has also intensified inter-Service rivalry. A
healthy rivalry is a fact of life among the three Services, and the occasional effort,
such as Canada’s, to merge them into one organisation and uniform has only
made matters worse. The competition for access to a falling budget, though,
tempted some to go beyond the acceptable limits. It led to the rise of factions
within the army with, as Dr Greener makes clear, some constitutionally improper
behaviour—leaks and private briefings by some which an official enquiry
identified as ‘designed to advance the interests of the Army’.
This study is not a jeremiad. It accepts the thought and honest effort which
went into time-consuming argument and sometimes compromised outcomes.
Given the difficulties it may seem surprising that the Defence Force managed
the important re-equipment that it did. Over the period a blue-water navy was
maintained and repeatedly deployed in distant waters; the Orion were re-winged
to give them a further twenty years of life; naval helicopters were bought; and
much better armoured personnel carriers acquired for the two regular battalions.
Nonetheless, the analysis makes it clear that we could do better. Political
fashions can be deterred or at least weakened by a better understanding of the
long-term needs of defence; inter-Service rivalries can be contained by a more
durable defence planning system. This well-researched and accurate look at the
lessons of the past two decades does not suggest the answers—there are no easy
ones—but it shines a clear light on the difficulties of defence procurement, a
hitherto rather shadowy subject which is of major importance to both the finances









and the Policy Framework
Defence decision-making, whilst from time to time making newspaper headlines,
is rarely the subject of prolonged debate in New Zealand. Notable exceptions to
this would be the controversy over access for nuclear-capable US warships, or
the purchase of ANZAC frigates, during the 1980s. It was clear from this time
that much of the equipment of New Zealand’s defence forces was going to require
replacement or significant upgrading. How decisions on defence acquisitions
have been made since that time constitutes the research topic under investigation
in this volume.
The Historical Background
Before moving on to investigate recent acquisition case studies, it is important
to set the historical background against which more recent policy decisions have
been made, and describe the foreign and defence policy framework within which
decisions for defence acquisitions are developed and implemented.
Prior to the Second World War, New Zealand defence planning revolved
essentially around the expectation that the Royal Navy (RN) and the British fleet
would ensure New Zealand’s protection. At the Imperial Conference of 1937
New Zealand Prime Minister Michael Savage was firm in his desire to have Britain
promise to send a fleet to the Far East. He received a qualified promise from Sir
Samuel Hoare, First Lord of the Admiralty, who indicated that it would be
possible in the current circumstances to send the fleet, while still retaining
sufficient ships to fulfil European requirements. New Zealand defence planning
continued on this understanding.
On 1 September 1939 Germany entered Poland, and two days later Britain
declared war, followed almost immediately by New Zealand. On 5 September
1939 Savage broadcast from his sick-bed what was to become an immortal speech:
Both with gratitude for the past and with confidence in the future we
range ourselves without fear beside Britain. Where she goes we go.
Where she stands we stand.1
These sentiments were given substance only a week later, when the New
Zealand Government offered an army division for service in Europe, and put
over 500 personnel at the disposal of the Royal Air Force (RAF). The Naval
Division had already come under RN command. By June 1940 the second echelon
1
of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force was in the south of England, training
to repel the expected German invasion. That same month Britain told New
Zealand that she might not after all be able to send the fleet to Singapore if Japan
entered the war.
This was devastating news for New Zealand, and it became clear that the
only nation who could assist in the region was the United States. Peter Fraser,
by now Prime Minister, told the British that he wished to establish diplomatic
relations with Washington, and in January 1942 Walter Nash arrived there as
New Zealand Minister. US support for New Zealand was quick to follow, with
two divisions landing in New Zealand in June 1942.2
The US presence in New Zealand, coupled with public sentiment and pressure
from Britain resulted in the decision to keep the 2nd Division in the Middle East,
where it had been in action since the previous November.3 This decision received
a less than favourable response from the Australians, who had already moved
two of their divisions from the Middle East. Relationships with Australia became
even cooler the following year when, in May 1943, New Zealand once more
decided to leave the 2nd Division in the Middle East.4 The development of the
3rd Division in the Pacific, with postings first to Fiji, then New Caledonia and
the Solomon Islands, did not seem to ameliorate the concern.5
Despite the forging of the ANZAC spirit in the First World War, the Second
World War saw each country, for the most part, operating in separate theatres.
However, as is so often the case between rivalrous cousins, both countries saw
advantages in banding together to ensure that a post-war world would take
account of them. Each country particularly had concerns about US intentions
in the Pacific following the end of the war.
In order to explore closer trans-Tasman relations, in January 1944 Peter Fraser
met with the Australian Prime Minister John Curtin, and his Minister for External
Affairs, Dr Herbert Vere Evatt. The outcome of a series of meetings that took
place during the Canberra conference was the Australia–New Zealand Agreement,
which established both a formal treaty between the two countries, and the
continuous Australia–New Zealand Secretariat. The document declared: ‘It would
be proper for Australia and New Zealand to assume full responsibility for policing
or sharing in policing such areas in the Southwest and South Pacific as may from
time to time be agreed upon.’6
The Agreement also stressed that the construction of wartime bases gave no
basis for territorial claims, and insisted that no change in the sovereignty of any
Pacific island territory occur without their agreement. Both the Americans and
the British were concerned about the tenor of the Canberra Pact, and Sir Alister
McIntosh noted: ‘Care was taken henceforth to exclude New Zealand forces from
any very effective role in the fighting against Japan.’ Whilst McIntosh went on
2
Timing is Everything
to comment that, ‘so far as New Zealand was concerned, it was a diversion’,7
John C. Beaglehole thought that in the Canberra Pact New Zealand:
most clearly announced its independence of mind, its intention of
pursuing a policy in the Pacific, intelligible in terms not of subordination
to British hesitations and abstraction, but of the strategic needs,
enlightened self-interest and duty to Polynesian peoples of a quite
independent power.8
That independent stance was to be to the fore once more during the
development phase of the United Nations.
Developing Nationhood: The inception of the United
Nations, and the adoption of the Statute of Westminster
New Zealand had not originally been a strong supporter of the League of Nations,
but this situation had changed by the mid-1930s. Bill Jordan, Labour’s High
Commissioner in London, spoke passionately to the League Council in September
1937:
My nation is a small one; you may say, if you please, that it is
insignificant in size and perhaps in strength; but it will stand by the
Covenant and the policy of collective security in order to maintain peace,
or to restore it when it is broken, and to give safety to the people of our
generation.9
By 1938 however it was becoming clear that the League did not have the
authority to intervene meaningfully in the deteriorating international situation,
and that its mandate could not be fulfilled. Whilst the League, springing out
from the aftermath of the First World War, had failed, New Zealand was
determined to help ensure that its successor, the United Nations, developed in
the closing stages of the Second World War, would not.
In February 1943, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill sent his thoughts
on post-war security to US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, proposing the
creation of a world organisation for the preservation of peace. The following
month in a broadcast Churchill declared that he favoured the establishment after
the war of a world institution representing the United Nations (the wartime
coalition), and eventually to include all nations of the world.10
By August of that year the Americans had developed a set of proposals that
they wished to discuss amongst the Big Four—the United States, the Soviet
Union, Great Britain and China. On 21 August 1943 a conference was held at
Dumbarton Oaks outside Washington, DC, and the form of a United Nations
Organisation was established.11  It was over a year later when the draft proposal
was made more widely available, and it was considered by the Australia–New
Zealand meeting in November 1944. A number of resolutions were drawn up,
3
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which were approved by both Cabinets. New Zealand’s Prime Minister Peter
Fraser was concerned to ensure that small states could play an effective part in
the new organisation. At the San Francisco conference held in April 1945, at
which the final version of the United Nations Charter was drawn up, ‘the New
Zealand Delegation played a useful role quite disproportionate to the country’s
size’.12 This was to become the hallmark of New Zealand in the international
arena in subsequent years. As Sir Alister McIntosh observed:
New Zealand had become an active member of the middle and smaller
powers arraigned against the great, while staunchly advocating the
United Nations as the best means of securing universal peace and justice
and placing the fullest insistence on its organs for the solutions of
international problems. New Zealand’s chief concern, always, was the
peace-keeping role of the United Nations; hence its stubborn adherence
to the concept of collective security.13
Whilst New Zealand was a charter member of the United Nations,
paradoxically it was not yet a sovereign nation. Whilst Britain had enacted the
Statute of Westminster in 1931 in order to give complete independence to the
dominions of the British Empire, it was not to apply to the Dominions of
Australia, New Zealand or Newfoundland until adopted by their respective
parliaments. New Zealand had considered adopting the Statute during the Second
World War, as the Australians had done, but were concerned that it might send
the wrong message to the Germans. The Statute was finally adopted in 1947.
Even then, Frederick Widdowson Doidge of the National Party spoke out against
adoption, ‘“on grounds of sentiment”, noting that “loyalty to the Motherland
is an instinct as deep as religion”’.14
Developing Alliances: The ANZUS Pact, ANZAM and the
South East Asia Treaty Organisation
In 1949 the National Party was returned to power in New Zealand, and loyalty
to Britain and the Commonwealth remained paramount. It was with Britain and
Australia that defence planning was developed. New Zealand’s defence forces
held traditions that were inherently British, and new equipment for the armed
forces continued to be procured from Britain until the mid-1960s. The Royal
New Zealand Navy (RNZN) had only been formed in 194115  and a British admiral
remained in charge of the fleet in the 1950s. Up until 1960, at least one of the
three Chiefs of Staff was a British officer on secondment.16
ANZUS
However, the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula on 25 June 1950 was to
see a rapid development in New Zealand/US relations. New Zealand’s response
to a call from the United Nations for assistance in the conflict was to commit two
4
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frigates.17  As the situation continued to deteriorate, New Zealand decided to
commit ground troops despite there being apparent reluctance on the part of
Australia and Britain to do so. Nevertheless, Britain did announce on 25 July
1950 that it would send ground forces, and New Zealand made its offer that same
day.18  New Zealand forces were to remain in Korea well beyond the armistice
of July 1954, with a final withdrawal of troops in 1957.
At the time of outbreak of hostilities, there was still no official peace treaty
with Japan. The United States now saw this as an urgent issue to be resolved,
as it moved to halt the spread of communism in Asia.19 This wish provided
Australia and New Zealand with some negotiating power in their desire for a
formal defence alliance with the United States, and the Pacific Security (ANZUS)
Treaty was formally signed on 1 September 1951.20  A month before the war in
Korea began, Frederick Doidge, who was by now Minister of External Affairs,
opined, ‘I regard an American guarantee of our security as the richest prize of
New Zealand diplomacy’, though he added cautiously that, ‘in embarking on
any formal step in this direction we must be certain that we are not appearing
to be turning away from Britain’.21 This dual relationship with Britain and the
United States, tempered by New Zealand’s commitment to the United Nations,
continued to be central to New Zealand’s foreign and defence policy for the
following 33 years.
ANZAM
Notwithstanding fighting alongside the United States in Korea, the New Zealand
forces along with their Australian counterparts were part of a British
Commonwealth division. Traditional ties with Britain would continue throughout
the 1950s.
After the Second World War, the Australians had developed a Commonwealth
defence contingency plan known as ANZAM—The Anglo-New
Zealand-Australia-Malaya area. In 1955 New Zealand was to respond to its
responsibilities under ANZAM, when the British asked for support during the
Malayan Emergency. New Zealand promised to commit two frigates, a fighter
bomber squadron, half a transport squadron and a Special Air Service (SAS)
squadron. In announcing New Zealand’s support, Prime Minister Sidney Holland
commented that New Zealand needed to pull its weight ‘in the British boat …
That, is a British thing to do.’22 No. 14 Squadron RNZAF was withdrawn from
Cyprus in April 1955 to be based in Singapore, and they were re-equipped with
de Havilland Venoms leased from the British. The Squadron’s first offensive
action took place on 1 May when five of the Squadron’s original Vampires
attacked terrorist positions.23 The Squadron continued to fly until 1958, when
it was replaced by 75 Squadron which was equipped with English Electric
5
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Canberra bombers. These aircraft flew alongside no. 45 Squadron RAF until the
Emergency in Malaya ended in July 1960.24
The SAS squadron of 133 personnel was attached to the British 22nd SAS
Regiment early in 1956, and was replaced by the 1st Battalion, the New Zealand
Regiment consisting of 740 personnel. This in turn was replaced by the 2nd
Battalion in 1959.25
South East Asia Treaty Organisation
Whilst communist forces were becoming an increasing problem for the British
in Malaya, the United States in 1954 was concerned, especially after the events
of the Korean War, about the possibility of French defeat in Indochina, and a
communist regime being established. Emergency meetings of ANZUS were called
and the United States called for united action to support the French. Fortunately
a settlement was reached before the Americans could bring more pressure to
bear, but it highlighted the importance of collective defence for the region.26
New Zealand remained concerned that any collective treaty should include
Britain, and in the event it did. New Zealand became a signatory to the Manila
Treaty (the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty) along with Britain, the
United States, Australia, France, the Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand, on
8 September 1954. New Zealand was pleased that the South East Asia Treaty
Organisation (SEATO) would reinforce New Zealand’s connections with Britain
and the United States, along with the United Nations. Clifton Webb, the Minister
of External Affairs, commented: ‘The Treaty gives great emphasis to the prime
import of the United Nations as the principal body charged with maintaining
peace and security.’27 The connections with Britain and the United States, which
had taken New Zealand into action in Korea and Malaya in the 1950s, would
lead New Zealand into action again during the 1960s. Involvement on active
duty first came in 1962, when Bristol Freighters of no. 41 Squadron supported
SEATO’s response to communist insurgence on Thailand’s border. Engagement
with the region was about to expand considerably.
Collective Security in Action: Confrontation, and the
Vietnam War
The 1961 Review of Defence Policy spelt out clearly the importance of collective
security to New Zealand:
If our policy is one of collective security we must retain the confidence
and support of the countries on whose assistance we rely: these are
principally the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. To do
this we must join them in defending what they regard as their [sic] vital
interests as well as our own, and make the best contribution we can. …
New Zealand’s ‘area of primary strategic interest’ thus includes, as well
6
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as our more immediate neighbourhood the South Pacific Region, the
SEATO treaty area in South-East Asia.28
It was to be no time at all before that commitment was to be called upon.
Southeast Asia continued to be the focus of Government concern, and in the
White Paper the Government confirmed its plans for a greatly enhanced Army.
Presaging the Defence Policy Framework of June 2000, it said:
The Government has continued to place emphasis on ‘forces in being,’
but has decided to place greater emphasis on ground forces with adequate
provision for reinforcement, believing that this is the most appropriate
and useful contribution it can make in South-East Asia. It has therefore
given priority to the maintenance of fully trained regular ground forces and
the means of transporting them to possible theatres of operations. 29
When the period of ‘Confrontation’ between the newly formed State of
Malaysia and Indonesia reached crisis point in 1964, the New Zealand Army was
early on the scene. The 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment
became part of the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Group from August
1964 until August 1966. In 1965 and 1966 New Zealand SAS detachments served
once more with the British 22nd SAS Regiment. The Royal New Zealand Air
Force (RNZAF) deployed six Canberra bombers in September 1964, and the RNZN
crewed two British mine sweepers, which were commissioned into the RNZN
for 16 months from April 1965.30
Whilst New Zealand had readily committed forces in Malaysia, a request from
the United States to send forces to the growing conflict in Vietnam was met less
enthusiastically. As early as 1961 the observation had been made in Wellington
that ‘the vital issue for Australia and New Zealand was not to restore stability
in South Vietnam, but to preserve our position with the United States as our
major ally’.31
Cabinet eventually agreed in May 1963 to send a non-combatant field engineer
team, although it was a year later before they went. US President Lyndon Johnson
again asked New Zealand to commit further troops in December 1964, arguing
that he could not ask the American people to make sacrifices if its closest allies
in the area would not support them. Cabinet once more decided that it would
not contribute combat troops, and that its first priority was Malaysia.32  However,
by May 1965 Cabinet had approved the commitment of 161 Battery, Royal New
Zealand Artillery. Initially under American command, the Battery joined the 1st
Australian Task Force in June 1966. In May 1967 a small rifle company from the
1st Battalion was added, complemented by a second in December 1967, both
companies forming part of an ANZAC battalion.33
The commitment of the New Zealand Army to Vietnam was New Zealand’s
first expedition without British involvement, and spoke to the importance of
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the ANZUS alliance at the time. New Zealand troops remained involved in a
combat role until December 1971, and the first and second Army Training Teams
were withdrawn after the election of the Labour Government, in December 1972.
The New Zealand Army was supported throughout its time in Vietnam by
the RNZAF, with no. 40 Squadron deploying the first troops in July 1965. From
1968 until 1971 no. 40 Squadron ran weekly flights into South Vietnam,
eventually evacuating New Zealand Embassy staff during the fall of Saigon in
April 1975.34
Growing Independence: 1971–84
During the 1970s New Zealand’s international relationships underwent significant
change. Britain had already indicated that it would be withdrawing forces from
east of Suez, although the new conservative government of 1970 indicated that
Britain would retain a small presence. In anticipation of the British withdrawal,
the five nations involved in the AMDA (the Anglo-Malaysian Defence
Agreement)—Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore—entered
into the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) on 1 November 1971.35  At
the same time Britain was in the final stages of negotiation for entry into the
European Economic Community (EEC).
The following year a new White Paper was released which spoke of the need
to take account of ‘the changes apparent in the last few years in the policies and
attitudes of New Zealand’s major allies, the United States, Britain, and
Australia’.36  It went on to add:
The keystone of New Zealand’s security since 1952 has been ANZUS ...
the ANZUS Treaty is basic to New Zealand’s defence policy. In the
changing international situation, it is more than ever desirable that the
signatory states work, individually and collectively to enhance the
reciprocal benefits deriving from the treaty.37
Within weeks, the Third Labour Government came to power, intent on
establishing a new sense of New Zealand independence. It did not initiate a new
defence review, but acting on its election manifesto withdrew the final troops
from Vietnam, and ended National Service.38  In proclaiming the Government’s
new position, Prime Minister Norman Kirk said:
New Zealand for its part intends to follow a more independent foreign
policy. It has emerged from the phase in its national development where
it allowed its policies to be determined by the views and interests of its
most influential ally: at one time Britain, more recently the United States.
From now on when we have to deal with a new situation, we shall not
say, what do the British think about it, what would the Americans want
us to do? Our starting point will be, what do we think about it?39
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As if to emphasise this renewed independent spirit, the Labour Government
established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.40
At the same time there was determined opposition to French nuclear testing
in the Pacific. The French had begun atmospheric tests in French Polynesia in
1966, and the Labour Party indicated that it would ‘run up the New Zealand
flag’ on a frigate and take it to Mururoa Atoll to protest.41  In 1973 Prime Minister
Norman Kirk said: ‘What we want to do is publicise what is happening in this
remote part of the world so as to stimulate world opinion still further and attract
wider support for the rights of small nations.’42
New Zealand and Australia had both protested to the International Court of
Justice, and they joined together to protest in the Pacific, with HMNZS Otago
and the Australian tanker Supply sailing together to Mururoa. HMNZS Otago
stayed on station for three weeks, relieved by HMNZS Canterbury which stayed
for another two.
To reinforce its opposition to nuclear weapons, the Government in 1975
promoted a resolution at the United Nations which called for the development
of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.43 This was to be achieved a decade
later when eight South Pacific countries signed the South Pacific Nuclear-Free
Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985.44
However, by this time explosions of a different kind had occurred, as changes
in New Zealand’s foreign and defence policy changed significantly the nature
of longstanding relationships with its major ally the United States. Whilst the
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty allowed for the transit of nuclear weapons
and port visits in the area, the policy of the Labour Government, elected in 1984,
did not.
1984: ANZUS and Beyond
Walter Nash had spelt out a vision in 1958, during the term of the Second Labour
Government, which was to be pursued a quarter of a century later, by the Fourth
Labour Government: ‘We stand for the suspension of nuclear tests, a complete
ban on further production of nuclear weapons and the destruction of existing
stocks with facilities for inspection in all fields by agreement by the powers
concerned.’45
Bill Rowling speaking at the Labour Party annual conference in May 1982
said that ‘nuclear weapons will not be allowed into New Zealand ports under a
Labour Government, and that’s the message’.46  In June 1984 Labour MP Richard
Prebble introduced a private member’s bill into Parliament calling for the
prohibition of nuclear weapons. On 13 June 1984 Marilyn Waring, a National
MP, crossed the floor to support the bill. Although the bill was defeated, Prime
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Minister Robert Muldoon claimed he could no longer command a majority and
called a snap election.47
At the time of the election, 58 per cent of the population opposed visits by
nuclear-powered ships and Labour had promised to ban both nuclear-propelled
and nuclear-armed vessels.48  David Lange had argued for a review of the Party’s
wish to ban nuclear-powered vessels, fearful of the impact on the relationship
with the United States if both nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels were
banned. He commented:
Shutting out their nuclear-powered ships for the same reasons we shut
out their nuclear weapons seemed to be offering an unnecessary affront
to the Americans. If we continued to lock propulsion and weapons
together and did not distinguish them, I was not sure how I could
persuade the United States of the essential rationality of our policy.49
The argument, however, was not to be won. Nonetheless, David Lange was
keen to ensure that the essence of the ANZUS Treaty should remain, convinced
that Labour could not fight the election successfully if the future of ANZUS was
to be called into question. Bill Rowling, now foreign affairs spokesman, offered
a solution to the controversy surrounding ANZUS: ‘The Labour Party should
fight the election on an undertaking to seek a review of the ANZUS alliance. …
[seeking] to broaden the scope of the ANZUS Treaty.’50 This was seen as an
option that would be easily accepted by those within the party who saw the
importance of ANZUS to the electorate. Labour fought the election with a promise
to ensure a nuclear-free New Zealand and to renegotiate the terms of association
with Australia and the United States. Labour won, though the new Prime
Minister, David Lange, acknowledged that the nuclear-free policy was not
decisive.
In January 1985 the United States requested that the USS Buchanan be allowed
to visit New Zealand. As the vessel was capable of carrying nuclear weapons
the request was declined, and New Zealand asked that the United States substitute
a Perry-class frigate. Lange was later to comment: ‘It was our policy to make the
attempt to reconcile what proved to be irreconcilable, but when a choice had to
be made between ANZUS and the nuclear-free policy I advised my cabinet
colleagues to give the nuclear-free policy precedence.’51 The United States
would not agree to the substitution and the visit did not proceed. Whilst Lange
was to say in the same month as the USS Buchanan crisis that ‘our commitment
to ANZUS and the broader Western community remains firm’,52  the United
States was to subsequently withdraw from most of its military and intelligence
cooperation with New Zealand.
Although the Australian response was initially cool, the Australian
Government indicated that it did not wish to see the trans-Tasman relationship
10
Timing is Everything
affected by the dispute. The 1987 Defence Review highlighted very clearly the
continued and growing importance of the trans-Tasman relationship.53  It is
against this background of strained and changing relationships that the first
case study, the ANZAC ship project, is set.
The Fourth Labour Government was to lose the 1990 election, but by this
time, although the electorate had firmly turned against Labour, it had nonetheless
embraced New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy: ‘In 1989, when it was getting hard
to find anyone who’d admit to being a Labour voter, over eighty percent of the
population declared themselves to be in favour of the nuclear-free policy. …
There wasn’t any going backwards.’54
Through the 1990s and into the Twenty-First Century
In the 1991 Defence White Paper, The Defence of New Zealand, the new National
Government sought to move New Zealand towards a defence strategy of
‘Self-Reliance in Partnership’:
Before the election we signalled that New Zealand’s defence policies were
too isolationist in their thrust and that we would bring New Zealand
back to its correct place in the international community. This statement
of defence policy sets out my Government’s commitment to an
internationalist approach to New Zealand’s foreign and defence policies
rather than a purely regional outlook.55
Jim Bolger, now Prime Minister, was determined to see New Zealand’s
relationship with the United States improve, and took that sentiment with him
when he went to New York in September 1991 to address the United Nations
General Assembly. Afterwards he was to have a private meeting with US
President George H.W. Bush, at which the issue of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear
stance was discussed. At the meeting Bush said that he would ‘soon be making
an announcement that would help the New Zealand problem’.56  Four days later
the United States announced that it intended to remove all nuclear weapons
from surface naval vessels. The next day, the British followed suit, and British
naval vessels would once again visit New Zealand waters. This was not, though,
to become the case with the United States.
Two years later Bolger was to speak with US President Bill Clinton, this time
at the 1993 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, held in November
in Seattle, Washington. Notwithstanding Bolger’s own observation to Clinton
that the Somer’s Committee on Nuclear Propulsion had concluded that essentially
nuclear-powered vessels were safe, he noted that there had been no change in
the public’s attitude towards nuclear-propelled ships. Public opinion was to
ensure that New Zealand’s anti-nuclear legislation remained intact. Although
Clinton undertook to have officials review the presidential directive on nuclear
ships, US policy also remained unchanged.
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In 1993 New Zealand was to take its place on the world stage, having been
elected to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in October 1992. Amongst
the reasons cited for New Zealand’s success in the election were the nation’s
consistent support for collective security; its significant contribution to
peacekeeping operations; and its independent voice—characteristics which had
been developed over more than half a century.57 The significant contribution
to peacekeeping was about to grow during New Zealand’s term on the UNSC.
Following the end of the Cold War, there was optimism for a time that the
world was entering a new era of peace. That optimism was ill-founded as ethnic
conflicts erupted around the globe. Europe saw the greatest conflict since the
end of the Second World War, as the former Yugoslavia disintegrated. In March
1994 the United Nations approached New Zealand informally to request that
combat troops be sent to Bosnia. There was significant public debate on the
issue, and senior defence officials and foreign policy advisors disagreed publicly
about whether troops should be sent.58  However, wishing New Zealand to be
seen as a good international citizen re-engaging with the international community,
the National Government committed New Zealand peacekeepers to the conflict
area. When 250 New Zealand troops arrived in the former Yugoslavia in
September 1994, their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Graeme Williams
described the deployment of Kiwi Company as ‘the largest number of troops in
one deployment that the Government has committed to active service since the
Korean War of the 1950s’.59
By May 1995 public support for New Zealand troops to be involved in United
Nations peacekeeping operations had increased, with 78 per cent of those polled
indicating support.60  It was also apparent, however that peacekeeping was an
increasingly dangerous activity. The 1997 White Paper noted the changing
nature of peace support operations. The history of peacekeeping for over 40
years had been one requiring lightly-armed forces, usually deployed at the
agreement of both parties to a conflict. During the 1990s this situation changed,
and the White Paper acknowledged this:
Since the end of the Cold War, however, peace missions have increasingly
been launched during hostilities. The consent of the warring parties has
been neither complete nor continuous. These peace enforcement missions
are a higher-order task than peacekeeping as they involve conventional
high-intensity operations.61
Recognising the dangers involved, the Government committed to equipping
the defence forces for their task:
The Government’s first priority will be to rectify the most critical
deficiencies in those capabilities where there is more likely to be a need
12
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in the short term, that is re-equipping the Army so that it can undertake
the more demanding peace support operations.62
The New Zealand Army was to be committed to a significantly demanding
peace support operation sooner than might have been anticipated at this time.
In September 1999, New Zealand hosted the APEC summit. Events close to home,
in East Timor, were to dominate the agenda. Initially it had been thought that
East Timor would be a side issue at the meeting, but by the time Clinton arrived
the stakes had increased. Clinton had warned that if the violence in East Timor
did not end, Indonesia ‘must invite—it must invite—the international community
to assist in restoring security’.63  At first New Zealand had considered sending
a company of about 120 troops, as part of an international force, but ultimately
a battalion group was committed, working alongside the Australians in a highly
demanding environment. This was to be a much larger commitment than that
made in Bosnia and, with six rotations of a battalion group, almost 3500 Service
personnel were committed to the East Timor operation from 1999–2001.64
Resources and manpower were stretched to the limit, and shortcomings in
equipment—the lack of a logistic support ship and poor reliability of the
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) among them—highlighted once more the
difficulties facing the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), and the importance
of planning for new acquisitions.
The New Zealand Government changed once more in 1999, with a Labour-led
coalition coming to power. The importance of peacekeeping was highlighted by
the Labour-led Government when it was elected in 1999, and a new approach
to defence was one of the Labour Party’s key priorities. In its Defence Policy
Framework, the Government in June 2000 spelt out the importance of
peacekeeping to New Zealand’s role in the world:
The Government considers peace support operations are important for
maintaining security and stability. New Zealand will make as full a
contribution to such actions as is reasonably possible. We will continue
to base our global engagement on active support for, and participation
in, United Nations and appropriate multi-national peace support
operations.65
The new Government’s policy was to have a significant impact almost
immediately on decisions made about all of the acquisitions under consideration;
no further frigates were to be purchased; HMNZS Charles Upham was to be sold;
the F-16 lease was to be cancelled, as was Project Sirius; and the number of light
armoured vehicles (LAVs) to be purchased was to be increased. The events
surrounding each of these decisions will be explored in detail in the following
chapters.
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Overview of Chapters
Chapter 1 introduces the book and provides a background context for the case
studies. Chapters 2–7 focus on the six case studies chosen for analysis. Chapter 2
explores the process that led to the decision in 1989 to purchase two ANZAC
frigates. The choice of the ANZAC frigates was controversial and caused much
public discussion and debate. What lay behind the choice of the ANZAC frigates?
Why did a Labour Government pursue the purchase of further frigates, when
the defence policy of the previous National Government indicated that
alternatives to frigates should be explored?66 What were the alternatives and
why were they not pursued? Now that New Zealand has two in service, what
are the tangible benefits that can be identified?
Chapter 3 examines the events surrounding the acquisition of HMNZS Charles
Upham. The agreement in 1994 to purchase the heavy lift ship HMNZS Charles
Upham was not originally surrounded by public controversy, but was the subject
of long delays, and subsequently became headline news. What factors were
taken into account in the final decision-making process? Once the vessel had
been bought, why were adequate funds for its conversion not made available?
Chapter 4 reviews the second and third ANZAC frigate decision-making
processes of 1997 and 1998. Having committed to the purchase of two ANZAC
frigates with an option to purchase two more, why, when strong arguments
were made that a minimum three frigate force was necessary to fulfil New
Zealand’s policy requirements, was the subsequent decision made not to purchase
even a third vessel?
Chapter 5 explores the events surrounding the controversial decision to
pursue the opportunity to lease F-16 strike aircraft from the United States, at a
time when no such plans had been signalled in previous defence reviews. The
first 14 of the RNZAF’s major maritime strike and ground support aircraft, the
A-4K Skyhawks, were originally purchased in 1968, and entered service in 1970.
Notwithstanding the significant sums that were spent to upgrade both the
airframe and the avionics of the aircraft, it was clear by the 1990s that the aircraft
would need to be replaced by 2007 at the latest. However, the decision to lease
the F-16s was made some eight years prior to this deadline. How did the decision
to lease the F-16s in 1999 come about—and how was the decision to abandon
the lease made?
Chapter 6 explores the P-3 Orion upgrades. The P-3 Orions have been an
essential part of New Zealand’s maritime patrol capability for many years now.
Why and how have these aircraft continued in service for so long? What has
influenced the decisions which have been made about upgrading them to
maintain their viability? In particular, what led to the cancellation of Project
Sirius (the plan to significantly upgrade the anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capability of the aircraft), and how was the decision taken to develop the current
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new suite of avionics? The chapter recounts the early upgrade under Project
Rigel, and the re-winging of the aircraft under Project Kestrel. It then goes on
to analyse the events leading up to the decision taken by a National-led
Government to proceed with Project Sirius; the subsequent events leading to
the Labour decision to cancel the project; and then finally analyses the processes
which led to the decision to upgrade the aircraft’s sensor and avionics equipment
under Project Guardian.
Chapter 7 reviews another controversial decision—taken in August 2000 by
a Labour-led Government—to buy 105 LAV IIIs. Whilst capital expenditure in
the Army has been significantly less than in the other Services, the sums spent
remain considerable. Nevertheless, it was apparent from deployments to Bosnia
and East Timor, among others, that the Army was facing an equipment crisis.
When it came to reviewing armoured equipment needs, what led to the purchase
of the LAV III armoured vehicles? What alternatives were considered, and why
did the Army have some of their most pressing needs met when, some would
argue, the other two Service branches did not?
Chapter 8, the Conclusion, draws together the observations arising from the
case study chapters. It answers the following questions:
• What conclusions can be drawn from the case studies examined in detail in
this book?
• What can be learned about the way defence decision-making is undertaken
in New Zealand?
The Policy Framework
Before moving on to the case studies themselves, it is appropriate to briefly set
out the framework within which defence acquisition recommendations are
developed and then actioned.
The major actors involved in defence decision-making processes are the
Minister of Defence and his Cabinet colleagues, the Secretary of Defence and
staff of the Ministry of Defence, and the Chief of Defence Force and appropriate
staff from each of the three Services. The Acquisition Division of the Ministry
of Defence is responsible for the acquisition of equipment for the three Services
of the NZDF. Following receipt of a ‘user requirement’ developed by the NZDF,
the Division takes responsibility for seeking Government approval, develops
and prepares the strategy for acquisition, and undertakes the tendering and
evaluation process. Once the equipment has been acquired, the Division manages
the acquisition through the delivery and warranty period.67
Defence policy-making and defence decision-making have in the past been
challenged by the relatively rapid pace of change of personnel involved, both
politicians and senior bureaucrats. Whilst in the United Kingdom there were 22
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Ministers of Defence during the 40 years after the Second World War,68  New
Zealand saw 11 Ministers of Defence in the 20 years after 1972. Over that period
there were also six changes to the Chief of Defence Staff/Chief of Defence Force,
and five changes of Secretary of Defence.69  In the past 10 years there have been
four Ministers of Defence, three Secretaries, and four Chiefs of Defence Force.
As the actors have changed over time so also have the processes and the
framework. The Fourth Labour Government made wide-sweeping changes to
the structure and function of many parts of the Public Service during the years
after it gained office. Separating policy advice and purchasing from daily
management of services was central to its philosophy, and Defence was subject
to scrutiny just as were other elements of the public sector.70  Derek Quigley
and the other directors of Strategos Consulting were commissioned at this time
to undertake a Defence Resource Management Review, which was published on
4 December 1988. In commenting on the Review, the Ministers of Finance and
Defence noted: ‘1989 will see the beginning of substantial changes in the Ministry
of Defence. … Resource Management in the Ministry of Defence has to be
improved.’71 The recommendations of the Strategos Report were to abolish the
Defence Council; to separate policy from operations; and to have the Ministry
of Defence responsible for the former, and the NZDF responsible for the latter.
Those recommendations were implemented in 1989. Some 12 years later Jane’s
Defence Weekly was to comment:
The resulting structure rather than separating operations from policy,
as was the intention, has left both institutions without the resources to
fully carry out their respective functions, while at the same time
providing two conflicting streams to the government.72
The ‘two conflicting information streams’ were to come rudely to public
attention during the debates over the acquisition of the LAV III, and these events
among others were to lead the Government to call for a review of accountabilities
and structural arrangements between the Ministry of Defence, the NZDF and
the three Service arms.
When the review, to become known as the Hunn Report, was published in
September 2002, it recommended a number of significant changes, not least that
the two arms be re-established as a single organisation. The Review noted:
‘Neither of these organisations has been working effectively. The NZDF has been
riven with internal dissention.’73
Despite the clear recommendation for a single organisation, the Government
decided against it. Minister of Defence Mark Burton indicated that changes had
already been made to help achieve a greater degree of ‘jointness’ between Services
and between agencies. He advised that steps would be taken to ensure that




System (DPS). The aim of the DPS was to ‘enable [the] CDF [Chief of Defence
Force] and Sec Def to provide high quality advice to Government in respect of
funding choices for investment in the NZDF’.76  Rolfe raised the prospect of the
DPS providing greater certainty for planners, reducing the need for White Papers
being written to try and match funding and policy. In the event, the DPS never
functioned comprehensively because it was ‘too complex and not use-friendly’.77
Despite ongoing attempts to revive the DPS, it ultimately failed.
The DPS was replaced by the Capability Management Framework, approved
on 22 April 2004. It allowed for the development of two new bodies—the
Executive Capability Board (comprising the Secretary of Defence and Chief of
Defence Force) and the Integrated Capability Management Committee (adding
second tier staff).78  Linked with the Defence Long-Term Development Plan
(LTDP), first released in 2002 and updated regularly, the Capability Management
Framework
is a governance and management system designed to support Defence
and Government decision makers in developing effective, long-term
investments in defence capabilities. It provides clarity in responsibility,
accountability and process for defence policy development, capability
definition and acquisition through to the introduction into service and
the disposal of capabilities.79
The LTDP is described as
a planning tool to enable decisions on defence acquisitions to be taken
in the context of the Government’s defence policy, the priority of projects
and affordability … The LTDP has a role in forward focus over 10 years
and was constructed as an active document, to be updated regularly.80
There have been four updates of the LTDP to date. Of the case studies analysed
in this book, the P-3K Orion upgrade is the only one to fall within the orbit of
the LTDP.
Conclusion
For over more than half a century New Zealand has been developing an
increasingly independent voice in foreign and defence policy. This chapter has
outlined the development of New Zealand’s modern defence and foreign policy
history, and has sketched out how the policy process works within a
contemporary setting. Having established some fundamental aspects of New
Zealand’s approach, the following chapters move on to explore the acquisition
decision-making process and impinging factors in detail. The implications of
changes of government, and changes in policy, public opinion and the
international security environment, as well as other external pressures, and the
part played by individual actors, among others, will be considered as each case
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study is analysed and as the book moves towards developing a greater
understanding of defence decision-making processes.
Whilst the planning process in Defence has been reviewed and refined in
recent years, and the Defence Policy and Planning Unit was reported as having
improved coordination in the planning process, this is but one element in the
acquisition decision-making process.81 The following chapters explore in detail
the range of elements which impact on those processes.
ENDNOTES
1 Text of New Zealand Prime Minister Michael Savage’s address, broadcast 5 September 1939, Dominion,
6 September 1939, cited in Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the
World since 1935, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1993, p. 33.
2  McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935, p. 46.
3  Major G.J. Clayton, The New Zealand Army: A History from the 1840s to the 1990s, New Zealand Army,
Wellington, 1990, p. 114.
4  Sir Alister McIntosh, ‘The origins of the Department of External Affairs and the formulation of an
independent foreign policy’, in New Zealand in World Affairs: Volume I, 1945-1957, New Zealand
Institute of International Affairs, Wellington: 1991, p. 21.
5 W. David McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares for War, University of Canterbury Press, Christchurch,
1998, p. 239.
6 McIntosh, ‘The origins of the Department of External Affairs and the formulation of an independent
foreign policy’, p. 22.
7 McIntosh, ‘The origins of the Department of External Affairs and the formulation of an independent
foreign policy’, p. 23.
8 John C. Beaglehole, ‘The Development of New Zealand Nationality’, p. 8, cited in McKinnon,
Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935, p. 55.
9 William Jordan, speech at the 98th Session of the League Council on 16 September 1937, cited in
McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares for War, p. 164.
10  E. Luand, A History of the United Nations, St Martins Press, New York, 1982, p. 20.
11  Martin Gilbert, A History of the Twentieth Century, Volume Two: 1933-1951, Harper Collins, London,
1998, p. 605.
12 McIntosh, ‘The origins of the Department of External Affairs and the formulation of an independent
foreign policy’, p. 25.
13 McIntosh, ‘The origins of the Department of External Affairs and the formulation of an independent
foreign policy’, p. 26.
14  Frederick W. Doidge, cited in W.D. MacIntyre, ‘Peter Fraser’s Commonwealth’, in New Zealand in
World Affairs, Volume 1, 1945-1957, p. 68.
15  R.J. McDougall, New Zealand Naval Vessels, GP Books, Wellington, 1989, p. 4.
16  I.C. McGibbon, ‘The Defence of New Zealand 1945-1957’, in New Zealand in World Affairs, Volume 1,
1945-1957, pp. 147–48.
17  Clayton, The New Zealand Army: A History from the 1840s to the 1990s, p. 133.
18  F.L.W. Wood, ‘New Zealand Foreign Policy 1945-1951’, in New Zealand in World Affairs, Volume 1,
1945-1957, p. 105.
19  Alan Burnett, The A-NZ-US Triangle, Strategic Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National
University, Canberra, 1988, p. 5.
20 McGibbon, ‘The Defence of New Zealand 1945-1957’, p. 159.
21  Frederick W. Doidge, cited in Burnett, The A-NZ-US Triangle, p. 7.
22 Sidney Holland, cited in McGibbon, ‘The Defence of New Zealand 1945-1957’, p. 169.
23  Matthew Wright, Kiwi Air Power, Reed Books, Auckland, 1998, p. 134.
24  Geoffrey Bentley and Maurice Conly, Portrait of an Air Force, Grantham House, Wellington, 1987,
pp. 140–45.
19
Introduction—The Policy Background and the Policy Framework
25  Clayton, The New Zealand Army: A History from the 1840s to the 1990s, pp. 139–40.
26  McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935, p. 125.
27 T.C. Webb cited in McKinnon, ‘From ANZUS to SEATO’, in New Zealand in World Affairs, Volume 1,
1945-1957, p. 138.
28 Review of Defence Policy 1961, Government Printer, Wellington, 1961, p. 4.
29 Review of Defence Policy 1961, p. 6. My emphasis
30  Matthew Wright, Blue Water Kiwis, Reed Books, Auckland, 2003, p. 185.
31  Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS (61) M.46, 14 December 1961, 478/4/6 cited in Roberto
Rabel, ‘Vietnam and the Collapse of the Foreign Policy Consensus’, in Malcolm McKinnon (ed), New
Zealand in World Affairs Volume II 1957-1972, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington,
1991, p. 44.
32  McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935, p. 156.
33  McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935, p. 156; and Clayton,
The New Zealand Army: A History from the 1840s to the 1990s, p. 141.
34 Wright, Kiwi Air Power, p. 146.
35  Ian McGibbon, ‘Forward Defence: The Southeast Asian Commitment’, in McKinnon (ed), New Zealand
in World Affairs Volume II 1957-1972, p. 34. Whilst in the years immediately after its inception its
future value was to be questioned, the FPDA endures some 37 years later, with significant annual
exercises taking place with the military involvement of all five nations. See James Rolfe, Anachronistic
Past or Positive Future: New Zealand and the Five Power Defence Arrangements, CSS Working Paper
no. 4/45, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, Wellington; ‘Flying Fish 2003’, Air Force
News, no. 40, August 2003, pp. 24–25; ‘Five Power Defence Partners operating together’, Navy Today
93, October 2004, pp. 4–5; and ‘HMNZS TE KAHA’, Navy Today 137, October 2008, pp. 26–27.
36 Review of Defence Policy 1972, p. 3.
37 Review of Defence Policy 1972, p. 16.
38  James Rolfe, Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships, Institute of
Policy Studies, Wellington, 1993, pp. 58–59.
39 New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, June 1973, p. 7; cited in McKinnon, Independence and Foreign
Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935, p. 185.
40  Steve Hoadley, The New Zealand Foreign Affairs Handbook, Second Edition, Oxford University Press,
Auckland, 1992, p. 19.
41  Kate Dewes and Robert Green, Aotearoa/New Zealand at the World Court, The Raven Press,
Christchurch, 1991, p. 11.
42  Norman Kirk cited in Dewes and Green, Aotearoa/New Zealand at the World Court, p. 7.
43  Helen Clark, ‘New Zealand’s Non-Nuclear Initiative’, in Ranginui Walker and William Sutherland
(eds), The Pacific: Peace, Security & the Nuclear Issue, United Nations University, Tokyo, 1988, p. 178.
44  Michael Hanel-Green, ‘The Rarotonga South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone Treaty’, in Walker and
Sutherland (eds), The Pacific: Peace, Security & the Nuclear Issue, p. 93.
45 Walter Nash, cited in Dewes and Green, Aotearoa/New Zealand at the World Court, p. 9.
46 Evening Post , 12 May 1982, cited in McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the
World since 1935, p. 279.
47  David Lange, my life, Viking, Auckland, 2005, p. 165.
48  McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935, p. 282.
49  David Lange, Nuclear Free—The New Zealand Way, Penguin Books, Auckland, 1990, p. 33.
50  Lange, Nuclear Free—The New Zealand Way, p. 35.
51  Lange, my life, p. 205.
52  Richard Kennaway and John Henderson, Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s,
Longman Paul, Auckland, 1991, p. 68.
53 Defence of New Zealand, Review of Defence Policy 1987, Government Printer, Wellington, 1987,
pp. 14–17.
54  Lange, Nuclear Free—The New Zealand Way, p. 161.
55 The Defence of New Zealand 1991, A Policy Paper, GP Print Ltd, Wellington, 1991, p. 5.
56  Jim Bolger, A View From The Top, Viking, Auckland, 1998, p. 149.
20
Timing is Everything
57 New Zealand in the Security Council: 1993-94, Information Bulletin no. 52, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Wellington, March 1995, p. 4.
58  John Crawford, In the Field for Peace: New Zealand’s contribution to international peace-support
operations: 1950-1995, New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, 1996, p. 62.
59  Paul Bensemann, ‘The War with no Enemy’, NZ Defence Quarterly, Summer 1994, p. 2.
60  UMR Insight Limited, Ministry of Defence Quantitative Summary, Wellington, April 1995, p. 3.
61 The Shape of New Zealand’s Defence, A White Paper, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, November
1997, p. 27.
62 The Shape of New Zealand’s Defence, A White Paper, Ministry of Defence, p. 8.
63 New Zealand Herald, 11 September 1999.
64  John Crawford and Glyn Harper, Operation East Timor: The New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor
1999-2001, Reed Books, Auckland, 2001, pp. 177–211.
65 The Government’s Defence Policy Framework, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, June 2000, p. 4.
66 Defence Review 1983, Government Printer, Wellington, 1983, p. 23.
67 The Ministry of Defence website, available at
<http://www.defence.govt.nz/about-us/divisions/acquisition.html>, accessed 4 November 2008.
68  Margaret Blunden, ‘British Defence Decision Making; the Boundaries of Influence’, in Margaret
Blunden and Owen Greene (eds), Science and Mythology in the Making of Defence Policy, Brasseys Defence
Publishers Limited, London, 1989, p. 211.
69  Rolfe, Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships, p. 21.
70  Jonathan Boston et al, Reshaping the State: New Zealand’s Bureaucratic Revolution, Oxford University
Press, Auckland, 1991.
71  Hon. D.F. Quigley, New Zealand Defence, Resource Management Review 1988, Strategos Consulting
Limited, Wellington, 1988, p. 1.
72  Phillip McKinnon, ‘New Zealand reviews defence structure’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 26 September
2001, p. 10.
73  Don K. Hunn, Review of Accountabilities and Structural Arrangements between the Ministry of Defence
and the New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, 30 September 2002, p. vi. The implications of this
comment shall be explored more fully in relation to the acquisition of HMNZS Charles Upham, the F-16
decisions, and the LAV IIIs.
74 New Zealand Herald, 27 March 2003. See Appendix 1 for the respective listing of responsibilities.
75  Rolfe, Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships, p. 57.
76 Force Development Processes, Defence Planning System, First Edition New Zealand Defence Force,
Wellington, 23 November 1994, p. 1.
77  Report of the Controller and Auditor-General, Ministry of Defence: Acquisition of Light Armoured
Vehicles and Light Operational Vehicles, Ministry of Defence, Wellington, August 2001, p. 59.
78  Report of the Controller and Auditor-General, Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force:
Further report on the acquisition and introduction into service of Light Armoured Vehicles, Ministry of
Defence, Wellington, December 2004, p. 32.
79 Statement of Intent of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Te Ope Kaatu o Aotearoa, for the year
ending 30 June 2005, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF), Wellington, 3 May 2004,
p. 38.
80 Defence Long-Term Development Plan, Update, November 2004, p. 3.
81 Army News, no. 298, 21 October 2003.
21
Introduction—The Policy Background and the Policy Framework

Chapter 2
The ANZACS, Part 1—The Frigate that
wasn’t a Frigate
As long ago as 1954 the cost of replacement frigates had been an issue. Almost
a quarter of a century later, the 1978 Defence Review made the observation that
‘the high costs of acquiring and maintaining modern naval ships and systems
compounds the difficulty of reaching decisions which will adequately provide
for New Zealand’s future needs at sea’.1  Indeed ‘extensive enquiries to find a
replacement for HMNZS Otago made it clear that the cost of a new frigate had
gone beyond what New Zealand could afford’.2 This observation led to the
serious consideration of converting the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) to a
coast guard service, but the Government rejected the notion on the basis that,
although a coast guard could carry out resource protection tasks, it would mean
the end of any strategic relationship with our ANZUS Treaty partners, and the
RNZN would no longer be able to operate as a military force. The Chief of Naval
Staff, Rear Admiral Neil D. Anderson, said that the New Zealand Government’s
commitment to maintaining a professional fighting navy was ‘a magnificent shot
in the arm for everyone in the Navy’.3
The Government remained committed to a compact multi-purpose navy, and
calculated that a core operational force of three ships would be the minimum
necessary force. These ships were to be the Leander-class frigates HMNZS Waikato
and HMNZS Canterbury (commissioned in 1966 and 1971 respectively), and the
older Type 12 frigate HMNZS Otago. The fourth existing frigate at the time,
HMNZS Taranaki (a type 12), was to undertake the roles of resource protection
and basic sea training. There was some concern though about the sort of vessel
that would ultimately replace the Otago and how and when that replacement
should happen. In May 1979 a project review team, led by Commander Somerford
Teagle, examined a wide range of vessels. One of these, an American frigate,
would have met every requirement set out in the Defence White Paper, but even
in 1979 it was priced at NZ$400 million, and therefore ruled out. Consideration
was then given to purchasing rejuvenated British frigates at a cost of NZ$44
million each, before plans were submitted for the possible conversion of Taranaki,
Waikato and Canterbury late in 1979.
A decision on frigate replacements was expected to have been made before
the end of 1979, but was deferred in February 1980, with a request from the
Government to the Ministry of Defence to explore further options. Later that
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year the Government decided not to replace the ageing Otago, rejecting the
RNZN’s replacement proposals for the second time in a year.
It was the British defence review of 1981 which allowed the possibility of a
‘bargain buy’ which helped resolve the issue for at least a decade. The decision
was made to purchase two Leander-class frigates, HMS Dido and HMS Bacchante,
which dated from the early 1960s. This allowed the naval combat force to remain
with a core of four operational vessels, albeit with oil-fired boiler power. The
Minister of Defence, David Thomson, commenting upon the purchase said: ‘In
the existing financial circumstances it was plainly necessary to seize any
opportunity to acquire effective operational part-life vessels as an alternative to
the purchase of a new ship.’4 Whilst there was concern expressed that this
would lead to the RNZN facing block obsolescence in the early 1990s, the
Government nevertheless concluded a deal in October 1981. Bacchante was
transferred to New Zealand in October 1982 and renamed HMNZS Wellington,
but did not enter service until mid-1986. Dido was refitted in Southampton and
transferred to New Zealand as HMNZS Southland in December 1983.
Public concerns about the cost of defence had heightened significantly by
the beginning of the 1980s, and the Government was keen to consider novel
ways of reducing the costs involved in maintaining a combat fleet. The 1983
Defence Review reinforced the findings of the previous Review that a reduction
in capability to a coast guard role was not acceptable, and that a combat force
should be maintained.5  However, fiscal concerns were to the fore, and the
Government’s dilemma about a future replacement for the frigates was clearly
spelt out in the Review. Because of the political and economic implications
surrounding the frigate replacement question at the time, and the debate which
has ensued for over two decades since, it is worthwhile quoting fully from the
Review to highlight Government thinking at the time:
The frigate’s main attraction lies in its flexibility of employment and its
ability to offer a graduated range of responses in varying circumstances
particularly in times of tension short of war. New Zealand’s frigates have
been configured essentially as anti-submarine escorts best suited to
operations within a fleet environment. They are however versatile and
will give scope for deployment on a wide range of duties for the rest of
their operational life. Given the range and capability of modern weapons
and sensor systems, frigates could remain a viable combat force option
for New Zealand into the indefinite future—if the financial problems of
providing them with an effective self-defence capability and for their
eventual replacement could be overcome. However, at this time there
appear no realistic prospects of the future defence budget being able to
accommodate the costs that would be involved. Financial considerations
alone therefore demand consideration of an alternative force structure for
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the Navy. The period during which the present frigate force is available
must accordingly be used to determine a new operational concept for
the RNZN.6
The novel solution that was being explored at the time was to introduce a
fleet of submarines; they were seen potentially as being cheaper to introduce
and to operate than the frigate force. Robert Miles, an outspoken and passionate
defence commentator, called MP Doug Kidd’s suggestion that the RNZN become
a submarine force ‘misguided’. He went on to roundly criticise the concept,
drawing attention to the limited utility of submarines for the range of roles the
RNZN was expected to fulfil. Instead, he suggested that New Zealand expand
its naval patrol force with the purchase of ships such as the British Castle-class
offshore patrol vessels.7  He would not be the only one to make that suggestion.
Initial investigations suggested that a submarine might cost NZ$140 million,
rather than the NZ$240 million cost for a new frigate. However, the plan never
did proceed; further evaluation indicated that it was not as cost effective an
option as originally thought, and the project was finally cancelled by the Labour
Government in February 1985.8
The Impact of the Fourth Labour Government, and the
Frigate that wasn’t a Frigate
As previously discussed, the election of the Fourth Labour Government and the
subsequent ‘nuclear ships’ dispute led to the need to review defence policy. The
ANZUS dispute had become the major controversy of the decade, and left the
Labour Party with the question of the future direction of defence policy. To
help inform this next step, the Government convened a Defence Committee of
Enquiry in 1985, the first time that a New Zealand Government had sought out
public opinion on defence planning.9 This Committee was to hear public
submissions and report on public attitudes towards strategic and security issues.
The report and its recommendations were to be taken into account in the
preparation of the anticipated 1986 Defence Review.10  Public debate and
controversy surrounded this period, and the question of frigates was to the fore
once more.
Another discussion paper, An Alternative Defence Policy, put forward by the
Peace and Justice Forum in March 1985, challenged the need for frigates and
also supported the purchase of the Castle-class vessels,11  and this
recommendation was reinforced by the ‘Just Defence’ submission to the Defence
Committee of Enquiry in February 1986.12  Such sentiments were echoed by the
Labour Party’s Wellington regional conference, held in May 1986, when it passed
two remits calling for the adoption of a civilian-based defence policy, and the
replacement of the frigate fleet by smaller boats suitable for fisheries protection.13
25
The ANZACS, Part 1—The Frigate that wasn’t a Frigate
Early in 1987 the debate heated up. The Australian Chief of Naval Staff, Vice
Admiral Michael Hudson, was in New Zealand meeting top Navy and Defence
officials during February. The 23 February issue of the Evening Post carried a
story stating that ‘the New Zealand Navy is considering joining Australia in a
frigate deal as part of a long-term plan to replace New Zealand’s ageing vessels’.
It went on to say that ‘one frigate type of particular interest was a light patrol
vessel with ocean-going capabilities’. The report brought a sharp rebuke
immediately from the New Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange, which was
reported in the Dominion the following day. Lange criticised by inference the
Secretary of Defence, Denis McLean, commenting:
The prospect is that we have a vessel, drummed up with Australia,
providing exactly what we need. But it won’t be a frigate.  … It is
unfortunate that there has been the impression gained, from certain
statements in certain quarters, that we are in the frigate business. We
are not in the frigate business.14
The report went on to say that defence specialists suggested that Lange was
talking about a frigate hull, but without the high-tech installations of a fully
fitted frigate, perhaps to appease the peace groups who were becoming
increasingly vociferous in their opposition to any replacement for frigates. It
was further suggested that replacing the frigates with patrol boats would have
meant the end of a blue-water role for the RNZN, but that Lange’s comments
made it clear that the Government intended to maintain a blue-water capability.
The 1987 Defence Review was published two days later, on 26 February 1987.
In the introduction to the 1987 Review, emphasis was placed on the
comprehensive nature of the review of defence policy which had taken place
since the Labour Party had come to power and introduced New Zealand’s
nuclear-free legislation. As a result of the ending of the security relationship
with the United States, greater emphasis was to be placed on the importance of
New Zealand’s relationship with Australia:
The New Zealand—Australia defence relationship has always been close
and remains a key element in New Zealand’s defence strategy. Defence
cooperation is one of the strands of the evolving trans-Tasman
relationship that also covers political, commercial and personal links.
The ANZAC military ties have a long and honourable history. … The
withdrawal of United States military cooperation with New Zealand has
made our defence relationship with Australia more important, but it has
not substantially changed its nature.15
The importance of this relationship was underscored with a clear
acknowledgement that New Zealand forces needed to be trained and equipped
to operate jointly with Australian forces, and that:
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The security of either New Zealand or Australia would be at severe risk
if the other was seriously threatened and it is inconceivable that a joint
response would not be forthcoming. For both security and military
reasons, as well as economic and political considerations, we need to
maintain our close defence relationship with Australia.16
The central defence objective of developing greater self reliance and working
closely with Australia to meet the defence needs of the region was clearly stated.
Some joint developments and purchasing had already begun to take place, with
the setting up of identical defence communications networks in both countries,
the purchase of an artillery field gun, and the potential purchase of new rifles
which would be manufactured in Australia. None of these, though, were on the
scale envisaged in the involvement of New Zealand in the planning and potential
purchase of the ‘Australian Ocean Combat Ship’.
The Labour Government had two clear and interlinked objectives—the
development of naval capability, with the replacement of the surface combatants;
and the development of the relationship with Australia. With the tenor of the
times, neither objective was going to be easy to achieve.
The Defence Review highlighted the importance of maintaining flexibility in
New Zealand’s naval forces. It confirmed that there was a longstanding need for
replacement of the current frigates, and pointed to working together with the
Australians to see ‘if a mutually acceptable and cost-effective ship can be
constructed which will meet both countries’ needs’.17 Two weeks later, the
Australian Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, was reported as saying that a
blue-water navy with a capacity to contribute significantly in the area of
submarine warfare was seen as an essential ingredient in the trans-Tasman
relationship: ‘Provided those capabilities are maintained … the co-operation
between our two countries will be close.’18  Significantly, the new vessels were
being called ‘new surface combatants’ in the official title of the Australian
project—supporting Lange’s insistence that New Zealand would not buy any
more frigates. John Henderson, at the time Head of the Prime Minister’s
Department, emphasised that great care was taken in those early stages to avoid
the term ‘frigate’ completely.19
The press release by Lange on 15 July 1987 confirmed the Government’s plan
to proceed with the projected replacement of the frigates during the 1990s.
Notwithstanding this confirmation, the same month the International Defence
Review drew attention to the political atmosphere in New Zealand, which it
suggested could seriously obstruct the procurement of any warships. It quoted
one source ‘close to the programme’: ‘The Prime Minister needs educating,
although that’s the New Zealand Navy’s job, not ours. Even “frigate” is a dirty
word there, and to be politically acceptable the ship will have to be called
something like an “ocean surveillance vessel”.’20  However, the descriptive term
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could not be avoided, and when Beazley released a statement on the project in
July, he welcomed the New Zealand announcement to join Australia in buying
a ‘new class of frigate’.
Initial estimates gave an indicative figure of up to NZ$300 million as the
sail-away cost for each of the first two ships delivered. Opposition to the frigates
closely followed the announcements, with Just Defence concerned that the
Government had not seriously considered cheaper non-frigate alternatives, again
mentioning the Castle-class patrol vessel. Sylvia Bagnall, its spokesperson, said
that at, a total cost of $1 billion, New Zealand would get four frigates designed
to suit Australia’s and not New Zealand’s needs.21 The following week the
Minister of Defence, R.J. Tizard, responded to clarify aspects of the project in
the light of the criticisms that were being reported:
Since we have no defined enemy, we need vessels that can perform the
functions of the various roles we see for ourselves. These include
maintaining a role in the South Pacific and building co-operation with
Australia. Contact and co-operation with Pacific Island countries is
paramount, as is protection of our own economic zone and help to Pacific
Island countries to do the same. Obviously an increased search and rescue
response will be a very significant part of our contribution.
There is a certainty that we will have these roles. By contrast there is no
certainty our ships will have to perform a wartime function. They must
have that capacity of course, but their use for most of their lifetime will
be in the roles set out above. That may not be how the Australians see
their ships’ role.22
The Minister’s words were carefully crafted, emphasising those roles that
would be most politically acceptable at the time. Jim Anderton, the new Chair
of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, was only too well aware of the issues
involved in upgrading the Defence Forces. Anderton drew attention to the
trade-offs involved:
Now that the nuclear policy is in place, the reality is that we are going
to have to bear the cost. There is a cost, and if we are to carry on with
any kind of conventional forces, we’re going to have to give them the
wherewithal.23
The trade-offs and controversy were only just beginning.
Evaluating the Alternatives
Paradoxically perhaps, the anti-nuclear policy of the Labour Government
provided the greatest opportunity in many years for the purchase of new ships
for the RNZN. The commitment to maintaining a blue-water navy and to ongoing
cooperation with Australia, that was to be spelt out in the 1987 Defence Review,
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ensured that the New Zealand Government took seriously the opportunity to
purchase ships jointly with the Australians. Whilst the South Pacific was
intended to be the major focus for Defence, the Government did not wish to see
New Zealand distanced from its closest ally. A Defence Review Officials Committee
had been exploring the possibilities for surface combat ship replacements
throughout 1986, and published their report in November of that year. They
noted that, as a consequence of ongoing close liaison between the navies of each
country, it was found that ‘the independently desired ship characteristics for
the RAN new Surface Combatants and the RNZN Replacement Combat Ship are
virtually identical’.24  (See Appendix 2, Ship Characteristics.) The Review
Committee indicated that significant operational and logistical advantages would
be possible if New Zealand and Australia were to select a common design. They
went on to say that, in collaboration with the RAN, two options had been
identified. The first was to pursue a joint program based on building all of the
ships in Australia. The second option was to pursue a cooperative program where
New Zealand would have ships built to the same design, but in the country of
origin. To pursue the first option, they advised, it would be necessary to sign
a Memorandum of Understanding by mid-1987. The Memorandum of
Understanding was subsequently signed on 6 March 1987, noting that the
Australian Government was seeking eight new Surface Combatants, and that
New Zealand would have an option to purchase two, with the possibility of a
further two at a later stage.25
The Review Committee had noted that the cost of the vessels was likely to be
up to 30 per cent more if they were built in Australian yards, yet felt that the
net benefit to Australia was such that the Australians could be expected to offset
the cost penalty to New Zealand. Notwithstanding this observation, the
Committee also noted that it was likely that potential European shipbuilders
might offer a package that was more fiscally attractive, and that therefore
building the ships in their country of origin was the most likely option.
Nevertheless, they recommended proceeding with the first option in the interests
of closer relationships with Australia, and to provide the maximum opportunity
for New Zealand industry involvement. The Memorandum of Understanding
recognised this dilemma, and was crafted in such a way that it allowed for New
Zealand participation up to the stage of selecting the design and shipbuilder
evaluations. At that point New Zealand could choose whether it wished to
proceed with the acquisition of the ships. This allowed for significant
opportunities for New Zealand to be involved in the choice of design and for
potential New Zealand industry involvement. It also allowed the opportunity
for a significant period of public debate about the acquisition itself. These two
elements developed alongside each other in an unparalleled fashion which was
to impact significantly on the decision-making process. At stake were political
futures; the nature of the trans-Tasman relationship; developments for New
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Zealand industry; and the future shape of the RNZN. The ‘Frigate Debate’, as it
became known, was of such significance that it shall be examined separately in
a following section.
The Review Committee’s observations
In developing its report, the Review Committee took the opportunity to look
broadly at what ships or designs were available at the time which might meet
the need of the RNZN to fulfil the tasks required of it. It reviewed a range of
vessels which would give an indication of a cost/capability balance, looking at
vessels which ranged from 1000–4000 tonnes, from Offshore Patrol Vessels
(OPVs) to Destroyers. It commented on a UK Ministry of Defence review which
examined an initial 13 OPV proposals, and narrowed that down to three—the
Skeandu, 84 metres; VT (Vosper Thornycroft) Mk19, 78 metres; and Yarrow OPV
at 95 metres. It noted that all three could be offered as ‘stretched’ versions at 90
and 91 metres for the first two, with the Yarrow OPV being available at 101, 105
and 115 metres. On the grounds of inadequate capability (having made the
observation that the minimum length to allow sufficient space for a hangar for
helicopter maintenance as well as adequate space for weapons and sensor
separation was approximately 110 metres), the Review team rejected the notion
of all of the OPVs with the exception of the Yarrow 115 metre OPV III. This ship
it considered alongside those falling into the Corvette/Light Frigate category.
The ships in the Corvette/Light Frigate category which they examined were
the Yarrow 115 metre OPV III; Vosper Thornycroft Mk 18; ‘M’ Type
(Netherlands); and F2000 (France). From this group of four, they noted that there
would be no compatibility of weapons systems on the French ship with those
in service with the RAN, and that, as the Yarrow OPV had been designed to
merchant ship standards, the vessel would not have the same survivability as a
conventional warship, yet would cost as much. The Review Committee also
looked at two larger vessels—the Yarrow Type 23 Frigate and the Vosper
Thornycroft Type 21, but felt that both vessels exceeded the capability
requirements of the RNZN, and were too costly.
Proposals to the Joint Project Management Team
Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, a Joint Project
Management Team was set up in the Australian Department of Defence. Twelve
proposals were initially received by the team, including three which had been
reviewed by the RNZN. These 12 designs were the ‘M’ Type (Netherlands); Meko
200P (Germany); F2000 (France); the Italian Maestrale; Type 23, (Yarrow and
Swan Hunter); Type 122 (Germany); City-class frigate (Canada); a modernised
Leander (Vosper Thornycroft); Nordkapp ‘coast guard frigate’ (Norway);
Ulsan-class frigate (Korea); and an airship proposal from Airship Industries. A
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reduced Type 122; Light Patrol Frigate, (Yarrow); Light Frigate, (Hall and Russell);
and FFG-7, (Unysis Corporation) were also proposed.
In September a supplement to the original Memorandum of Understanding
was signed, spelling out in greater detail the Collaborative Project Management
Arrangements.26  (That same month the New Zealand Labour Party’s Annual
Conference voted for withdrawal from the frigate project.) By October three
designers had been selected to develop their designs further; these were Royal
Schelde of Holland for the ‘M’ Type; Yarrows Shipbuilding for the Type 23; and
Blohm and Voss for the Meko 200P. It was indicated by the respective Ministers
of Defence that the three had been chosen from a total of 19 who had responded
to the request for proposals, and that two of the three would be chosen to join
consortia to bid for the tendering of the ships by March 1988. Later that month
the Ministers announced that the 13 groups who had registered in the project
would be invited to reconsider their original plans; and that from the final
proposals two consortia would be invited to tender for the ships to be built in
Australia.
By the end of 1987 the designs had been narrowed to two—the Type ‘M’
and the Meko 200. Blohm and Voss had not only paired with Australian Marine
Engineering Corp (Amecon), based at Williamstown in Victoria, to build the
Meko 200, they had purchased a 25 per cent shareholding. Royal Schelde
meanwhile had paired with Australian Warship Systems (AWS), based at
Newcastle in New South Wales. Both consortia presented their tenders to the
Department of Defence on 19 January 1989, with an expectation that the
successful bidder would be announced in August. New Zealand would at that
time make its decision on whether or not to proceed with the project.
The Frigate Debate
The potential purchase of the ANZAC frigates was possibly the most strongly
debated defence purchase of the century, generating significant public discussion
and media coverage. It was clear almost from the outset of the frigate debate
that the Government was intent on maintaining a blue-water capability, just as
their predecessors had determined in 1983 and 1978. ‘One key point is clear: as
an island nation we need a navy,’ said the Minister of Defence in a December
1988 discussion paper.27 What was less clear was what form of vessel would
replace the frigates and form the core of the RNZN’s capability. At the centre of
the debate were arguments about cost and utility. Members of the peace
movement, politicians and service personnel, both serving and retired, produced
a plethora of articles.
This debate about the frigates raged throughout 1988 and 1989, quickening
pace as it went along. Members of the peace movement and others opposed to
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the frigate purchase were quick to raise their concerns, whilst the New Zealand
Government seemed slow to rebuff its critics.
Lieutenant Commander David Davies (a retired RN and RNZN officer) was
strongly critical of the Government’s stance, and wrote a lengthy paper arguing
against the frigate purchase, fundamentally on the basis of their lack of utility
for New Zealand’s needs.28  He argued that the current four frigate force had
been used in much the same way as frigates had been used throughout the 1950s,
1960s and 1970s, with an emphasis on overseas deployments and very little time
on active service in New Zealand.29 With the introduction of a new Fisheries
Act in 1976, New Zealand had indicated its intention to declare a 200 mile
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and, through his experience as Fisheries Controller
at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Davies felt certain that the resulting
1.4 million square miles of ocean had inadequate protection. Furthermore, he
suggested it never could have as long as the deep-sea navy consisted of four
frigates. His concern centred on reports that he had received from several
different sources about the illegal activities of longliners fishing north of the
Kermadecs. If these reports were accurate, he suggested, this activity would lead
to significant depletion of stocks of juvenile fish:
I am very strongly of the opinion that the deep-sea resources of the EEZ
are not only under threat but are under attack and have been from the
earliest days of the declaration of the 200mile Exclusive Economic Zone.
I would also speculate that unless we get our defences in place to combat
this situation very soon, irreparable damage will be caused.30
Davies was concerned that the RNZN should have sufficient vessels, of
sufficient capability, to ensure adequate protection of New Zealand’s EEZ, and
to undertake the other tasks spelt out in the 1987 Defence Review. He suggested
that six ships was the smallest possible working group, and discounted any
meaningful role for the Lake-class patrol boats which were still nominally in
Navy service at the time.31 Whilst not specifying the type of vessel which would
best meet New Zealand’s needs, he suggested specifications which were similar
to a well equipped OPV.
When the arguments against the ANZAC frigates were put forward by the
peace movement, they drew attention to the highly sophisticated nature of the
proposed vessels. ‘What you see here is a very sophisticated modern warship,
one of the most sophisticated armaments in the world today,’ is how David Knox
of the Meko 200 consortium described their proposed ship.32
In August 1988 Peace Movement Aotearoa published its case against the
frigates. They highlighted that the issue should not just be seen as a military or
Government spending issue, but also as a moral issue. They reflected the feeling
that few in the Labour Government supported the project, and that if the project
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went ahead it would be ‘purely for short term political reasons’, and that ‘most
of the pressure is coming from the Australians whose shipbuilding industry is
operating under-capacity and who are keen to build a defence export industry’.33
The cost of the project was viewed as preposterous when spending was being
squeezed in so many other crucial areas, and this was seen as the biggest single
reason for not proceeding with the purchase. The point was carefully made that
Treasury had emphasised that the need to reduce the deficit should take financial
precedence over other Government objectives, and quoted an Evening Post
editorial which had asked: ‘Can the Government seriously be contemplating
expenditure of nearly $2 billion, or more, at a time when gas reserves are being
sold off to pay off part of the national debt?’34 The RNZN was attacked for
driving the project for historical reasons—a continuing wish for an
anti-submarine capacity and an ANZUS role, and for pushing through a project
‘they know isn’t reasonable’.35
Peace Movement Aotearoa proposed a new concept navy, based also on six
ocean-going vessels—two multi-purpose support ships, and four resource
protection ships. Whilst it did not specify that these should be Castle-class
vessels, they did comment that the approach from the Whangarei Engineering
and Construction Co. to the Ministry of Defence, indicating that it had the
capacity to build the Castle-class OPVs, should have been taken more seriously.
They also suggested that the RNZN’s priorities should be completely re-assessed,
and that the current emphasis on anti-submarine warfare training be replaced
by training for tasks which were actually needed. The following month, the
Labour Party’s Dunedin conference rejected the ANZAC ship program, and in
October a Heylen poll conducted for the television program Frontline indicated
that 76 per cent of the population was against the frigate deal.
The Government was slow to respond to criticism, but in October Tizard
indicated that the Government was serious about the project, and that from then
on criticism would be met with a Government publicity campaign. He began
this himself with a presentation to the Tawa Rotary Club in November. Here he
commented that the project had been very much in the media spotlight over the
previous six months, and that it had been ‘subject to an intense, emotional
campaign by the New Zealand peace movement’.36 Tizard wished to take the
opportunity to ‘blow the logic back into the debate’.37  He went on to summarise
the reasons for the purchase of the ANZAC frigates, highlighting the block
obsolescence of the Leanders, and the requirements of the 1987 Review. In
addition to the baseline characteristics, he emphasised the ‘fitted for, but not
with’ weapons capability of the vessels, which would allow for ‘equipment such
as anti-ship missiles, towed array sonar, and close-in weapon systems (to) be
fitted later if circumstances demand’.38 Tizard emphasised that the frigates
would come with an adequate level of equipment to protect themselves in low
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threat environments, responding to critics who had expressed concern that the
vessels would have insufficient self-defence capabilities. Echoing his comments
of the previous year, he once more stressed the resource protection, disaster
relief and search and rescue, and the low-level military roles of the vessels,
adding: ‘If these ships never fire a shot in anger, then I shall be pleased, because
throughout their lives these vessels will be busy performing peacetime roles.’39
Peace Movement Aotearoa and others had been highly critical of the cost of
the frigates, but the Prime Minister sought to put the deal in perspective at a
press conference in November 1988:
Now I believe that people will gradually get the whole thing into context
when they recognise that there is going to be no whipping out there and
asking for $2 billion. That it is accommodated within the vote. That at
the maximum projection it reaches $100 million a year. Now we are
spending about $16.9 billion—not million, but billion dollars a year—on
health, education and social welfare.40
Alexander Fry, the Assistant Editor of the New Zealand Listener also sought to
give some sense of proportion to the debate when he commented:
Aggregating the expenditure on ships over 20 years and coming up with
a figure of $2 billion is itself a cheap shot. We could do the same for
education ($60 billion in twenty years) and frighten ourselves off
education. The fact is that New Zealand spends less on defence than most
developed countries. Nobody wants to increase that dramatically, so we
need intelligent debate before the final decision on ships is made.41
The debate was set to continue. The publication in December 1988 of New
Zealand Defence, Resource Management Review (which was to become known as
The Quigley Report) saw another step taken in the process of major state sector
reforms, which were the hallmark of the Fourth Labour Government. Whilst
many of the reforms suggested were focused on structural and fiscal concerns,
opportunity was nonetheless taken to comment on the ANZAC frigate proposal
The ANZAC ship project is seen by Australia as a litmus test of New
Zealand’s commitment to the trans-Tasman relationship. But in our view,
this project involves much more than a decision to purchase or not to
purchase frigates. The Australians have made it clear that if New Zealand
opts out of the project, this will be regarded as raising questions not
only about our defence credibility but about our overall commitment to
closer relations with Australia generally. Failure to purchase the frigates
will be interpreted by the Australians as an unwillingness on New
Zealand’s part to play a credible role as a defence partner in the region
and signal that we are in the process of withdrawal from the ‘community
of friends’. It will also be interpreted as a clear sign that we are not
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prepared to recognize that Australia is itself prepared to pay a substantial
price in monetary and non-monetary terms to ensure that New Zealand
remains a credible defence partner. The ‘price’ which Australia is
prepared to pay has already been extended to a commitment that New
Zealand will not find comparable ships which cost less from other
sources.42
Also in December 1988, the Minister of Defence released a discussion paper
which provided a clear critique of previous defence planning. It drew attention
to the exaggerated view previously held of the direct threat to New Zealand,
and the lack of planning for more likely contingencies. It highlighted equipment
weaknesses in each of the services, and the lack of logistical resources needed
for regional operations. As the paper discussed the specific requirements for the
replacement of the frigates, it highlighted one of the biggest dilemmas facing
the Government—that of specification: ‘On the face of it our requirements are
simple. For most of the situations New Zealand ships might expect to face the
question of “threat” does not arise.’43  Much criticism had been raised about
the level of equipment with which the ships were to be fitted, driving the price.
The Minister squarely raised the question of what self-defence capabilities were
appropriate, pointing to the RNZN’s recommendation for specifications close to
those of NATO vessels; however, he indicated that the New Zealand Government
would pursue a lesser specification. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the
vessels would have to be suitably equipped to take account of the possibility
that they might be used in coming to the defence of Australia. The tenor of the
times was reflected in the Minister’s careful use of language: ‘The question of a
military role for these ships is not an easy area for public discussion.’44
Nevertheless, the Minister once again spelt out the Government’s commitment
to maintaining New Zealand’s naval forces so that the country could make a
contribution to international security, and would not limit the RNZN to the role
of coastguard:
That is not the Government’s intention. Current defence policy is founded
on a wider regional view of New Zealand’s defence interests and
responsibilities. The decision to take the coastguard route would be
difficult to reconcile with those commitments. In some circumstances it
could prevent the use of New Zealand ships in situations where they
were needed.45
Fears about the possible roles for the ships, and the possibility that they
might draw New Zealand back into the ANZUS alliance remained strong, as did
the opposition to the ships from within the Labour Party. The same month as
the Minister released his paper, the Labour Party president, Ruth Dyson,
commented that ‘buying the frigates is not inevitable’,46  and later that month
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the Party was reported to be working on a package which would outline a range
of cheaper alternatives to the Government.
The debate about the frigates continued to rage into 1989. The year began
with a major seminar in Wellington, hosted by the Pacific Institute of Resource
Management. Terence O’Brien, at the time Assistant Secretary at the Ministry
of External Relations and Trade, ended his presentation thus:
My conclusion is simply that the case for alternatives has not yet really
been made. The case for proceeding along the road that the Government
set two years ago remains undisturbed in terms of hard-nosed NZ national
and external interests.47
Kevin Hackwell from Just Defence responded in his presentation:
In his paper, Mr O’Brien stated that for anyone to argue for an alternative
ship to the ANZAC frigate they would first have to rewrite the 1987
Defence White Paper …
It is Just Defence’s belief that an accurate reading of the White Paper
leads inevitably to the conclusion that New Zealand should be buying
alternative ships that are very different from the ANZAC frigates.48
It was the case that the baseline characteristics approved by the Labour
Cabinet on 15 July 1987 provided for a significantly higher level of capability
than had been intended by the White Paper.49 The baseline specifications set
for the frigates to be acquired by New Zealand were exactly the same as those
earlier set by the Australians for their own frigates:50
New Zealand requirements could not be said to have been arrived at
independently. Mr [Frank] O’Flynn agreed, pointing out that as the
Minister of Defence who had signed the Memorandum of Understanding
with Australia, he had had no control over the provision of baseline
characteristics for the New Zealand ships.51
David Lange couched his observations about the ships specifications quite
carefully when he addressed the 73rd Dominion Council Meeting of the Returned
Services’ Association on 12 June 1989:
I think it is fair to say that the ANZAC design is toward the higher end
of the spectrum envisaged by the 1987 White Paper. … We set out in
the 1987 Review the sort of characteristics we had in mind. … It is no
secret that we originally expected to end up with something more like
a patrol boat.52
The Australians, however, were determined that New Zealand would not end
up with just patrol boats.
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What’s in a name?
External sources of influence were quite apparent when it came to New Zealand
narrowing down the alternatives, and deciding whether it would pursue the
opportunity to join the Australians for the ‘Australian Ocean Combat Ship’
option. Those influences were both subtle and not so subtle, impacting from the
time of the naming of the project, through to New Zealand’s decision to proceed
with purchasing two ANZACS:
The glorious name of ANZAC (Australia–New Zealand Army Corps) of
WW1 and WW2 fame has been adopted for the programme, despite
perhaps being incongruous for a naval project, in that it is a traditional
symbol of virtually all forms of military co-operation between the two
countries.53
In June 1989, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian
National University published a paper by former New Zealand Defence Secretary
Denis McLean, and Desmond Ball, at the time Head of the SDSC, titled simply
The ANZAC Ships.54 They also sought to draw on the ANZAC connection in
their support for the joint project:
The ANZAC connection is, in terms of its breadth, intimacy and
longevity, a rare phenomenon in the modern world. … But a common
cultural heritage overlapping geostrategic interests and a long tradition
of close cooperation in the defence field mean that it would be folly
radically to diverge in our regional defence policies and military
programmes.55
The peace movement was not impressed:
It’s clear why the name ‘ANZAC’ was chosen for the new frigates. It’s
easier for the Navy to appeal to sentimental, backward-looking
associations with past wars rather than think through what a real role
in the South Pacific would mean today.56
Rear Admiral David Campbell was Secretary to the Australian Chief of Naval
Staff at the time, and recalls the emphasis accorded to the ANZAC connection:
Minister Kim Beazley was very keen in the early days of this project that
NZ should be involved, and the more the better. He was of the view that
every encouragement and assistance should be given to NZ to remain
fully engaged in regional defence. All sorts of bad vibes were seen as
coming from NZ after the ANZUS split. CNS knew full well from his
political master that he had to exercise as much influence over his RNZN
counterpart as possible. I recall special pressure being placed in the
lead-up to and the conduct of the inaugural Western Pacific Naval
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Symposium in ’86. Part of the pressure was the selection of the name of
the ship class.
Naming ships in the RAN is a very serious business. There is a Ships’
Names Committee whose secretariat sifts and sorts the many hundreds
of submissions that come in each year. Ship Associations are the most
vociferous but ideas come from city councils and individuals as well.
The Committee also looks after ships’ badges and other naval heraldry.
The new frigates attracted their share of nominations and Tribal and
Bathurst class were prominent, after their WW2 and Korean forebears.
In the end, CNS (Vice Admiral M.W. Hudson) personally decided on
Anzac. Not only was she an honoured name in the RAN (with two
predecessors) but there was very powerful symbology in the New Zealand
connection and that, I believe, was uppermost in CNS’s mind. (All of
which, I’m bound to say, was against the expert and earnest advice of
his Secretary, who urged Tasman. There had been an earlier ship of that
name and the same NZ connection was there. Better, indeed, since it was
a maritime connection and not just a khaki, Army thing. The Secretary
still sulks over the decision. Naming ships is a very serious business
indeed.)
In the event, the name was well received in NZ. But it’s interesting that
it was such a calculated thing. I don’t know whether in fact it had any
influence on the NZ decision, but it was certainly hoped and intended
that it would.57
Admiral Hudson commented;
I cannot recall the precise date on which the term ‘ANZAC’ was made
public, but its origin lay in a single cross Tasman telephone conversation
between RADM Doug Domett and myself. We needed some symbolism
that this would be a truly joint project and I suggested ‘ANZAC’ as one
that politicians on both sides would be hard put to ignore. He agreed
immediately and, as we anticipated, it was quickly taken up. This
possibly was the easiest part of the whole project.58
Whether the naming of the project did or did not have any influence on the
decision, Australian politicians were determined that they would have.
Throughout the two and a half years leading up to New Zealand’s decision
about whether to sign up to the ANZAC shipbuilding program, the Australians
made it very clear that they wanted New Zealand involvement. As previously
indicated, Kim Beazley made it apparent at the time of the release of the 1987
White Paper, that if New Zealand expected close cooperation with Australia it
needed to maintain its blue-water and anti-submarine warfare capability.
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In June 1988 Senator Gareth Evans reinforced the need for New Zealand to
maintain its capability; ‘New Zealand has to decide whether it wants the common
security defence relationship with Australia. If it wants it, it’s going to have to
bring something worthwhile to that relationship.’59 That something, as it turned
out, was expected to be the purchase of up to four ANZAC frigates.
Whilst there were many denials of apparent Aussie bullying (‘Senator Denies
Australian Pressure Over Frigates’ read a headline in the New Zealand Herald),60
the leaking of a Cabinet paper to the press in November 1988 made clear what
the Australians expected:
The Anzac ship project, as Mr Beazley’s own pet project, is something
he is determined to see come to fruition. In Mr Beazley’s view the region
required the protection of a frigate force of some 20 ships. … Without
New Zealand’s help Australia would be three or four ships short of this
essential requirement. For these reasons Beazley stressed that Australia
was willing to ‘go overboard’ to ensure that New Zealand got the ships
at a price it could afford.61
Apart from the additional naval capability that the ANZAC ship project
promised, the addition of a nominal extra four ships made the unit cost per vessel
much more attractive for the Australians, who were determined to redevelop
their ailing shipbuilding industry: ‘In announcing the programme, the Australian
Minister for Defence, Kim Beazley, described it as “the largest naval shipbuilding
programme in Australia’s peacetime history” and commented that “the navy is
offering the salvation of Australia’s shipbuilding industry”.’62
For reasons of both regional security and domestic politics, Australia wished
to ensure that New Zealand committed to the project. Perhaps this was another
reason why Australia was willing to ‘go overboard’. John Henderson commented:
‘I worked a lot with Beazley’s office. Beazley was determined we’d have four
frigates. Why was he so keen? Because it was make-work for the Australian
shipbuilding industry.’63
That same day in November 1988 that the Cabinet paper was leaked, David
Lange was reported in the Evening Post as saying that New Zealand could not
‘decouple’ its security interests from those of Australia. He went on to say that:
there was no ‘real, practical, logical alternative’ to the joint Anzac frigate
building programme. If New Zealand was to withdraw from its joint
commitment to Australia, it would ‘tear apart the fabric of a relationship
built up over the years that covers everything from politics, law and
business to a whole mass of personal and family ties’.64
Earlier that day at a post-Caucus press conference, when asked if it was
inevitable that New Zealand would be buying from Australia, the Prime Minister
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replied: ‘Now as I’ve said before, we won’t be buying anywhere else and I have
the view that we will be buying ocean combat vessels from Australia.’65
The first two issues of the New Zealand International Review in 1989 contained
a total of five articles, putting both sides of the issue—and again the question
of alternatives was raised.66  So what were the other alternatives?
The Other Alternatives
The alternative that had perhaps had most press space by the beginning of 1989
was the Castle-class, having been suggested by Robert Miles in 1983, and by
Just Defence since 1985. This class of offshore patrol vessel had been designed
for the Royal Navy, to provide a ship capable of resource protection, policing
Britain’s 200 mile EEZ. The first of class, HMS Leeds Castle, was completed in
1981. Together with its sister ship HMS Dumbarton Castle, the vessel quickly
saw active service in the Falklands War, being despatched there in April 1982.
The vessels gained a reputation for excellent sea-keeping, and an ability to
embark helicopters in rough conditions. They were 81 metres long, and displaced
1630 tonnes. Maximum speed was 19.5 knots, with a range of up to 10 000 miles.
Whilst the original vessels did not have hangars for helicopters, the
manufacturers indicated that design provision had been made for hangar space.
Just Defence made much of their relative cost and capability when comparing
them with the ANZAC frigates, citing the Whangarei Engineering Company
managing director Kelvin Hardie giving a price of about NZ$40 million for
construction (admittedly without weapons systems), as opposed to NZ$500
million for an ANZAC frigate.67
The suggested alternative of the Castle-class was given short shrift by the
Minister of Defence. In a press release issued in July, Tizard was again on the
offensive, saying that the RNZN had never considered the Castle-class as
replacements for the Leanders. They had been considered as replacements for
the Lake-class patrol vessels prior to the development of the 1987 White Paper:
The reference to the Navy wanting to purchase or build Castle class
patrol vessels is based on information that was produced prior to the
1987 White Paper. ... What it comes down to is the Castle class vessel
was a contender for the patrol craft and nothing else. ... The 1987 White
Paper did not include a strong priority for replacement patrol craft so
funding for it was never sought in the indicative capital equipment
plan.68
The following month Captain Ian Bradley (Ret.) sent a letter to John Matthews,
the Managing Director of Technic Group—an engineering firm in New Plymouth
which was keen to see new vessels built in New Zealand—responding to a request
for comment on the Castle-class. He compared it to the IS-86, a Danish designed
ship which had by now entered the fray, championed by Harry Duynhoven,
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Labour MP for New Plymouth. ‘Either of these ships could have a role in the
RNZN’, commented Captain Bradley. Duynhoven had been intent to see that the
IS-86 was chosen.
In March 1989, two months after the tenders for the ANZAC frigate project
had been delivered, Peter Glente, the managing director of Svendborg Shipyard
in Denmark visited New Zealand. Subsequently he wrote to Gerald Hensley (at
that time in the Prime Ministers’ Department) offering details of his firm’s
frigate—the 4000GRT (subsequently referred to as the IS-86). This was a vessel
of 112 metres, with a displacement of 3500 tonnes, and a top speed of 21.4 knots.
It had a large helicopter deck, hangar and a double skinned hull designed for
breaking ice up to a metre thick. The vessel was offered at an indicative price
of NZ$70 million, or on very favourable finance terms.
Glente made the point that four such ships had been ordered by the Royal
Danish Navy, and the first would go to sea trials the following year. His letter
was forwarded on to Tizard, to whom Glente subsequently wrote on 5 April
1989. By this time Svendborg had made contact with Duynhoven who was on
holiday in Europe, and had persuaded him to visit the shipyard. Duynhoven
returned in time for the central North Island Labour conference in Wanganui
on 9 April, and helped ensure this conference voted against the ANZAC frigate
proposal. He said:
I believe we can get ships that can easily do what we require for New
Zealand, and that are completely capable of coping with the seas, that
are quite similar in size to the frigates, for less than $100 million.69
The Government was unmoved, with the Minister of Defence responding in
May to a letter from John Matthews requesting a meeting, by saying that there
was no good reason for having a meeting at that stage, and emphasising that the
review of potential ships had been closed some two years previously. This
response was reinforced by the Prime Minister the following month in a written
reply, when he wrote: ‘I would not at this point wish to pursue your offer to
build “any type of frigate you require” here in New Zealand.’70  Unwilling to
take ‘No’ for an answer, the Danes sent a delegation in July, with Glente, and
Captain Niels Ottesen of the Royal Danish Navy, but Lange still remained
unmoved, once more ‘pouring cold water’ on the idea. Lange commented that
the proposal could pass quite a high degree of commercial and technology risk
on to the New Zealand Government, and he was also critical of a number of
purported technical deficiencies with the vessel. Not to be deterred, Matthews
wrote an open letter to the New Zealand Government on 20 August 1989, and
on that same day Duynhoven also wrote to all Cabinet members, urging them
to once more consider the IS-86. Duynhoven worked hard to use political
influence to help shape a change in the decision-making process, but to no avail.
David Lange made that very clear:
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Once we got the word that the frigates were the price of Australian
goodwill, it became a matter of extracting the best possible deal. We
mused publicly about alternative purchases. We acted coy about making
up our minds. We haggled over details. But in the end we signed on the
dotted line and bought two Australian ships.71
Later he was to comment:
Yes, the other designs didn’t get a look in; they didn’t get a fair hearing.
We went through the motions but I made it abundantly clear that there
was no way those designs were going to succeed. I mean, I told Harry
Duynhoven that he could produce them for nothing and we still wouldn’t
take them. … We ended up being told they were going to be built in
Australia. There is no doubt about that. … But in 1988 I said we wouldn’t
be buying anywhere else and that was the truth of it. There was no point
in mucking around—that was what we had to do.72
Geoffrey Palmer had a different perception:
Yes Harry’s ships were never a goer. But we had them analysed
incessantly, and they were never going to be interoperable with the
Australians. Interoperability with Australia is essential, and we needed
to have the equipment to make that possible.73
Despite Duynhoven’s protestations, by August 1989 the decision on the
ANZAC frigates was well in train.
The Frigate Decision
August 1989 was a pivotal month in the ANZAC frigate decision-making process.
Already in July, Tizard had indicated that the Government had the support of
the majority of Cabinet ministers. This however was insufficient to save the
political career of David Lange, who resigned as Prime Minister during the first
week of August. The US-based publication American Defense & Foreign Affairs
Weekly was quick to comment on the significance of this resignation, suggesting
that it would seriously delay any decisions on the joint ANZAC program. They
noted that Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer, who was to take Lange’s
place, and Helen Clark, who was to become Deputy Prime Minister, had been
quiet on the frigate issue, and would in all probability not support the proposal.
They were unequivocal in their comments on Lange’s departure: ‘Lange, known
for never being able to make a decision, took the easy way out—almost
predictably, according to the cynics—and retired on “health grounds” before
the tough frigate decision was to be made.’74
The Australians were going to wait no longer, and took the decision on
14 August to accept the Amecon consortium bid to build the Meko 200 derivative.
The issue remained a potentially divisive one within the Labour Party with the
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Party president, Ruth Dyson, reminding MPs that the national conference the
previous year had rejected the frigate deal. Nonetheless three days later the
Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, publicly announced his support for the project,
and on 7 September 1989 announced that the Government had decided in
principle also to accept the Amecon tender and purchase two ANZAC ships,
with an option for two more at a future date, envisaging ‘a one-for-one
replacement of the Royal New Zealand Navy’s existing four ships’.75 The Prime
Minister acknowledged the influence of societal concerns, saying:
And I know the Peace Movement will not be happy with it. But about
that matter, what I want to say is that we have considered very carefully
everything that the critics have put up. We’ve been through a lengthy
consultative process about it. And we’ve come to the conclusion in the
end that in the best interests of New Zealand we needed to commit to
this project.76
He spelt out the cost of the project—$942 million for two ships and the total
project, with project costs some 20 per cent less than Australian costs, as New
Zealand was to carry a lower share of project and infrastructure costs. The sail
away cost of each ship had been kept to NZ$299 million, with an overall project
cost some 30 per cent less in real terms than the 1986 dollar price. In considering
the question of whether to commit to two or four frigates, the Prime Minister
added that the cost for a further two vessels would be an additional $867 million,
‘but I should say to you that that decision does not need to be taken for nearly
a decade’.77
A change of leadership in New Zealand clearly helped the decision-making
process. According to John Henderson, ‘in the first month after the change of
leadership, Palmer drove the frigate decision through. … It was the honeymoon
period.’78  Palmer himself acknowledged the place of both timing and political
influence when facing the challenge of having the decision approved:
When David Lange left the decision was far from a done deal. Timing is
everything in politics and the change of leadership probably made things
easier. Russell Marshall, Bob Tizard and myself were never in any doubt
about the importance of acquiring the ANZACS. But I had to work
extremely hard to get it through Caucus.79
The editorial in the New Zealand Herald the day after the decision was
announced concluded that ‘the country, meanwhile, will gratefully close the
issue and await with interest a start on shipbuilding’.80  Such sentiment
subsequently proved unduly optimistic.
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Implementation of the Project
How well did the decision to go ahead with the ANZAC project work in practice
for New Zealand? What were the difficulties that had to be surmounted? There
was a delay to the final signing of the heads of agreement contract for the two
frigates, when it became apparent that the Australians wanted New Zealand to
commit to pay for parts for the second, optional, pair of frigates. The contractual
issues were eventually settled and the contract signed on 10 November 1989.
That was not, however, the end of the matter.
The Labour Party had had a particularly difficult term of office between 1987
and 1990, with three Prime Ministers in that period. When it seemed clear that
Labour was likely to lose the 1990 election, the then Prime Minister, Mike Moore,
suggested that the frigate deal might be cancelled.81 Trade-offs and judgement
of political side effects were to the fore. As the secretary of the Metal Workers
Union in Victoria said: ‘It seems to me the statement of a man desperate for
votes’82  In the event, the votes were not forthcoming, and the Labour Party
lost office. The uncertainty over the frigates though remained.
In July 1992 the Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee was critical
of several aspects of the frigate project in its report which examined progress
on the frigate contract. In particular, it was critical of Treasury not ensuring
greater certainty in costs through foreign exchange management (by this time
the dollar cost for the frigates had risen 31 per cent to $1219.5 million83 ), and
they were concerned about whether industry participation levels would be met.
The criticism brought a stinging rebuke from the Australian Shadow Minister
for Defence, Alexander Downer: ‘So much of this New Zealand report just sounds
like whingeing. We offered New Zealand a situation where they could buy one
frigate and practically get the other one free at the Australian taxpayer’s
expense.’84
New Zealand industry participation rates did improve, and the promised
trade off of greater New Zealand involvement in Australian defence work
contracts did begin to materialise. By July 1993 New Zealand companies had
secured NZ$340 million of some NZ$800 million earmarked for New Zealand
industry. By December 1995 that had only increased to NZ$382 million, but by
February 1997 that amount had risen to NZ$470 million, placed with some 417
firms. Ultimately, the total value of work awarded to New Zealand firms was in
excess of NZ$800 million.
Before any of this work was undertaken, the final weapons specification had
to be decided. The November 1992 issue of Asia Defence Journal noted that,
besides a vertical launch point defence missile system, each of the new frigates
would carry an FMC Mk45 127mm gun under a technology transfer contract.
The article began: ‘It seems that the ‘politics’ of the ‘ANZAC’ frigate project are
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well in the past. There are no longer demonstrations against the frigate acquisition
outside the New Zealand Parliament. … It is now business as usual.’85
The ‘politics’ of the project had though been alive and well, and yet again it
was necessary to contend with external sources of influence. Rear-Admiral David
Campbell of the RAN again commented:
I was the Australian Naval Attaché in Washington from January
1989–February 1992. It was an interesting and difficult time in US–NZ
relationships. It’s hard to appreciate now, but NZ was treated as a pariah
state. Australia and New Zealand were bound by treaty over the frigate
acquisition, i.e. something enforceable under international law. In effect,
the RNZN would have an exact copy of the RAN ships—guaranteed by
treaty. The catch was that nobody had consulted Uncle Sam. The RAN
enjoyed a pretty-well unrestricted access to US technology, but it was
a presumptuous assumption that this was transferable to NZ—yet this
is precisely what was entailed in the treaty. Soon at issue were the Mk 49
radar, the Mk 41 vertical launch system, and the 5”Mk 45 Mod2 gun.
The US was not at all happy to see these going to NZ and soon made its
objection known.
I initially knew nothing of this. The first thing I knew was when I was
summoned by the Secretary of the Navy (The Hon H. Lawrence Garrett
III) to explain myself. Why was I going around saying that the Kiwis
ought to get/were going to get the radar? Why was I stirring up the
Navy International Program Office clearly in the face of US policy?
Apparently, that’s what the NZ Defence Staff were doing—taking my
name in vain. I pleaded innocence and outrage and Garrett accepted that.
It happened again a few weeks later, this time over the Mk 41, and again
later over the gun. Both times I was again summoned and Garrett was
really getting annoyed, accusing me of duplicity, and worse. After the
third occasion, I had a blazing row with my NZ counterpart and
threatened serious consequences.
A little later, I was being directed by Canberra to try to get the USN to
relent but that was something that had to be done without NZ ‘assistance’.
Given all that had gone before, that was not easy to accomplish. Looking
back upon it, I really can’t decide whether I was a brilliant negotiator
or whether Uncle Sam was simply making us all sweat a bit. But, either
way, it was hard work. In the end, everything worked out alright.86
In the end, as far as delivery of the vessels was concerned, everything was
resolved, though with several teething problems along the way.
The first steel was cut for ANZAC ship 01 in March 1992, and it was
commissioned as HMAS Anzac on 18 May 1996. Ship 02 was to be HMNZS
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Te Kaha. The first steel for the vessel was cut on 11 February 1993, and it was
launched in Melbourne on 22 July 1995. The vessel’s arrival in New Zealand,
due for May 1997, was delayed after problems were discovered with the
propulsion system—calcium buildup from marine growth on the bearings around
the ship’s propeller shafts. Te Kaha crossed the Tasman Sea in early July, and
was commissioned into the RNZN on 22 July 1997. Whilst there were some
modest delays in the build program, the early concerns about significant delays
and cost over-runs in Australian yards were largely unfounded. The RNZN’s
second ANZAC, HMNZS Te Mana, had its first steel cut in February 1995 and
was launched on 10 May 1997. Due for commissioning in March 1999, Te Mana
was actually commissioned on 10 December 1999.
The ANZAC Frigates in Service
Since being commissioned, both ANZAC frigates have been working at a heavy
operational pace. Initially there were some further equipment failures, with
Te Kaha having its gas turbine propulsion unit replaced under guarantee in
September 1998. The following July it once more had problems with the
propshaft bearings, and these were replaced in dry dock in Devonport, Auckland.
The final build problem was discovered when Te Kaha was once more in dry
dock for its Annual Maintenance Period in May 2002. Microscopic cracks had
been found in the bilge keels of several of the Australian ANZAC frigates, and
similar cracks were discovered in Te Kaha. Design solutions were supplied by
both the shipbuilder and the designer. Te Mana had fewer reported faults, a
broken camshaft in one of the diesel engines being one of them.
‘Fitted for but not with’ was one of the catch-phrases of the time, leading to
charges that the vessels would not be adequately armed. In 1996 the RAN
instituted proposals to improve the warfighting capabilities of its vessels, with
the introduction of its Warfighting Improvement Program, but the RNZN had
no involvement. However, by the time the frigates were in service, there had
been a number of additions to the weapon systems.
Original costings had been based on one medium calibre (76mm) gun and
one battery of anti-aircraft missiles. Plans were underway at an early stage to
fit refurbished Mk32 ship-launched torpedo tubes from the Leanders, and Te Kaha
was fitted with the tubes from Southland. Provision was also made, and the
vessels subsequently fitted with, the Phalanx close-in weapon support system,
Te Kaha inheriting the system from HMNZS Waikato. The vessels were also
designed to accommodate a towed array sonar system, with which they have
been fitted from time to time.
Perhaps the most significant weapons upgrade was the addition of the SH-2G
Super Seasprite helicopter, built by Kaman Aerospace in the United States. The
maximum initial cost of four new-build helicopters was set not to exceed
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NZ$274 million in 1997—a decade after the frigate debate had begun in earnest.
Whilst the new aircraft were being built, Kaman loaned the RNZN four SH-2Fs
from the US Navy, the first of these flying in February 1998. Ultimately a decision
was taken to acquire five new aircraft. The first two new aircraft were accepted
in Auckland on 18 August 2001, with deliveries of all five due to be completed
by 2003. Despite their not inconsiderable cost, they arrived with a minimum of
fuss.
These aircraft added significantly to the capability of the vessels. They were
fitted with advanced radar and electronic support measures equipment, and
could be fitted with Maverick air-to-surface missiles, or Mk 46 torpedoes or Mk
11 depth charges, considerably extending the reach of the frigates. By the time
the ANZAC frigates were sent in harm’s way, they were significantly better
armed than might have been anticipated. A decade previously Lange had said:
We’re stuck with them now. Sometimes you win Lotto and sometimes
you don’t, and we didn’t win on that one. I cannot see any justification
for the frigates continuing. I just can’t. I cannot get anyone in Defence
to tell me what they’re going to be used against. They cannot tell me
how things of that specification are to be used. I come back to what we
need. We need a logistic support ship to support the army and we need
to have a platform to take to the Pacific for the sort of support work that
needs to be done, but the frigates don’t do it.87
However, history has once again proven that it is never possible to predict
future defence scenarios. True to the original intent of having vessels that would
undertake resource protection close to home, Te Kaha sailed to the Ross
Dependency amidst much media publicity in February 1999, to deter Patagonian
Toothfish poachers. Later that year though, she was dispatched to provide
support to International Force East Timor (INTERFET), and then to the Persian
Gulf to join the Multinational Interception Force. In June 2000 Te Mana was
sent to Honiara in the Solomon Islands for guardship duties, and was relieved
later that month by Te Kaha. Both vessels were to return—Te Kaha in September,
and Te Mana in May 2001. For five months in 2002 Te Mana was deployed to
Asia, returning in July, and Te Kaha left the following month for a four month
tour of duty in Asia. During the return voyage to New Zealand Te Kaha was
diverted to the Persian Gulf once more, to take part in Operation Enduring
Freedom, and was replaced on station in February 2003 by Te Mana. During the
2002–2003 reporting year, the two frigates were programmed for a total of 251
days at sea. In fact they worked a total of 337 days at sea. In April 2004 Te Mana
once more deployed to the Persian Gulf for a four month period of Maritime
Interdiction Operations (MIO). During the 2003–2004 reporting year, the two
frigates were programmed for a total of 287 days at sea, yet worked a total of
307 days.88 This high level of activity continued to be maintained over the next
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four years. In the 2006–2007 reporting year programmed activity was to be a
minimum of 272 days at sea, yet the two frigates achieved 290 sea days. In April
2008 Te Mana once more left Auckland for a five month period to undertake
operations in the Persian Gulf as part of the Coalition Task Force. Such a pace
of operations in distant waters was not what was envisaged as New Zealand’s
area of direct strategic interest when the ANZAC debate first began, and yet
again reinforced the role of external sources of influence in the life of the ANZAC
frigates.
Summary
The ANZAC frigate project was one of the most controversial major defence
projects of recent times and the decision-making process long and tortuous.
Indeed, when making the announcement about the decision to proceed with a
two frigate purchase, Geoffrey Palmer said:
I can’t remember a decision which the Cabinet and the Caucus have gone
into in greater detail and argued the merits of for longer or more
extensively than this one. It is certain that these issues have been
thrashed out in complete detail.89
History has proven the first assertion to be correct; undoubtedly the merits
for and against were argued extensively. However a question mark was to remain
over the second comment as will be examined in chapter 4, which focuses on
the decision of whether or not to purchase a further ANZAC frigate.
In identifying key decision-making influences with regard to the purchase
of the frigates, it is clear that the essential break-up of ANZUS and the need for
closer relationships with Australia played a major part. Reflecting the pre-eminent
place of external sources of influence, in his interview with Lange, Squadron
Leader Forrest asked: ‘If they said jump, would we jump?’ Lange’s response
was: ‘That’s right, and that’s the guts of it.’90  However, Geoffrey Palmer
disagreed, indicating both that he felt that the view of Australian pressure was
overstated, and that there was a clear need for four frigates:
I was Prime Minister and I can tell you they did not lean on us. I had
one telephone call from Bob Hawke. But I didn’t need any convincing.
I felt then that we needed a four frigate Navy, and I still feel that now.
I couldn’t have lived with myself if we hadn’t bought them. It never
occurred to me that we’d not end up buying the four.91
Whilst it is apparent that the role of Australia was pivotal, how New Zealand
saw its role in the world, public opinion, the judgement of political side effects
and opportunity costs, and politics and political influence were also influential
throughout the whole frigate debate and decision-making process. New Zealand’s
role in the world was redefined by New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance and the
48
Timing is Everything
subsequent ANZUS split. The refocusing of New Zealand’s Defence effort had
to squarely face public opinion, which revolved around both the cost of the
frigates, seen by some critics as obscenely expensive, and their warfighting
potential which was strongly opposed by the peace movement. Taking account
of politics and political influence, advocates such as Palmer were only too well
aware of opposition among many in the Party to the purchase of the frigates. In
undertaking its judgement of political side effects and opportunity costs, the
New Zealand Government sought to make the decision more acceptable by
emphasising the potential NZ$800 million worth of work which was forecast to
come to New Zealand, and by highlighting the ‘fitted for but not with’ nature
of the vessels. Other influencing elements which had a strong bearing were
bureaucratic politics (evident particularly during the evaluation period, as the
RNZN sought to maximise the utility of the vessels), whilst timing and political
influence were acutely important as a final choice was made.
There were therefore a number of clearly identifiable factors that weighed
in the decision to proceed with the purchase of the ANZAC frigates. Whether
or not such factors were vital in other acquisition case study decisions will be
explored in the following chapters.
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As long ago as the 1970s the need had been identified for the purchase of a sealift
ship to support the implementation of New Zealand’s defence and foreign policy
in the South Pacific, and to support New Zealand’s involvement in UN operations.
The proposed ship was to have an ice-strengthened bow for Antarctic operations,
and helicopter facilities, but the cost at the time was seen as putting such a vessel
beyond New Zealand’s reach. The 1978 Defence Review noted the need for ‘a
general purpose logistic support capability. The adaptation of a suitable
commercial vessel…is not discounted’.1
The need for a Logistic Support Ship (LSS) continued to be recognised, and
the 1987 White Paper drew attention to the need to purchase some form of sealift
vessel for New Zealand forces as an essential part of the New Zealand Defence
Force (NZDF)’s ability to mount effective operations in the region. With the
impending withdrawal of the New Zealand battalion from Singapore, and the
clear shift in focus to the South Pacific signalled in the White Paper, the Army’s
Ready Reaction Force (RRF) had no means of moving quickly around either the
Pacific or to Southeast Asia—there was insufficient transport to deploy and
sustain a battalion group away from New Zealand. The White Paper commented:
‘A further and essential part of our ability to mount effective operations in the
region is the purchase of a logistic support ship—probably a converted merchant
ship.’2
Subsequent studies undertaken in 1988 suggested that a purpose-built LSS,
initially with a displacement of up to 12 000 tonnes, be built. The vessel would
have the capacity to transport up to 200 troops and heavy equipment, and be
capable of unloading onto a beach, or onto conventional wharves.3  Such a
specialist ship, with landing craft and helicopters, could have cost up to NZ$240
million, and was ultimately seen as exceeding the necessary credible minimum.4
The 1991 Defence White Paper defined three security scenarios in which
there might be a call for a limited deployment of forces in the South Pacific
region: the need for evacuation of New Zealand nationals; a terrorist threat; or
requests for assistance to respond to threats to law and order. The desired
capability to respond to these tasks was seen as being able to deploy a sizeable
force to those islands which have seats of government or significant centres of
population. Once again the gap in transport and force projection capabilities
was identified, and a call was made to review possible ways of closing the gap.
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The 1991 White Paper did set up a number of reviews and one of these saw the
need for a vessel that would primarily move troops and equipment around the
Pacific, and be available to provide support for peacekeeping operations. The
Air and Sea Transport Review team concluded that there was no doubt that a
military sealift capacity was a core capability element if the NZDF was to meet
the defence tasks specified in the White Paper.5 The team had a clear concern
about the limitations of chartering, observing that the time taken for a vessel to
be delivered to Auckland could not be quantified with any certainty. With few
suitable vessels available for charter in Australia, New Zealand or the South
Pacific, it was likely that a vessel would have to come from Europe, taking
36 days to get here. Whilst the Review team noted that there appeared to have
been some reservations about the need for military shipping for strategic
transport, they were of the opinion that ‘sea-lift is essential; otherwise the lack
of a credible deployment capability should call into question the New Zealand
Army’s present force structure’.6
The new vessel was to be capable of carrying supplies to the Islands in times
of civil emergency, or to evacuate New Zealand citizens at times of civil unrest.
The review saw a sealift ship deploying up to a company of personnel with their
equipment and supplies, to provide reconstruction, rehabilitation or medical
assistance. The vessel would also be expected to be able to provide sealift to
offshore islands, especially the Chatham Islands, when other transport was
unavailable, and to maintain the continuity of Cook Strait transportation between
the North and South Island when other services were restricted or were
unavailable. Importantly, the type of gap to be filled was re-defined, and it was
suggested that the less ambitious task of operating into those ports which had
wharf facilities might be sufficient. It was ultimately recommended ‘that the
NZDF obtain a military sealift ship (MSS) based on a commercial medium size
roll on/roll off ship as a matter of priority’.7 This chapter traces the events that
led to the purchase of such a ship, HMNZS Charles Upham, then its subsequent
lease and ultimate sale.
Evaluating the Alternatives
During 1991, the Review team considered a number of possible vessel types as
solutions. They acknowledged that a Mercandian 1500 vessel could deploy 50
per cent of the vehicles and stores required by the RRF, and considered this size
of vessel as the credible minimum. However, they believed the purchase of a
vessel such as the Union Rotorua would be a more attractive option. Whilst it
was somewhat larger than the minimum requirement, the Review team felt it
would be ‘an economical and effective solution to the NZDF’s greatest current
capability deficiency’.8  It noted that the Union Rotorua almost exactly matched
the dimension specification to deploy the RRF vehicles and equipment. The
Union Rotorua was one of the first vessels to be considered for the task of
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providing logistic support. This vessel could have deployed all of the RRF’s
vehicles and equipment in one lift. Admiral Sir Somerford Teagle recalled seeing
the vessel in Sydney Harbour, looking large and imposing. He said to his
Australian Defence Force (ADF) counterpart, ‘that could be our new Logistic
Support Ship’,—though personally he was not wedded to any particular vessel
type, more the capability any such vessel would bring to the NZDF. The Review
team also saw the vessel as imposing, and thought that the perception of the size
of the ship might be its only real disadvantage. With a length of 205 metres and
a maximum laden weight of up to 24 000 tonnes, the ship did have a large profile.
Whilst in international shipping terms it was only a medium-sized vessel, it was
amongst the larger ships to visit New Zealand ports regularly, and would have
been by far the largest ship operated by the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN):
There was a perception that she was too big—I don’t know why. There
was no issue of her being too big in the maritime sense. As for the
requirement that the chosen vessel should fit the Calliope Dock, that was
just one of many criteria. I don’t believe that this on its own would be
sufficient reason to reject the Union Rotorua.9
In all of the documentation that I have reviewed, there is no clear, rational
explanation as to why the Union Rotorua was dropped from the short-list. The
vessel was gas-turbine powered, and it was noted that the prime mover would
soon need an overhaul.10  However, its sister ship the Union Rotoiti was
diesel-electric, and Teagle saw no reason why the Union Rotorua could not have
been easily converted.
The estimated through life costs were NZ$10.02 million per year, as opposed
to an estimated NZ$7.1 million for a Mercandian 1500, but the Review team were
clear that the greater capability, capacity, speed and flexibility offset the increase
in operating costs.11  Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, the Review team’s
observation of the vessel’s apparent lack of problems as regards stability or
motion at sea with a light load should have been given more weight. Of particular
note was the Review team’s observation about a Mercandian vessel already plying
New Zealand’s waters. The Spirit of Freedom, a Mercandian 610 had been trading
between Auckland and Lyttleton for four years and the Review team noted that,
‘designed for trade in the North Sea, this vessel, unless fully laden, is very
uncomfortable at sea in the South Pacific’.12 These were to be words of portent.
The 1997 NZDF Report, HMNZS Charles Upham: Review of acquisition and
proposed conversion, went into some detail about the steps which led up to the
purchase of HMNZS Charles Upham. In summary, the steps reported to have
been undertaken were as follows:
1. In November 1991, the NZDF undertook an appraisal of the roll on/roll off
vessel Union Rotorua. The ship was available for sale, and the Review team
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considered that, with suitable modifications, it would provide the minimum
capacity required for sealift operations. In May of 1992 Cabinet authorised
the investigation of costs to bring the Union Rotorua into service.
2. In June 1992 further studies within NZDF led to a refinement of the
requirements for a new vessel, and the Union Rotorua was considered to be
slightly too large for the these new requirements, and Cabinet authorised
comparison with at least one other vessel.
3. In July 1992 the shipbroking firm of Rugg and Co. in the United Kingdom
was engaged to investigate suitable ships on the second-hand market.
Defence staff received a total of 33 available ships in 20 different classes,
which they narrowed down to 21 ships in 9 classes, plus the Union Rotorua.
In October 1992 this list was further refined down to 4 classes, and the
option of building a new ship was considered, with yards in Korea, Poland
and Spain being asked for indicative prices. (The Polish yard was slow to
respond and not pursued further.)
4. In November a team of Defence personnel inspected the four second-hand
class of ships, and held discussions with the Spanish and Korean shipyards,
with the outcome being that either a new or second-hand ship would be
suitable. Of the second-hand ships, the Mercandian 2-in-1 class was the
preferred option.
5. In December 1992 BMT Defence Services Limited in the United Kingdom
was selected to review Defence’s estimates for the conversion cost for a
Mercandian 2-in-1 class vessel, comment on the practicality of the
conversion, and also to carry out comparisons with a new vessel. During
that month a specification was also drawn up which was to be used for the
evaluation and subsequent purchase of the chosen vessel (see Appendix 3,
User Requirement). At the end of January 1993 BMT Defence Services
concluded that a conversion was feasible, but indicated that the vessel class
failed to meet specification in a number of areas including a narrow quarter
ramp and low deck height, and that stabiliser tanks would be required for
helicopter operations. There were also concerns about vessel motion. In
addition it commented that there was very little difference in cost between
a second-hand and new vessel.
6. In April 1993 Defence sought Cabinet approval for the purchase of either
a second-hand or a new vessel. Cabinet, though, decided to defer a decision
until it had reviewed the forthcoming Defence Consolidated Resource Plan.
The 1997 NZDF Review notes that officials were surprised that, at this
point, Cabinet stressed that the main rationale for acquiring the vessel was
to be able respond to natural disasters and other emergency situations in
the South Pacific region. Cabinet at this time also invited the Minister of
Defence to investigate the possibility of cooperating with Australia in the




In late 1993, the Australian Government offered to lease the heavy landing ship,
HMAS Tobruk, to the NZDF. In November a brief was developed for the Chief
of Naval Staff to assist with discussions. It was noted in the brief that there were
some important shortfalls against the user requirement, most notably that the
ship had only half of the cargo capacity of a Mercandian vessel, and that the
vessel required significantly more crew—144 as against 65. (This was potentially
a concern for the RNZN at the time, though it was noted that the RFA operated
with a crew of 65, so some personnel savings were likely.) Discussions were held
with several senior Royal Australian Navy (RAN) officers during the period
14-18 February 1994 and ‘the general feeling was that the ADF wished to lease
the vessel to New Zealand rather than have us buy it’. Significantly, it was stated
that ‘the RAN ... obviously do not wish to be put in a position where they make
an offer which we might turn down’.13
The NZDF assessed its suitability and initially was supportive of pursuing
this option. The Tobruk still had significant cargo and personnel carrying
capacity, with the ability to land resources across the beach. However, it was
apparently not clear at this stage what the costs involved would actually be.14
Nevertheless, it was recommended that this option be pursued, and on 11 May
1994 the Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray wrote to his New
Zealand counterpart, Warren Cooper, with a firm offer of a lease for the ship.
Later that month, Cabinet gave approval for discussions to proceed with a view
to acquiring the vessel, which Australia would retain some access to each year.
At the time, an officer, not part of the team claimed: ‘The team is going through
the motions. We will have a look at her, but the politicians have already decided
to take her.’15  Senior Defence personnel agreed that it would be politically
beneficial for the New Zealand Government to take the Tobruk, but the Tobruk
was described as a 25 year old ship in a 10 year old body. An engineering officer
was reported to say: ‘The country will pay dearly. She’s an orphan, so parts will
be expensive. She will be a nice little earner for the dockyard’s new operators.’16
However, a meeting held on 9 June with representatives from the Ministry of
Defence and the NZDF, agreed that the Tobruk offered an acceptable interim
solution to meet the MSS requirement; and that the aim should be to obtain a
Cabinet decision in time to agree a lease with the Australians in Darwin on 28–29
July 1994.
Within less than two weeks the situation seemed to have markedly changed.
In a Position Paper, approved by the Secretary for Defence, attention was drawn
to the original reasons why agreement had been given for pursuing the lease of
the Tobruk. Of some importance was the continuing requirement by the ADF
for the capabilities of a New Zealand crewed and operated Tobruk for exercises
and contingencies, which was an important Closer Defence Relations (CDR)
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consideration. The avoidance of capital costs was also seen as an advantage,
though not decisive.
In the event, on 21 June 1994 the Australians advised that they wished to
sell the Tobruk, offering a deferred purchase or lease to purchase option. (In a
Minute to the Cabinet Subcommittee, the price of A$58 million was mentioned
as the current value of the ship.17 ) It was observed that the purchase of the
Tobruk, based on the Australians having no further use for it, had no inherent
advantages for New Zealand. This removed any CDR benefits for New Zealand
and, coupled with an availability date which kept slipping, Defence in New
Zealand decided that the purchase was not the right decision. A negotiating team
was still nevertheless due to leave for Australia; they were advised clearly by
the Secretary of Defence that they were ‘to ensure that our Australian colleagues
have a full appreciation of the new position in respect of acquiring an MSS
capability … and that other than for CDR considerations, New Zealand has no
interest in Tobruk’.18
In the Alliance Report of 1998, The Biggest Lemon Ever To Leave Auckland,
it was reported that New Zealand was offered the vessel at the then cost of about
NZ$18.57 million. The Audit Office was told by the NZDF that while the Tobruk
was offered in May 1994 at a price of A$7 million, plus a quantity of spares at
a further A$7 million, these were preliminary estimates only and subject to
negotiation.19
Rear-Admiral David Campbell was at the time Deputy Chief of Naval Staff
(DCNS) in the RAN. His recollection was that ‘the Minister said the Kiwis could
have the ship for nothing’. Campbell went on to say that the principal reason
was that whilst the RAN could no longer afford the Tobruk (with two replacement
ships arriving), the Minister ‘was very anxious that her capability not be lost
to the alliance in the SW Pacific’.20  So keen was Senator Robert Ray on retaining
the capability that he was prepared to give the ship away. With an offer like
that on the table, coupled with the very strong political pressure Ray was
exerting, the New Zealand Government had to examine the proposal very
seriously. The planned visit mentioned above went ahead, and Campbell received
an official visit from representatives of the RNZN and the MoD:
It was plain to me from the outset that they had no intention of taking
the ship. Before the visit there had been some trans-Tasman enquiries
and preliminary negotiations. I recall one such item being ‘Would we
include the ship’s inventory of spare and repair parts?’ Reluctantly, I
agreed. They were probably worth more than the ship herself, but I
understood the Minister wanted the transfer to go ahead and so I was
prepared to forego the revenue. In my office, they wanted to know
(actually it was stronger than a question; it was more like a demand)
whether Australia would pay for her next scheduled refit? Absolutely
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not, I said—an answer that they knew perfectly well was the only
possible one. It was evident to me that they were genuinely worried
about her relatively high manning and the cost of the forthcoming refit,
but at the same time they were desperate to get other reasons why they
should not accept her. The negotiations, on their part, were perfunctory
and dutiful and I never thought that they were sincere.21
In November 1997 the then New Zealand Minister of Defence spoke to this
decision:
After several months of discussion the RAN recommended that New
Zealand should buy the vessel, but that it would not be available for two
years (i.e. by 1996) and the cost of this would be considerably higher
than New Zealand had anticipated. In view of this, and taking into
consideration the very high operating costs for the vessel, the NZDF
determined that it was not worth continuing with further discussions.22
In reviewing the correspondence of the time, it seems as if there was an initial
willingness to seriously consider the Tobruk despite the vessel’s shortcomings.
As noted previously, the potential benefits to CDR were seen as being important:
‘On balance we considered the CDR contribution New Zealand could make by
taking on the Tobruk were worth these disadvantages.’23  In this minute, Gerald
Hensley, the Secretary of Defence, commented that leasing the Tobruk was seen
as an acceptable interim trade-off solution because it meant New Zealand could
have made a significant contribution to CDR. The change from a lease proposition
to a possible purchase was seen to change that considerably. Yet two elements
do not quite fit: Rear-Admiral Campbell’s recollection that the Minister was
willing to give the ship away to maintain the capability in the region (which
was confirmed by Dick Gentles—‘Yes, they did offer it to us free of charge’);24
and Campbell’s response to my question as to whether there would have been
a likely ongoing CDR requirement? ‘With Tobruk do you mean, whether donated,
leased or sold? Yes, most certainly.’25
Were bureaucratic politics an issue with the Tobruk? The memo from the
Secretary of Defence was very clear in the message it sent to officials who were
going to Australia. Or was the Tobruk really a vessel that was going to be too
expensive to run and maintain? Undoubtedly the Tobruk would have been an
expensive vessel to man and operate, costing perhaps NZ$4 million per annum
more in operational costs. This is though quoted as a maximum cost, and again
like the Union Rotorua it was observed: ‘The Tobruk can do many things that
even a converted Charles Upham will not be able to.’26  It was suggested by the
Alliance Party in 1998 that ‘the real additional operating costs had we purchased
the Tobruk would probably have come in at much less than this figure’.27 The
Alliance Party went on to suggest that, in retrospect, not proceeding with the
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acquisition of the Tobruk was probably a mistake. The Audit Office report argued
with these sentiments, saying that there would have been a delay with the vessel
entering NZDF service; that further delays would have been incurred because
of the necessity to refit the engines; and that, as with the Charles Upham, there
was no guarantee that funds would be available to complete the necessary work.
Nevertheless, despite the decision not to take the Tobruk, the vessel has continued
to prove useful in combined regional operations ‘turning up like that nautical
nemesis the Flying Dutchman’28  —providing logistic support in the Bougainville
operation in 1994, subsequently visiting Wellington on 30 May 1998 to unload
Army equipment used in Bougainville, and taking New Zealand troops to East
Timor in 1999. In 2005 the vessel transported troops and equipment to Iraq.
Although concerns had been raised in 1994 about the ship’s longevity, the HMAS
Tobruk was still in service in 2009.
HMNZS Charles Upham
The prospect of a LSS had been under consideration for 15 years by the time
Defence asked Cabinet in 1993 for approval to purchase a vessel. However, at
this point the consultants preparing the 1997 Review commented that they
understood that the Prime Minister’s Department had given indications that the
Military Sea-lift Ship project should not be promoted. Officials prepared a new
report for Cabinet but it wasn’t considered because of the forthcoming 1993
General Election.
In July 1994 the decision was made within Defence to proceed with the
purchase of a second-hand ship. Four issues were identified which led to this
decision; a vessel could be acquired quickly (it was already almost three years
since the first potential vessel had been inspected); cashflow would be improved;
no large initial outlay would be necessary, and the smaller sum spent and shorter
lifespan of this initial ship would allow for experience to be gained which would
better inform requirements over the longer term. The Ministry then asked the
broker who had previously handled the earlier enquiry to update them on the
availability of Mercandian 2-in-1 class vessels, rather than review the market
again. Following protracted discussions the Mercandian Queen II became available,
approval was sought from Cabinet to purchase the vessel and this approval was
given on 28 November 1994.
In the supporting documentation to the Cabinet Subcommittee from the
Minister of Defence, the caution was made: ‘If we decide against sealift, the
Australians could perceive us as not being serious about maintaining a credible
defence effort.’29  In a further memorandum to the Cabinet Subcommittee dated
22 November 1994, the Minister of Defence spoke to Treasury’s concern about
the financing of the proposed acquisitions that were to be discussed at Cabinet,
including the MSS. He noted that Treasury acknowledged that the MSS would
be a flexible and desirable asset and that, in Treasury’s view:
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the decision on whether to purchase a ship involves a trade-off between
three key factors:
Cost: A fully capable MSS costs $60m being $25 million for the initial
capital and an additional $34m required to upgrade for the ship (sic) for
carrying troops and helicopter. The additional operating costs of $7m
annually are significant. No compensating or offsetting capability is
proposed. The operating costs are to be met by unspecified internal
efficiencies and adjustments.
Risk: The likelihood of a major deployment of military forces without
sufficient warning time to charter commercial shipping is a critical factor
in assessing the case for the MSS.
Priority: Ministers will need to assess whether providing this new
capability should proceed when there are other pressures on defence
resources to maintain existing capabilities such as the Orion fleet.30
Cabinet approved the expenditure of up to NZ$26 million for acquisition and
initial modification of a MSS, and noted that the updated Defence Consolidated
Resource Plan (DCRP) was to include provision for further expenditure of up to
NZ$34 million for phase 2 modifications. The sale was finalised on 16 December
1994 at a purchase price of Danish Kroner 55 000 000, or NZ$14.15 million. A
Defence official reportedly said: ‘There is a feeling of relief around defence that
the project has been finally realised.’31
Once the purchase was completed, the vessel was to be delivered after
carrying a cargo to defray costs, and it sailed as a merchantman under the New
Zealand flag. The vessel arrived in New Zealand on 14 March 1995, and was
delivered to the RNZN the following day. It was formally commissioned into the
RNZN in October 1995, being named, by his widow, after one of New Zealand’s
most famous war heroes, Charles Upham. The Minister of Defence, Warren
Cooper, said at the time that he expected that the vessel would be well used in
exercises, UN peacekeeping deployments, and in emergency relief work.
From the outset it had been clear that the vessel would need modification.
The initial modifications were to be limited to essential work to bring the ship
into immediate service, but even at this stage the vessel was said to be useable
and able to carry a full range of freight: ‘The MSS will be able to meet its primary
function without the follow on modifications and it will also to a large degree
be able to perform effectively its assigned ancillary tasks.’32
The Charles Upham was 133 metres in length with a displacement of 7220
tonnes. It had a single engine and single screw. As a commercial vessel, the
Charles Upham carried a merchant crew of seventeen. Refitted for a helicopter,
she would have permanent accommodation for up to 65, with the capacity to
accommodate an additional 150. In a four page New Zealand Defence Quarterly
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article, much was made of the arrival of the new ship, the contribution she would
make to the NZDF, and the modest alterations necessary:
The helicopter deck apart, most modifications are not likely to be
structural or expensive. Even so, the Defence Force is in no tearing hurry
because, says Ministry of Defence Project Director, Peter Ware, they
‘want to get it right.’ No firm decision will be taken on major alterations
for some months, during which crews will be able to get operational
experience of the ship. … Many decisions have yet to be taken before
the Charles Upham is fully operational, but at this stage the future of
New Zealand’s military transport looks bright. Certainly the ship will
give a much needed boost in an area that has long been lacking, and it
looks set to do so at a minimum cost to the taxpayer.33
During the next several months the crew was able to get operational
experience of the ship, and the above bright predictions were to be proved sadly
wrong.
The 1997 Review of the Charles Upham drew attention to the Air and Sea
Transport Review which followed the 1991 White Paper, and recommended an
‘80/20’ solution for the purchase of a MSS. That is, acquiring most of the
capability needed to meet most of the likely operational circumstances. Having
the ability to unload at an unimproved wharf was therefore one of the
fundamental requirements. Nevertheless, the Review itself pointed out that cargo
handling equipment ‘appears to be an area not fully considered at the time (late
1992)’.34  It went on to say that part of the proposal was to use a forklift for large
container handling; however, the vessel had a weight limit of 17 tonnes per
single axle, whilst the forklift had a weight of 20 tonnes per axle, even when
not loaded. This seems to have been a major oversight, especially when no
requirement was made for the vessel to have its own lighterage facilities. The
Review expressed surprise about this, saying that it seemed inevitable that there
would be some missions where wharves were either damaged, or non-existent.
It seemed increasingly as though the ship could not achieve the 80/20 solution,
and that reaching some of those islands which had seats of government or
significant populations was not as possible as had been hoped. The vessel was
reportedly unable to access Rarotonga, and there were fears that fitting it with
cranes to unload heavy cargo would cause it to roll.
Entering Service—The (sea) Trials of HMNZS Charles
Upham
HMNZS Charles Upham’s main task was to deploy the Royal New Zealand Army’s
RRF on overseas operations. This would require transporting up to 150 troops,
armoured personnel carriers, trucks, field artillery, and associated equipment
62
Timing is Everything
such as field kitchens and surgery. An opportunity to test this ability was to
present itself in 1996 as part of a ‘Limited Operations and Evaluation’ period.
The vessel made two operational sea trips, from Napier to Lyttleton and, from
24 June–3 August 1996 from Auckland to Fiji on Exercise Tropic Dust, with
plans to visit Tonga, Niue, Western Samoa and Fiji. The author went on board
the ship in Apia harbour in Samoa in July, and was struck first of all by how
high she was sitting out of the water. The vessel had some light equipment on
board, and a number of containers carrying shingle to add ballast, but by all
accounts the trip so far had been one of the most uncomfortable many of the
seasoned sailors had ever experienced. Commander Gary Collier, Director of
Naval Force Development, spoke about the difficulties the following year:
Unfortunately, the ship struck some very rough weather and, not helped
by an engine defect, she ended up beam on to some fairly heavy seas—not
much fun for the ship’s company, let alone the army personnel and cargo
onboard especially when a roll of 37° was recorded. This was a similar
motion to that experienced by some of the senior member’s of the ship’s
company when, also lightly laden, a cyclone was encountered during
the delivery voyage.35
The commanding officer, Commander Ian A. Logan, was reported as being
at times fearful for the safety of the ship. So great was this concern that the ship
was withdrawn from service in August 1996 in order to undertake modifications
to reduce the motion problem of the ship and improve the reliability of the
propulsion system. At the same time the Minister of Defence was told that a
submission seeking Cabinet approval for Phase 3 modifications was in the process
of preparation.
The main reason why the Charles Upham was kept tied up alongside at
Devonport in Auckland was its propensity to roll when at sea. The BMT Defence
Services report in January 1993 had drawn attention to the probability of
uncomfortable motion when the ship was lightly loaded: ‘The technical staff
involved in the selection process were aware of these points, and the other
advantages … were sufficient to override any concerns on this point.’36 The
vessel had been designed to carry up to 7000 tonnes of cargo, and thus loaded
sat low in the water, slowing the period of roll. Lightly loaded, the ship rolled
hugely, making life on board distressingly uncomfortable, threatening the safety
of cargo lashings, and preventing altogether any possibility of helicopter
operations. Whilst there was no initial decision on whether the ship would have
a helicopter of its own, in light of the observation about the possibility of
operating in areas with limited wharf facilities, the limited ability for a helicopter
to operate even after stabilisation work would seem to be of concern. Subsequent
calculations predicted that the vessel would need to carry at least 3500 tonnes
of cargo or ballast in order to produce suitable ship motion.
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The Calliope South Windbreak
By the beginning of 1997, the reputation of the ill-fated vessel had plummeted.
It was reported that there had been a whispering campaign instigated against
the quality of the RNZN’s project management, and it was suggested that the
priority for the Charles Upham’s conversion had been unexpectedly downgraded.
In April the first formal review of the vessel’s purchase was published, HMNZS
Charles Upham: Review of acquisition and proposed conversion, finding that the
vessel was bought for a fair market price and was suitable for conversion. In
May of that year, the New Zealand Herald ran a front page article with the
headline ‘Huge bill for defects in Navy vessel’. In June of 1997 Commander Gary
Collier wrote an update article in Navy Today—referring to the ship as ‘the
Calliope South windbreak’—explaining some of the reasons for the hold up in
further development work on the Charles Upham. He suggested that there were
three factors contributing to the delay: the financial position of the NZDF had
necessitated a Defence Assessment; there was an ongoing review of operational
requirements; and the Government had called for an independent audit into the
acquisition process and the ship’s suitability for conversion. Collier postulated:
I would be cautiously optimistic that, once detailed design work has
been completed, we could see some real activity in the latter half of next
year (it takes about 12 months to complete the drawings and the
subsequent contract process anyway). … I will finish this hopefully
helpful article by emphasising that Charles Upham is an important element
to the NZDF and that it is receiving a high priority amongst the corridors
of power.37
The need for sealift capacity was once again highlighted in the 1997 Defence
Review:
Modern armed forces have a large logistical tail. Troops can be moved
by air but their kit and supplies must come by sea. New Zealand has not
traditionally maintained a military sealift capability. Instead it has relied
on others, most recently the United Nations, to provide transport for
our heavy equipment. The risks of continuing to do so are rising.38
Nevertheless, the White Paper of that year indicated that ‘the Government
will consider whether to convert HMNZS Charles Upham in about two years
time’.39  (In fact, on 20 October 1997 Cabinet had agreed it would consider
modifications to the Charles Upham towards the end of the three year planning
cycle in 2000.) By this stage, the vessel had been tied up alongside at Devonport
in Auckland for 16 months, and had cost some NZ$22 million. In November
1997, the recently formed Alliance Party published its first booklet on the vessel,
The Scandal of The Charles Upham, and described the formal April report as
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being ‘widely regarded both inside and outside the Defence Force as a
whitewash’.40
In April 1998 the RNZN indicated that the funding priority to convert the
ship could not be maintained in the face of a stringent Defence budget, and that
the ship would be offered for lease anticipating funding becoming available.
The Minister of Defence, commenting on why the vessel could not be converted
said: ‘This is simply not our most important need…funding for the conversion
of HMNZS Charles Upham is scheduled for 2000/01.’41
The ship subsequently sailed on 12 May 1998 on a delivery voyage to Spain,
for a bareboat charter of two years and two months, to deliver citrus fruit in the
Mediterranean. Immediately on completion of the charter, it was said, the vessel
would undergo the modification program necessary to allow the ship to operate
effectively in all load conditions: ‘The ship will be a significant asset for New
Zealand’s responsibilities in the Pacific Region.’42  In July 1998 the Alliance
Party produced their second booklet, The Biggest Lemon Ever To Leave Auckland,
describing the vessel then as ‘doing a passable imitation between a lemon and
a white elephant’. It then commented that both the field commander in
Bougainville, Brigadier Roger Mortlock, and the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral
Fred Wilson, had been as critical as serving officers could be of the logistical
and cost implications of not having the Charles Upham available for use for
Bougainville. Following this, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee,
asked the Audit Office to comment on both the quality of advice the New Zealand
Government had received and the implications contained in the Alliance Party
booklets. The Audit Office report was released in September 1998.
With the degree of controversy and public concern that had been raised by
this stage, requests for information were being received by both the Ministry
of Defence and Treasury. The Minister of Defence felt that the public interest
would be best served by as full a disclosure of official information as possible,
and asked for information held by both the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF
pertaining to the acquisition of the Charles Upham to be made available. The
result was a 690 page document, Official Information Pertaining to the Military
Sealift Project HMNZS Charles Upham, released in November 1998. In a statement
made to the Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee at the time of the
release, the Minister said:
Contrary to speculation based on misinformation that is being fed to the
public, the Charles Upham, once modified, is the right ship to meet New
Zealand’s military sealift requirement. While it is unfortunate that the
current financial squeeze has resulted in a delay to these modifications,
there are no reasons not to proceed with the work in two years time. We
will then have a fully capable ship that will give us at least 15 years
service.43
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Later in November, the Minister recommended that Cabinet endorse the
Defence 10 Year Capital Plan, and noted that it would take 18 months for the
design work to be completed and tenders let for the conversion of the Charles
Upham.
Finally, in July 1999, five years after Cabinet had given initial approval for
the purchase of a second-hand vessel, it gave approval in principle for the
conversion progress to begin. The conversion was expected to be finished by
2002, some 15 years after the 1987 Defence Review.
Controversy continued and, in early November 1999, following the
deployment of New Zealand troops to East Timor, Geoff Braybrooke, Labour’s
defence spokesperson, attacked the Government saying: ‘The troop carrier
capability has had such low priority under National that the botched purchase,
HMNZS Charles Upham, is carrying oranges and lemons in the Mediterranean.’44
Later that year there was an election, a change of Government, and the beginnings
of the third formal review of HMNZS Charles Upham.
The Decision to Dispose of HMNZS Charles Upham
Following the election in 1999 and the subsequent change to a Labour led
government, a Strategic Assessment45  and a report, New Zealand’s Foreign and
Security Policy Challenges,46  were completed in 2000, each of these helping to
inform The Government’s Defence Policy Framework 47  released in June 2000. In
this policy document it was made clear that the Government would complete
reviews by November 2000 which would identify options for effective military
sealift for deployment and support of troops. Later that month the Secretary of
Defence wrote to the Minister, noting that the Prime Minister had asked to be
briefed on those capability projects identified in the Framework. The Secretary
reported that a contract had been let to BMT Defence Services for the production
of the design for the conversion to be undertaken; this was to be done in three
phases, two of which had already been completed. The options put to the
Government were to accept that the conversion to the Charles Upham provided
the cheapest way of providing an acceptable sealift solution, and allowing the
design work to be completed; or to review the project specifications for generic
military sealift taking ‘consideration of the advantages of an across-the-beach
capability, and identify available alternatives’. The Secretary added: ‘The Defence
Policy Framework points in the direction of the generic review.’48
In a briefing to Caucus in October 2000, the Minister indicated that in fact
lessons had been learned from East Timor:
The primary reason we need a sealift ship is to deploy the heavy
equipment of a committed Army group within a reasonable period. The
lessons of East Timor demonstrated the importance of sealift and the
need for us to address this.49
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The Sealift Review was completed in November 2000, and made a number of
observations and recommendations. Firstly it highlighted the distinction
customarily made between strategic and tactical sealift. Strategic sealift is the
delivery of heavy equipment from New Zealand to an assembly area, usually a
fixed port, where vehicles and equipment are married up with personnel, who
are most likely to have been flown into the area. Tactical sealift is the delivery
of equipment and personnel into an operational area; and tactical sealift ships
are designed to operate in areas without formal port facilities. The Review makes
the point that, in the case of East Timor, both requirements were demonstrated,
with strategic sealift transporting equipment to Darwin by roll-on, roll-off vessel;
and a French tactical sealift ship completing the journey and off-loading over
the beach. The Review indicated that a limited over the beach capacity would
be useful, and could be provided by a modified Charles Upham. The Sealift
Review examined four options:
1. Reliance on commercial chartering;
2. Acquisition of a used military sealift ship;
3. Purchase of a new purpose built ship; and
4. Modification of the Charles Upham.
It defined the capacity needed as the requirement to transport equipment to
support a battalion group, and therefore the specification was almost exactly
the same as that originally proposed in the User Specification of 1992.
The reliance on commercial chartering was seen as carrying some
risks—particularly the concern about the possible delays at a time when a rapid
response might be needed, but also the lack of a tactical capability. The used
military sealift ship was seen as a high-risk option in terms of cost, whilst the
new, purpose-built vessel was seen as high in tactical utility, whilst only being
able to match half of the strategic capacity of a modified Charles Upham. The
Review concluded that, whilst the Charles Upham had some limitations in its
ability to off-load cargo across the beach, and limited utility for other duties
when not undertaking sealift, it was nonetheless ‘the most cost effective option
for meeting the core requirement for assured strategic sealift’.50
Earlier that month the Cabinet Policy Committee had invited a group of
Ministers, including the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of
Finance and Minister of Defence, to explore how to progress defence options
more rapidly. One month later, 21 December 2000, a Sustainable Defence Plan
was submitted to Ministers from both the Department of the Prime Minister and
Cabinet and Treasury. The Plan stated:
Officials’ conclusions at this stage are that:
1. Any immediate requirement for strategic sealift should be provided
by charter arrangements;
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2. The Charles Upham should be sold next year when it comes off
charter; and
3. Any further requirements for sealift or a ship with a multipurpose
role can be examined in the context of a replacement for HMNZS
Canterbury.51
Following discussion at the Cabinet Policy Committee meeting in March,
Cabinet decided on 2 April 2001 to endorse the above recommendations, and
the decision was announced in the Government Defence Statement of 8 May
2001.52  In July the Minister of Defence announced that the vessel had been sold
to a Spanish shipping company saying that the NZ$35–40 million needed to
modify the vessel was not considered to be a prudent use of defence resources.
Reflections on the Purchase and Disposal of HMNZS
Charles Upham
As has become already apparent, the major concern about the Charles Upham
was that it did not work in the way that was intended. After the ship had been
bought, the intention was to make it ready in three steps. The first of these were
the initial modifications and commissioning; the second was the period of sea
trials; and the third was to have been the more expensive full modification stage.
Timing and political influence were important influencing elements from very
early on in the ship’s development.
It is important here to recall that the 1997 Review had commented that the
Prime Minister’s Department had given indications in 1993 that the MSS project
should not be promoted. Cabinet had given approval for the purchase of the
ship on 28 November 1994, and the sale was finalised very quickly, on
16 December 1994. After a Mercandian had first been identified as a suitable
ship, some six vessels had come up for sale. By the time Cabinet approval had
been given all had been sold, but one sale fell through and a vessel was again
available. However, the sale needed to be actioned quickly. Dick Gentles, former
Deputy Secretary, Policy and Planning noted: ‘There was a feeling of conspiracy
that because we’d bought the vessel so quickly after Cabinet approval that the
deal was cooked up; politicians were suspicious.’53  Political influence then came
into play. Warren Cooper, the Minister of Defence at the time said: ‘I formed
the impression that Jim Bolger wasn’t enthusiastic about the deal and that
impression grew subsequently when we had purchased the vessel.’54  Robin
Johansen confirmed the concern: ‘I had a visit shortly afterwards from the Prime
Minister’s Department, and was told I shouldn’t put up any plans for the
conversion of the vessel because “it won’t happen.”’55  Jim Bolger, Prime Minister
at the time, was forthright in his comments: ‘I was never persuaded that we




At the time of commissioning in October 1995 it was proposed that no firm
decisions on major alterations would be taken for some months, to allow for
operational experience. The second step began on 2 November 1995, with the
ship virtually unchanged from its original condition, except for the addition of
communications equipment and increased accommodation.
As has become clear, the first stage of sea trials for the ship was dangerous,
and disastrous for the ship’s image. At this point it seems as though there were
two factors operating in tandem to make development of the Charles Upham
difficult—fiscal and operational. In looking at trade-offs, the decision had been
made to bring the vessel out from Europe with a commercial crew. When the
RNZN had commissioned the fleet replenishment ship HMNZS Endeavour, the
crew had been sent to the Merchant Navy Training School in Launceston, and
some to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) in the United Kingdom for training. An
RFA Chief Officer joined the Endeavour as an advisor: it was recognised that
operating merchant vessels required different skills from those required for
combat vessels. Again the question of bureaucratic politics was raised. Peter
Cozens noted: ‘The Navy didn’t use the same principles for the Upham as they
had with the Endeavour—a huge lack of judgement. At first I thought it was
plain stupidity; but it was strategy.’57 Teagle gave a different view:
There was never the opportunity to train the crew the way we did with
Endeavour. With the Endeavour we had time to plan. We learnt from the
RFA for Endeavour; that specialist training they had provided needed to
be provided for the crew of the Upham and it wasn’t. I had retired shortly
after the decision to purchase the ship was taken, so why, I don’t know.58
The issue of bureaucratic politics was also raised by the Audit Office Review:
We could not establish why the evaluation of the Charles Upham by sea
trials was not reactivated after the propulsion system was fixed. When
the ship was leased it was sailed to Europe in a light-load condition.59
These two elements, together with the history of policy decisions which were
part of ongoing political influence, combined to ensure that the necessary funding
which had been identified at the beginning of the project was never forthcoming.
The ship was withdrawn from service in August 1996, and a freeze on
unapproved capital expenditure was already in force. In October 1996 the first
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) election returned a Government led by the
National Party, with the support of New Zealand First. Winston Peters, the leader
of New Zealand First, was appointed as Treasurer, and once again no funds were
forthcoming for the progress of the Charles Upham.
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The Reviews
As indicated, there were three formal reviews of the Charles Upham, in 1997,
1998 and 2000, and two reports, by the Alliance Party, in 1997 and 1998. The
1997 Review concluded with:
The consultants have reviewed the acquisition process. They consider
that the process of evaluating the options and the purchase was carried
out in a professionally responsible manner. The steps taken were, for
the most part, those that one would normally expect.60
The Alliance Party report of 1997 said that the ‘conclusions are most kindly
described as surprising. … Unkinder critics have called the conclusions a
whitewash’.61 The 1998 Report from the Office of the Controller and
Auditor-General was wide-ranging in its review. It examined the DCRP, which
covered a 10-year period and was reviewed on an annual basis. It was told by
Treasury that the latter’s former manager had been concerned about the lack of
priorities in the plan. It also noted that the Plan was reviewed at least annually,
with resulting changes to priorities. The DCRP for 1994–95 had a note attached
regarding the Charles Upham which stated: ‘Potential upgrades have been
identified at $34 million. The cash requirement will be confirmed in light of
operating experience and funded out of underspends and programme slippage
on an opportunity basis.’62
The Report team was clearly concerned that the commitment to fund
modifications was secondary at this stage to other projects. They highlighted
that Treasury commented: ‘It is not clear at this stage what would be the value
of an unmodified sealift ship, in the event that Ministers do not wish to commit
to the additional expenditure necessary to upgrade it.’63
It would seem that right from the beginning of the proposal there was a
question mark hanging over any future major funding for conversion. Members
of the External Relations and Defence Committee were asked in their deliberations
to note that the purchase and initial modification of the vessel would provide
an adequate basic capability, and that future modifications would happen only
if money was available which did not mean prejudicing other projects. The
Report team was of the opinion that, even at this stage, it meant that the upgrade
of the MSS was the lowest of priorities. Once more highlighting the place of
bureaucratic politics, it concluded that the Government of the day made its
decision ‘on assurances from both NZDF and the MoD that proved in the event
not to be valid’.64 The Audit Review Team summarised its major findings
succinctly: ‘The adequate basic MSS capability promised to Cabinet has never
been realised. The statement that capital equipment procurement would not
require a capital injection has proved to be incorrect’.65
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Was HMNZS Charles Upham a lemon?
HMNZS Charles Upham ended up being the butt of many jokes, particularly
when it went off to Spain to become a citrus fruit transporter. There are many
varied opinions about why the vessel turned so sour. Robert Miles, a radical
defence commentator from Timaru, suggested that it was likely the RNZN knew
they were buying a lemon; that if this had not been the case, they might have
had a new amphibious assault ship, or the Tobruk.66  In February 2000, in an
open discussion on the lessons of East Timor, Major General Piers Reid, former
Chief of General Staff, spoke in impassioned fashion about the Charles Upham:
For the third time in the past six years, after Bosnia and Bougainville,
the mistaken purchase of the totally unsuitable Charles Upham has come
back to haunt the Defence Force. I cannot overstate the need for a suitable
vessel; for deployments, for services protected evacuations and for
disaster relief. The internal Defence politics, which saw the cheapest
near-enough cargo ship purchased, to preserve funds for the frigates,
has worked entirely against the national interest.67
The Admirals, contended Robert Miles—echoing Major General Reid—wanted
to concentrate on a blue-water fighting force. Such sentiments were echoed by
Peter Cozens, Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of
Wellington: ‘The Navy simply did not want it, and did everything in their power
to ensure they didn’t get it.’68  Robin Johansen, former Deputy
Secretary—Acquisitions added: ‘The Navy didn’t see the acquisition of the
Upham as being of strategic value to them.’69  Rear Admiral Jack Welch however
commented: ‘The Navy was given the task of fulfilling a national requirement
to buy a ship to transport the Army. Had we followed through with the
conversion she would have been quite suitable for the purpose.’70  On this aspect
Peter Cozens agreed and thought the concept of conversion was ‘brilliant,
spot-on. The Corps of Naval Constructors said it was feasible and would produce
an excellent outcome. It would have done.’71  His sentiments were reflected by
Admiral Sir Somerford Teagle: ‘It could have been a good ship. It was a
tragedy—a missed opportunity. It seems it was never really given a chance.’72
Once again, Jim Bolger responded in direct fashion: ‘The terminology that it
could have been a good ship tells you everything you want to know. It wasn’t.’73
There were other commentators who suggested that the ship was never really
given a chance, and provided interesting feedback of their own. The following
letter appeared as part of ongoing correspondence in the New Zealand Listener
in 2001:
(The) reference to the much-maligned HMNZS Charles Upham assumed
that the ship was lacking in stability by inferring that she could only
cart lemons ‘without rolling over and going glug’. That ship, and many
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others of her class, sail the world’s sea lanes daily. One of their many
attributes is that they possess a surfeit of positive stability, which makes
for uncomfortable seakeeping qualities, but in turn provides a tremendous
margin of safety if the ship is ever damaged. This fact seems to have been
overlooked.
As a military materiel carrier, she was superb, but the RNZN did not
appreciate her capabilities. Some of the published figures for her to be
made ‘serviceable’ in RNZN terms were ludicrous. One wonders why
she was never given a fair go. Merchant naval personnel are conversant
with such ships and had she been manned by them, she might have
performed her allotted duties admirably.74
The RNZN continued to work on a solution for the poor sea-keeping qualities
of the vessel throughout the 1990s but, with a change of Government following
the election in 1999, the opportunity for correction was to be lost.
Summary
Whilst external sources, and in particular the value placed on CDR, had some
influence in the early stages of the decision to purchase the ill-fated HMNZS
Charles Upham, the most consistently apparent influencing elements during the
early phases of the decision-making process were New Zealand’s role in the
world, geographical priorities, and the judgement of short-term versus long-term
payoffs. Although the National Party and the Labour Party each had different
views of New Zealand’s role in the world, they both recognised the need to be
able to deploy troops and equipment overseas. Geographical priorities as spelt
out in the 1987 White Paper required Defence to be able to respond to regional
crises. With the debate about a LSS having begun in earnest in 1978, and having
been reinforced by the recommendations of the 1987 White Paper, the impact
of judgements of short-term versus long-term payoffs and the trade offs this
entailed was to nevertheless ensure that some 30 years later New Zealand was
still waiting for a fully functioning Multi-Role Vessel to become available. Here
one would have to wonder about the difference in the order of magnitude of
committing several hundreds of millions of dollars for a replacement frigate, the
lease of the F-16s, the upgrading of the Orions or the purchase of new armoured
vehicles for the Army (each of which will be explored in subsequent chapters),
with the original estimate of NZ$34 million to upgrade the Charles Upham.75
Undoubtedly bureaucratic politics had their place, as the New Zealand Army
and the RNZN pursued their own priorities. Timing and political influence,
though, were ultimately the crucial features in the decision-making process, the
resistance to completion of the conversion work proving to be the death knell
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The Second Frigate Decision
In 1989 the decision on whether to buy the third and fourth ANZAC frigates
seemed a long way off; indeed as previously indicated, Geoffrey Palmer had said
the decision would not need to be taken for almost a decade. Before the next
decision was due to be made, major changes to New Zealand’s electoral system
were to take place, with the introduction of Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)
representation in 1996, and the need for the formation of a coalition government.
It was the need for retaining coalition support that was to have a decisive
influence on the National-led Government’s decision not to proceed with the
option to purchase the third and fourth ANZAC frigates.
As early as 1992, the Minister of Defence, Warren Cooper, suggested that
New Zealand might not take up the option to buy the third and fourth ANZAC
frigates. He was to reinforce his opinion, if not that of his leader, in an interview
with the Australian Defence Magazine in 1994: ‘We’ve got two Leander-class
frigates that will remain good for a few years. My guess is that we wouldn’t be
able to sign up confidently for another two ANZAC frigates, but that door is left
open.’1  In January 1995, whilst New Zealand’s first ANZAC frigate was taking
shape on both sides of the Tasman, Cooper fired a further broadside in the
discussions on whether to purchase the third and fourth ANZAC frigates: ‘Two
frigates enough for NZ: Cooper’, read the headline in the New Zealand Herald.
The article went on to say that the Minister did not believe that New Zealand
needed to buy more ANZAC frigates: ‘I am not fully committed to the third and
fourth frigates. … Quite frankly there are other priorities the Government will
want to address.’2 The decision on whether to buy more ANZAC frigates was
due to be taken by the end of 1996. That timing was to coincide with the first
MMP election, and the Minister indicated that defence spending would need to
compete against other demands in the areas of education, health and welfare.
During the early 1990s, although there was little public debate about the
frigates, public opinion nonetheless remained important. During 1995, the
Foundation for Peace Studies published a report of a survey which had sought
to establish up-to-date public opinion on a range of matters related to peace and
defence issues. Two questions in the survey had particular relevance for the
upcoming debate on the purchase of further frigates—one about the level of
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defence spending; the other about how many, if any, ANZAC frigates should be
purchased.
With regards to attitudes on defence spending, there was a clear message
that there was no mandate for increased spending, with results as follows: 3













As can be seen, a large percentage of respondents wished to maintain the
status quo, holding defence spending at current levels and pursuing the purchase
of two frigates. However, a significant minority, 31 per cent, wished for a
decrease in defence spending, and 28 per cent wished for cancellation of the
frigate purchase, whilst only 8 per cent supported the purchase of a third frigate.
It was against such a backdrop that the first MMP election was to be fought.
The 1996 MMP Election, the Impact of Coalition
Government, and the Second Frigate Decision
In the run-up to the election, the Labour Party launched its foreign affairs and
defence policy in August 1996. Whilst remaining committed to a blue-water
navy, Labour would buy only two ANZAC frigates. Foreshadowing changes
that would start to take place at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
policy stated that Labour would ‘ensure that we [New Zealand] have a fleet of
a minimum of four vessels that will perform the essential South Pacific blue
water navy roles at a more appropriate level of sophistication and technology’.4
Reinforcing the research findings of the Foundation for Peace Studies
Aotearoa-New Zealand’s the previous year, and speaking to public sentiment,
the leader of the Opposition, Helen Clark, commented that ‘there is but a small
constituency for defence-related expenditure in New Zealand’.5 This was
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apparently reflected in the Defence budget which, according to New Zealand
Defence Force (NZDF) spokesperson John Seward, had decreased dramatically
in real terms—some 35 per cent since 1989–90. The budget for the 1996 financial
year was NZ$1.6 billion, and reportedly just 1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). New Zealand’s Australian neighbours continued to watch with concern.
Following the return of a National-led Coalition Government at the end of
1996, the thorny issue of the frigate purchase option was soon back on the
political agenda. Ruth Laugesen reporting in the New Zealand Herald at the
beginning of 1997 noted:
After a softly-softly approach by the Australian government last year
because of the New Zealand elections, Prime Minister John Howard is
expected to apply renewed pressure on Jim Bolger when he visits New
Zealand for three days from Saturday.6
She went on to comment that the representatives from Australia were expected
to meet resistance from New Zealand First Cabinet ministers, as that Party’s
election policy had also opposed purchasing more frigates. New Zealand First
MP and Associate Treasurer Tuariki Delamere has stated: ‘Our overall stance is
that we oppose it. We would need to be convinced and we have to work through
the issue’.7  Notwithstanding this expected opposition, National’s new Minister
of Defence, Paul East, supported the proposal to buy more frigates, saying that
he could see clear benefits for continuing with the ANZAC frigate program.
With a decision on whether to pursue the option to buy two more ANZACS
needing to be taken by November 1997, May of that year saw the Prime Minister,
Jim Bolger, in Melbourne for the launching of the second New Zealand ANZAC,
HMNZS Te Mana. In a speech he gave the day before the launch, Bolger offered
strong support for the frigate project. He indicated that the New Zealand
Government would not reduce the size of the planned fleet of four, despite
indications that there was growing resistance both within his own Caucus, and
within that of New Zealand First, to buying even one more frigate. Speculation
was growing though that if further frigates were ordered, the air strike force
might have to be abandoned. That same day, in a bid to hedge bets, Paul East
indicated that the Government might opt for an alternative to buying the two
proposed new ANZAC frigates. He noted that options included indefinitely
deferring a decision; going for corvette-sized vessels; or exploring the possibilities
of second-hand vessels.
By August 1997, with pressure growing from within, the Government
confirmed that officials from the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) and from the
Ministry of Defence would visit the United States to check the prices of warships.
The performance criteria for the ANZAC frigates had been set out at the time of
the first frigate purchase decision-making process, and essentially remained
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unchanged. However, alternative vessels with comparable abilities were explored
during the time of the first Coalition Government. In order to retain a four-frigate
Navy, the Minister had asked officials to explore the possibility of replacing the
Leanders with second-hand ex-US FFG-7s. However, taking all costs into account
(see Table 4.1) it was clear that the purchase of two second-hand refitted FFG-7s
would cost substantially more than a new ANZAC, and the Minister concluded
that that option should not be further pursued.
Table 4.1: Comparison of Annual Costs for Mixed and ANZAC Fleets
(1997 NZ$ million)
(Averaged over five years)







(Source: Defence Assessment Paper, Office of the Minister of Defence, Wellington, 17 September 1997, p. 5.
Paper attached to ERD (97) 18.
Harry Duynhoven, the Labour MP for New Plymouth, was quick to suggest
the Danish frigate option again, saying that by investigating the possibility of
ex-US warships, the RNZN had ‘blown out of the water’ one of its main arguments
against the Danish vessels—that running two classes of warship would be too
costly. It was not an option that gained support.
It had been six years since a Defence White Paper had been published, and
in June of 1997 the Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on External Relations and
Defence directed officials to complete the Defence Assessment by 31 July 1997.
In the draft copy of the Defence Assessment, six force structure options were
developed, the major features of which are shown in Table 4.2:
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Table 4.2: Force Structure Options
Option DOption C4Option C3Option C2Option C1Option AVariables






























(Source: Defence Assessment Paper, Office of the Minister of Defence, Wellington, 17 September 1997, p. 3.
Paper attached to ERD (97) 18.)
The recommendation of the Minister of Defence, Paul East, to the Cabinet
Subcommittee, was to adopt a refined Option C4, resulting in:
i. A Naval Combat Force based on the ANZAC frigates, with the third to be
ordered this year.
ii. A Land Combat Force based on two regular force infantry battalions with
four rifle companies each.
iii. An Air Combat Force comprising the A-4 Skyhawks, these to be replaced
by a suitable aircraft in due course.
iv. A Long Range Maritime Surveillance Force based on the Orions, re-winged
and equipped with updated sensors and communications suites (Projects
Kestrel and Sirius).
v. An Air Transport Force based on the one-for-one replacement of the current
fleet of C-130 Hercules and B-727 aircraft. The C-130 fleet is to be replaced
by the acquisition of five C-130J aircraft.
vi. The maintenance and development of the remaining capabilities in the
existing force structure.8
The Minister also recommended upgrading the Army’s combat capability,
including the acquisition of armoured vehicles. In the covering paper, ERD (97)
18, of the Cabinet Subcommittee, it was proposed that:
A proposal be brought forward before the end of 1997 to authorise
officials to commence negotiations for the acquisition of a third ANZAC
ship. The option available to New Zealand for the purchase of two
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additional ANZAC frigates would not be taken up. The Navy would
become a three frigate fleet from 30 June 1998.9
In fact, the prospect of buying any further frigates in the near future seemed
increasingly unlikely. On 13 October Winston Peters, leader of New Zealand
First, Deputy Prime Minister, and Treasurer, declared that his Party would not
support the purchase of a third frigate—there was no mention of a fourth.
Confronting his colleagues in Cabinet over defence spending, he suggested that
any decision on buying more than the current two frigates should be deferred
until after 2000, that is, until after the next election. (New Zealand First had
slumped in the polls at this stage to 1.7 per cent support, and this stand was
seen as an attempt to position New Zealand First, in the eyes of the electorate,
as a compassionate party.) The following day, despite his own firm conviction
that New Zealand needed a third frigate, the Prime Minister commented that the
decision on whether to purchase a third frigate could wait until after the 1999
election. This time it was the Minister of Defence’s turn to say that the decision
had to be taken ‘fairly soon’, though the previous deadline of November 1997
no longer applied, and it would still be possible to purchase a frigate beyond
the option date. Peters was firm in his resolve against the purchase of any further
frigates, claiming that the first decision was wrong: ‘It was the wrong decision
to make; it was the wrong technology, enormously overpriced. That is still my
view.’10
However, on 15 October the New Zealand Herald called for greater
commitment on the part of the Government:
A closer trans-Tasman defence relationship requires New Zealand to
maintain a respectable fighting force and at least a modicum of military
equipment compatible with that of its partner.
Credibility on that score requires at the very least a four-frigate Navy.
And having agreed to replace two of its ageing fleet with the Australian
vessels there seems no sense in going elsewhere for the remainder.11
On this occasion it would seem that the New Zealand Herald was somewhat
out of step with the over-riding public and political opinion of the times. The
Government had taken note of the report commissioned by Treasury on The
Navy Critical Mass Argument. Written by Professor G. Anthony Vignaux, he
concluded: ‘Based on the data provided…the logic of the “Critical Mass”
argument is undeniable. A frigate force of 2 frigates cannot carry out the
Government requirement. A force of 3 frigates is marginal.’12  Despite this
observation that three frigates would be marginal, at a meeting on 20 October
Cabinet agreed that the Naval Combat Force would be based on a fleet of three
surface combatants, and also ‘agreed that the option available to New Zealand
under the ANZAC Ship Treaty, which provides for the purchase of two additional
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ANZAC frigates, will not be taken up’.13  Cabinet deferred any decision on the
content and timing of the release of the White Paper until 3 November. No
comment was made about any possible acquisition of a third frigate.
At the time that Peters made his pronouncement about the third frigate, the
long awaited Defence Assessment was in the final stages of completion; another
assessment, the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, had only just begun. The need
for a broad deliberation on the future of defence had led the Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade Committee to set up an enquiry to ‘consider options for the
development of New Zealand’s Defence policy, structure and capabilities beyond
2000’.14 The Chair of the Committee was the Hon. Derek Quigley, ACT MP and
author of the 1988 Resource Management Review. Quigley suggested that the
Defence Assessment be put on hold, pending the outcome of the inquiry: ‘The
Defence Assessment is more than a year late already. A short delay will give us
the opportunity to have a broader look at defence requirements’.15 The
Government, however, were not going to wait.
In November 1997 the latest Defence White Paper, The Shape of New Zealand’s
Defence, was released.16 The White Paper reinforced that the policy set out in
the 1991 White Paper continued to be the most appropriate policy framework
to guide defence policy, and spelt out, as expected, the future structure of the
Naval Combat Force which, as indicated above, was to move from four frigates
to three in 1998. Commenting on the White Paper, the Australian Minister for
Defence said he hoped that the frigate decision was not final: ‘We’ll certainly
be taking it up with New Zealand.’17  Paul East suggested that the Government
could ‘revisit’ the matter the following year.18  His successor was to ensure that
this happened.
The Third Frigate Decision
Maintaining a three frigate fleet was a clear objective; how to maintain it was
not at all clear. Fighting a rearguard action against his coalition colleagues, the
new Minister for Defence, Max Bradford, raised the prospect in March 1998 that
the RNZN might have to merge with the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), unless
a third frigate was ordered. It was suggested by Greg Ansley the New Zealand
Herald’s Canberra correspondent, that this comment bore ‘the marks of frustration
and politicking, rather than serious thinking’,19  and the Australian Minister
for Defence apparently shared little enthusiasm for the remarks. It was indicative
of the tenor of the times.
Yet, it was to be the end of October and into November before the debate hit
the headlines again. A year beyond the original deadline for making a decision
on the purchase of further ANZAC frigates, Cabinet was asked to give
authorisation for the purchase of a second-hand ANZAC frigate. In papers
accompanying the memorandum to Cabinet, the Minister of Defence made a
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strong case for the purchase of a third ANZAC frigate, and highlighted that this
would be the last opportunity to buy a third ANZAC.20 The production line
would be closed within two years, foreclosing the possibility of New Zealand
buying a second-hand ship which the Australians would replace with a
new-build.
However, along with this request, was another of the same date, asking for
agreement in principle that the lease of 28 F-16s from the United States be
negotiated. To seek two such requests at the same Cabinet meeting was perhaps,
in light of the politics of the time, being a little optimistic. The Minister himself
was only too aware of the difficulty of selling the proposals:
But there is another affordability view, that of the public. There is little
doubt that most people see the purchase of a third frigate as
‘unaffordable’. Perhaps this has more to do with not understanding the
role of the Navy, or of the role of the frigates in the Navy.21
The Minister was also aware of the views of some of his Cabinet colleagues: ‘We
had a relatively pacifist group of people within Cabinet. … The perception in
Cabinet was that there wasn’t support for a third new frigate. That’s why I’d
taken the precaution of organising a second-hand one.’22
Whilst Paul East had noted in the Defence Assessment Paper that no second
hand ANZAC frigates were available, by the following year that had changed.
Max Bradford said: ‘The Australians bent over backwards’ [to come up with a
deal].23 The Australian Department of Defence:
offered [name deleted] a new ship as of today24  … for delivery in four
and a half years time. Modification would be required at a cost of up to
[figure deleted]. The down payment would be 15% and the remainder
would be paid over 5 years after delivery in 2003.25
Treasury seemed warm to the notion of a second-hand ship. Whilst a new
ANZAC was considered and other classes of ship, such as the FFG-7 or UK Type
23 were also reviewed, Treasury felt that:
The proposal to purchase a second-hand frigate from Australia is likely
to be the most cost-effective means of maintaining a three-frigate Navy
over the longer term, as it avoids the development and support costs
that would be required with another class of ship. The second-hand
purchase also minimises likely cost escalations.26
The release of the Interim Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Committee, Inquiry Into Defence Beyond 2000, in November 1998, the month in
which the frigate decision was taken, added more fuel to the, by now, raging
debate. The authors commented:
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The political, commercial and practical naval arguments ten years ago
for purchasing the ANZAC ships were straightforward. … The argument
ten years ago has weakened with time, and has little force in relation to
the purchase of a third ANZAC frigate. Both countries’ businesses would
have too much to lose by a winding back of the clock in the broader area
of CER—not to mention the bad signals that any unilateral action by
Australia would send to its other trading partners.27
However, the Minister made the point very clearly in the paper that this was a
last-chance opportunity.
This is the last opportunity to acquire a third ANZAC ship. Not taking
a decision will risk the New Zealand Government not having a valid offer
on the table for consideration from either TENIX or the Australian
Government. The flow-on effect will mean that New Zealand would not
be able to source an ANZAC replacement for HMNZS Canterbury prior
to her withdrawal from RNZN operational service in 2005.28
By the fourth quarter of 1998 the country was officially in recession and
unemployment rose. In November 1998 Jenny Shipley was Prime Minister and
leading a minority Government. The coalition with NZ First had disintegrated
in August of that year, and Shipley’s Government relied on a ‘mixed bag of 18
ACT, United and Independent MPs’.29  In her ‘Opening Remarks’ in the book
Holyoake’s Lieutenants, Shipley noted: ‘Sir Keith exemplified the virtues which
subsequent New Zealand Prime Ministers have to strive for—magnanimity, calm
assurance, good humour, team-building and, moreover, consensus-seeking as
opposed to enforcing consensus.’30
In the lead-up to the decision on whether or not to purchase a third ANZAC
frigate, Shipley was only too well-aware of the importance of seeking consensus
and maintaining political support from a very varied group of MPs.
Labour Leader Helen Clark saw an opportunity to make significant political
gains out of the situation, and pulled no punches:
It is understood that the New Zealand Government has already indicated
to Australia that it is likely to purchase a third frigate, but that
Mrs Shipley does not want to make any public announcement before
February. The coincidence of announcement in February, presumably
after the scheduled vote of confidence, will not be accidental. Mrs Shipley
and National know that there has been opposition in ACT to a frigate
purchase, and that former Peace Activists like the Rev. Ann Batten,
would have to reconsider their support for the Government if the frigate
purchase went ahead.31
85
‘No, Minister….’—The ANZAC Frigates, Part II
Helen Clark went on to say:
The Rev. Ann Batten says she speaks for the other independent MPs
involved in launching the new political party when she states that they
will not back the frigate purchase … if National is determined on the
purchase of the third ANZAC frigate, then this issue may well precipitate
an election before Christmas.32
What is outstanding about the proposed purchase is the persistent
allegation that the Government is proposing to put down a $50 million
non-refundable deposit for a third frigate in a bizarre attempt to commit
future Governments to it. It is understood that no such deposit is
required. Mrs Shipley and National Cabinet Ministers are fighting a
losing battle in trying to sell the idea of another ANZAC frigate purchase.
National backbenchers are said to be extremely concerned about the
political implications for their Government, which is already on the
rocks.33
Clark went on to comment on the issue of trade-offs, which Max Bradford
commented on as bureaucratic politics. Clark said:
The big losers from a spend-up on yet another frigate would be the NZ
Army which currently is carrying the major burden of New Zealand’s
defence commitments overseas. The NZ Army is highly respected for its
work around the globe. Yet it has been sent to a major commitment in
Bosnia under-equipped to the extent that soldiers’ lives were in danger.34
The pressure on the Government continued throughout November. At its
meeting on 30 November, Cabinet noted that there were three options before it
to secure a replacement for the frigate HMNZS Canterbury; to buy a new ANZAC
frigate from Australian-based Tenix Corporation now; to buy a second-hand
ship from Australia; or to wait for an opportunity to buy in two or three years’
time. Nevertheless, despite the opportunity to purchase what appeared to be a
bargain, Cabinet rejected the deal for a third ANZAC frigate. The decision was
announced on 1 December 1998 that New Zealand would not be proceeding with
a third ANZAC frigate, and a decision for a replacement vessel was to be delayed
until 2002. Bradford put on a brave face in commenting on the decision, and
said the Government would continue to look for a replacement third frigate,
although he ‘acknowledged that this was highly unlikely to be another
ANZAC’.35  In reflecting on the decision, Bradford commented:
There was a huge stink and we weren’t doing at all well in the polls. The
issue never got a timely enough run to convince the public. It was a
combination of a concerted campaign by the Opposition and a minority
Government no longer in coalition. There was Deborah Morris and others
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being fed misinformation by the Army, and there were those in our own
Party who were against it.36
The following year there was to be another election and a change of
Government, and this was to be followed by a significant change to the outlook
for the RNZN. New frigates would no longer be on the agenda.
Summary
In examining the final (two) decisions not to proceed with the purchase of further
ANZAC (or indeed any other) frigates, several features come to the fore. New
Zealand’s relationship with Australia, the ongoing requirement for a blue-water
navy, and the recognition that there was one last opportunity to buy a third
ANZAC frigate—all these factors played their part during the early stages of the
decision-making process. Timing however, was once more to be a crucial factor.
The 1991 and 1997 Defence Reviews reinforced the notion of ‘Self-Reliance in
Partnership’, while at the same time requiring the maintenance of a balanced
force which was militarily credible. Whilst naval combat credibility had
previously been predicated upon the notion of a minimum of a four frigate Navy,
the Government was only too well aware of the political and budget constraints
of the time. These constraints, rather than military credibility, led to a decision
by Cabinet to move the naval combat force from four frigates to three in 1998.
Even this, however, was not to eventuate.
Whilst continued public opposition to the frigates, and bureaucratic politics,
including the role of Treasury and the Army, were important as the decisions
not to proceed were made, ultimately the two most important elements during
these periods were politics and the judgement of political side effects. Reflecting
the new power of MMP, the impact of these influencing elements was to lead
to the Government backing down on a decision to purchase a further frigate in
both 1997 and 1998. Having made a policy decision in the 1997 White Paper
that New Zealand should have a three frigate fleet, National was just not able to
ensure that this would actually eventuate.
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‘The Deal of the Century’—The F-16s
In November 1998 the National-led Coalition Government, at the same time that
it decided not to pursue the purchase of a third ANZAC frigate, made a decision
to lease 28 F-16 A/B aircraft from the United States. That same month, the Interim
Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Inquiry into Defence
Beyond 2000 was published.1  In contrast to the Government’s decision, the
Report challenged whether it was necessary to retain an air combat wing at all.
The following year the Labour Party returned to power leading a coalition
government, and had already indicated that it would review the F-16 lease
decision. In order to do so, it called for the Chair of the Inquiry into Defence
Beyond 2000 Report, the Hon. Derek Quigley, to undertake the review. The
Review was published on 6 March 2000,2  and the Government announced on
20 March that it would not proceed with the lease arrangements entered into
by the previous Government.
This chapter traces the events leading up to the National-led Government’s
decision to lease 28 F-16s, and the subsequent decision by the Labour-led coalition
to cancel the lease, highlighting the critical elements which came to bear as the
decision to lease was made, and then unmade. Subsequently I report on the
decision to abandon the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) strike air combat
wing, and the disbandment of No. 2, No. 14 and No. 75 Squadrons in December
2001.
History and Background
For over three decades, the McDonnell Douglas A-4K and TA-4K served as New
Zealand’s strike aircraft. The 1966 Defence White Paper reinforced the need for
the RNZAF to continue to operate in combat, transport and maritime roles.3  By
this stage, the Canberra bombers of No. 14 Squadron, which had been introduced
in 1959, were seen to need replacement by 1970. British fighter production had
been axed by the 1957 White Paper, and attention turned to the United States,
which had several aircraft which might be suitable. Types considered by the
RNZAF during 1967 included the Northrop F-5E Tiger, McDonnell Douglas F-4E
Phantom and A-4E Skyhawk, and the General Dynamics F-111. Ultimately the
McDonnell Douglas A-4E Skyhawk was selected, and in April 1968 14 were
ordered at a cost of $NZ24.65 million.4  Designated A-4K (K for Kiwi), the aircraft
were essentially the A-4E with minor changes as specified by the RNZAF. The
10 A-4K and 4 TA-4K aircraft arrived in Auckland on board the USS Okinawa
on 17 May 1970, although the uninsured aircraft were almost lost at sea. After
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leaving Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the aircraft carrier hit a storm with 80 knot
winds. The captain considered rolling the aircraft into the sea to save his ship,
but the storm abated just in time to save them.5 The aircraft were officially
taken into service in June 1970, with No. 75 Squadron.
The decision to purchase the A-4 Skyhawk met with some criticism within
the RNZAF, but the aircraft, first flown in 1954, had demonstrated its capability
by 1968 when New Zealand placed the order: it was at that stage still the mainstay
of the US Navy and US Marine Corps attack wings, and had been well-proven
in combat in the Vietnam War.6
The aircraft’s general capability for close air support was sufficient for the
tasks expected of it in 1970, but by the time of the 1983 Defence Review an
extended range of tasks was anticipated, including maritime strike, counter-air,
sea and land interdiction and close air support. The RNZAF considered three
options at the time: the acquisition of more capable second-hand aircraft; new
aircraft; or the upgrade of the A-4 Skyhawk. In 1983 the RNZAF evaluation group
reviewed a number of new aircraft, and favoured the purchase of new F-16s.
The program cost was to be NZ$900 million, including spares and equipment,
and was seen as prohibitive. A decision was then taken to considerably upgrade
the current aircraft. The 1983 Defence Review commented:
The A4-K Skyhawk aircraft have served us well in the attack role. The
1978 Review identified a requirement to upgrade the aircraft’s navigation
and weapon delivery systems and planning to do so is well advanced.
It has since been established that a structural refurbishment programme
will also be necessary to extend the life of the aircraft.
The Review went on:
In addition to the planned upgrading programme, consideration has been
given to acquiring additional aircraft. Augmenting the present force
would offset basic performance limitations, replace those lost in service
and provide for attrition during the aircraft’s remaining life.7
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) had a number of A-4 Skyhawks which
were surplus to its requirements after its aircraft carrier had been scrapped in
1982. In 1984 the New Zealand Government approved the purchase of eight
single-seat A-4Gs and two TA-4G two-seat trainers. The package deal cost NZ$40
million, including spares and equipment, and No. 2 Squadron was reformed to
accept the aircraft.
The avionics upgrade was to be extremely comprehensive. The Labour
Government gave its approval for a NZ$140 million modernisation plan in May
1985. The upgrade was anticipated to give the aircraft an avionics suite
comparable to an F-16C, significantly enhancing the aircraft’s strike capability
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and intended to give it an operational capability of 90 per cent of an F-16C for
15 per cent of the cost—a variation on the classic Kiwi 80/20 solution.8  Despite
the cooling of NZ–US relations over the anti-nuclear ships debacle, the US
Congress gave its approval for the technology transfer in December 1985, and
the contract with Lear Siegler was signed in 1986 by the Minister of Defence,
the Hon. Frank O’Flynn. The importance of this work was reinforced by the
1987 Review of Defence Policy, which said:
The RNZAF must be able to respond immediately and, if it becomes
necessary, to engage hostile ships and submarines, at some distance from
New Zealand. Maintaining this ability is an important part of deterrence:
ensuring this type of threatening situation does not eventuate. Work
currently underway on modernising the Skyhawks will greatly increase
effectiveness in this regard.9
The first ‘Kahu’ Skyhawk was returned to service and flown in June 1988,
and the last in March 1991.
The value of the upgrade was immediately apparent. Wing Commander Ian
Gore, who led No. 75 Squadron on a series of exercises with Australian,
Malaysian, Singaporean, and Thai air forces in 1991 and 1992 said: ‘The Skyhawk
has gone from an aircraft with no systems you could rely on, to one with the
capability of modern front-line fighters, at a fraction of the cost.’10  Flight
Lieutenant Murray Neilson, who also flew on those exercises, further noted:
‘We were constantly surprised how well we performed in air-to-air combat
against superior aircraft, especially the F-16 … Kahu has brought the Skyhawk
into the 1990s.’11
The aircraft however still had shortcomings; they were noticeably slower
than their modern counterparts when fully laden with weapons, and the Maverick
missiles were only effective for a range of five miles—insufficient for a realistic
attack on a modern warship. Nevertheless, Gore still saw Kahu as a major success:
‘Considering we did so well against aircraft we aspired to replace the Skyhawk
with—the F-16 and the Harrier—the update was an inspired choice.’12
At the time of the 1997 Defence Assessment, the decision was made to maintain
an Air Combat Force comprising A-4 Skyhawks, which would be replaced by a
suitable aircraft in due course. The 1997 White Paper commented further: ‘The
aircraft are old but sturdy. They have been rewinged and seven years ago were
given a major upgrade. They have sufficient life left to perform effectively into
the next decade.’13
In commenting on the Government’s decisions, the New Zealand Herald noted:
‘It is understood there is no immediate plan to replace the Air Force’s 19 elderly
Skyhawk fighter-bombers, but longer-term purchases are not ruled out.’14  It
was, in fact, to be no time at all before new purchases were considered.
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‘The Deal of the Century’15 —The Lease of the F-16s
‘Since the publication of the White Paper, an opportunity to acquire F-16 aircraft
has arisen,’ said the Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal Carey Adamson in an
RNZAF News Special in December 1998.16 The article went on to say that a
joint RNZAF–MoD Team had conducted an evaluation of the aircraft and
discussed issues around the potential lease of the aircraft whilst visiting the
United States in September 1998, and a decision on whether to proceed with the
acquisition was expected before the end of the year.
The United States Government had offered New Zealand the opportunity to
acquire 28 F-16s, originally brought for Pakistan, but embargoed in 1990 because
of US concerns over Pakistan’s desire to develop nuclear weapons.17 The planes
on offer consisted of 13 single-seater F-16A-15OCU and 15 two-seater
F-16B-15OCU, which had been stored at a desert US Air Force base in Arizona
since they were built in 1991 and 1992. The planes were effectively almost new,
with each of them having flown for only three or four hours.
Gerald Hensley, at the time Secretary of Defence, had originally been
approached in 1996 about the possibility of the F-16s being made available to
New Zealand:
I was at the ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting in Kuala Lumpur. I recall
Kurt Campbell, Deputy Secretary said to me over dinner, ‘Why don’t
you buy the F-16s?—we’ll give you a good price’. That was in 1996.18
I regret saying it now, but I replied that we were in the middle of the
latest Defence Review, and could do nothing until it was completed.19
Subsequently, in May of 1998, the Secretary of Defence approached Sir Wilson
Whineray to chair the Air Combat Capability Study, the timing of which
has largely been determined by the need for a decision on the opportunity
to purchase second-hand, but little used F-16 fighter aircraft, the so-called
‘Peacegate’ aircraft. Before a decision can be made on these aircraft,
Defence first needs to determine what type of air combat capability is
required.20
The Report (the Whineray Report) went into some detail to determine what
type of air combat capability was required, and explored a broad range of
capability options to assess how each might fulfil New Zealand’s requirements.
The study was unequivocal in its findings that the range of operational roles
able to be carried out by an air combat capability should remain Close Air
Support, Air Interdiction and Maritime Strike. These three roles were said to




The study explored the capabilities of the current A-4K Skyhawk, F-16 C/D,
F-16 A/B, Light attack Aircraft, and a combination of Attack Helicopter and
P-3K Orion. These five options were subject to detailed analysis, and Sir Wilson
Whineray commented:
This very clearly showed that the type of capability New Zealand requires
is of a modern multi-role fighter aircraft; the F-16 C/D was used to
represent such a capability in the study. This was by far the best option.
None of the other options performed nearly as well.21
Notwithstanding these comments, the Report went on to say:
The initial production fourth generation multi-role fighter capability
represented in the study by the F-16 A/B was found to be highly effective
across almost all of the requirements New Zealand anticipates. While the
F-16 A/B would need updating to meet New Zealand requirements, it is
a fourth generation aircraft with upgrade potential to a capability
standard similar to that of an F-16 C/D.22
Max Bradford, the Minister of Defence, was very keen to see the Skyhawks
replaced by the F-16s, partly because of growing concern about their structural
integrity: ‘I was getting some disturbing reports from the RNZAF about the state
of the airframes, and the expected life of the aircraft would be less than
anticipated because of structural problems with their tails.’23  In November 1998
the Minister proposed to Cabinet that New Zealand should agree in principle to
the proposal to negotiate the lease of 28 F-16 A/B aircraft. That same month, it
was reported that the Skyhawk fleet was to undergo Life of Type testing, to
determine whether the aircraft could remain airworthy until their anticipated
retirement around 2005. The proposal to Cabinet sought approval to bring
forward the replacement of the A-4K Skyhawk, and commented that ‘mechanical
airframe systems such as the engine, hydraulics and fuel systems … are subject
to the effects of age, declining reliability and a lack of readily available support
from equipment manufacturers’.24
Leasing the aircraft was proposed over two 5-year periods, with an average
cost to lease all 28 aircraft of NZ$12.5 million per year. There was, in addition
to the lease cost, a capital cost estimated at NZ$204.5 million to reactivate the
aircraft and purchase spares and training. Savings of $54 million were anticipated
if the purchase went ahead, as the update to extend the life of the A-4K Skyhawks
would not be necessary. It was also expected that the sale of the Skyhawks would
realise ‘a meaningful return’.25  In total, it was estimated that the leasing of the
F-16s would save NZ$431 million over the life of the aircraft, compared to
purchasing new aircraft early in the next century.
In making a case for the lease of the F-16s, Max Bradford introduced an
updated Defence 10 Year Capital Plan.26 Within this, the Minister recognised
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the issue of trade-offs and commented that the new plan necessitated a change
in project timings, ‘slipping C-130 replacement to smooth a potential funding
bulge’,27  and requiring, ‘an extended delivery of armoured vehicles.’28
Treasury’s response to the Capital Plan was cool, indicating that ‘the Plan
does not fit within the envelope of increased capital and operating funding
signalled by the Defence Assessment’.29 Treasury went on and said that the
planned upgrade for the Army, purchase of a third ANZAC frigate, leasing the
F-16s and replacing the C-130 Hercules could not be undertaken within the
funding envelope.30 Taking account of external influences, the proposal paper
for the lease of the F-16s advised:
The US has asked us to make a … stronger commitment to increased
defence spending, and an acknowledgement that the unfinished business
needs to be addressed. … A decision in principle to lease the F-16s …
would be very well received by the US Government and it would be a
positive factor in its consideration of forward movement in our defence
relationship.31
Gordon Campbell was somewhat blunter when commenting upon the
Australian viewpoint: ‘The decision to get them is also meant to appease the
Australians. … If we hadn’t decided to get the F-16s, the Australians would
probably have gone completely ballistic.’32
Once the decision in principle had been made, Campbell asked Max Bradford
when an ‘iron-clad agreement’ would be made, ‘one that not even an incoming
Labour government could overturn?’33 The Minister replied: ‘We would want
to make pretty rapid progress on this ... February, March, early April.’34  In the
event it was to be July before the lease deal was signed—and it was not as
iron-clad as some might have hoped for. Whilst the Minister was emphasising
the potential savings involved in the lease deal, questions were being raised
elsewhere about whether an air combat force was necessary at all. The Inquiry
into Defence Beyond 2000, Interim Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Committee was also published in November 1998. Whilst the Report
acknowledged that there were national interest arguments in favour of keeping
an air combat force, it noted that in 28 years the A-4 Skyhawks had never been
used in combat. The Report went on to say:
Air combat forces are expensive to retain and operate (14 per cent of the
NZDF budget), and possibly beyond New Zealand’s economic capacity
to keep up to date without detracting from other more necessary military
capabilities. … We believe that the NZDF has two options: either disband
the jet training and strike capability, on purely financial grounds, or to
replace the current A4s with more modern combat aircraft on the basis
of their capacity to contribute to the advancement of the country’s
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national interest considered alongside other competing expenditure
priorities.35
On 1 December 1998, having lost the battle over the third frigate, the Minister
was nevertheless able to announce: ‘The A-4K Skyhawks air combat force will
be replaced with 28 F-16 A/B aircraft on lease from the United States. Final
negotiations on lease terms, and on the purchase of spares and support
equipment, have to be completed.’36
In the debate over the choice of the F-16, A/B Group Captain Ian Brunton,
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, RNZAF, noted that the F-16 had been the workhorse
of the 1991 Gulf War, and that there were now 4000 F-16s worldwide.37
However, in commenting on the importance of up-to-date technology in
contemporary conflict, one US analyst said:
The most significant technologies in the (Gulf War) conflict were not
necessarily weapons but those that allowed allied forces to identify and
track targets rapidly; gather, process, evaluate and distribute information;
decide priorities for targeting; navigate on the ground, in the air, and at
sea; or command and control.38
Gordon Campbell, in an article entitled ‘Pop Gun’ in the New Zealand Listener,
published a month after the lease deal was announced, highlighted that the F-16s
were fitted only with ‘secure UHF radios’39  and were without the data-link
modems that allowed the processing and distribution of information seen as
essential in modern combat. The aircraft were fitted with the same radar as the
A-4 Skyhawks, without the capability to identify multiple threats and decide
the level of threat and order of response. Campbell asserted: ‘One thing is clear
… although these Block 15 A/Bs outclass our venerable Skyhawks, they are
themselves already outdated.’40  Brunton responded: ‘The article is technically
incorrect and paints a very misleading picture of the F-16 acquisition.’41
Nevertheless, he did acknowledge that ‘the computers and display systems in
our aircraft are, however, becoming dated and will require upgrading’.42
Notwithstanding this comment, Brunton assured that the F-16s would be ‘more
than capable of defending themselves.’43  Quigley remained to be convinced,
saying some seven months later that ‘the pilots who fly our F-16 A/B aircraft, if
the acquisition were to go ahead, would face serious disadvantages in combat’.44
Once again, in responding to the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, the
Government argued that the aircraft would be capable of fulfilling the tasks
required of them without further upgrading, but that they would ‘eventually
receive a mid-life upgrade’.45  In his response to Campbell’s article, Brunton
added:
It is unnecessary for us to proceed with MLU (Mid-Life Upgrade) at this
time. Furthermore, it makes sense for us to gain experience operating
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the aircraft for a period so that we are in a better position to choose the
best update option in due course.46
It seemed to me that these were the very sentiments expressed at the time
that an unmodified HMNZS Charles Upham was brought into service.
In noting that the aircraft were not due to arrive until mid-2001, Helen Clark,
the Leader of the Opposition, commented that this ‘[gave] an incoming
government plenty of time to review the position.’47 The following year was
to be an election year, and the opportunity to purchase the F-16s, whilst not as
controversial as the issue of the third frigate, was nonetheless to be at the
forefront as the election approached.
To Lease or Not to Lease—The 1999 Question
Not surprisingly, the Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal Carey Adamson, was
delighted with the Government’s decision. In an article in the December edition
of RNZAF News, he commented:
The F-16 will maintain the roles of maritime attack, air-interdiction and
close air support and, in doing so, will continue to defend New Zealand’s
strategic interests far more effectively and capably than the Skyhawk
has been able to. Our allies and regional neighbours will see this as a
major increase in the credibility of our national commitment to peace
and security in the region.48
Helen Clark was somewhat less enthusiastic about the proposed lease deal,
saying that ‘the whole thinking and strategy behind it is warped’.49  However,
the importance of maintaining an air strike capability was further highlighted
by the Secretary of Defence Gerald Hensley the following year:
Maintenance of an air strike capability in particular is critical to our role
in the principle FPDA activity; that of the air defence of Malaysia and
Singapore.50  … We see New Zealand and Australia as a single strategic
entity. As with the FPDA, our air combat force plays an important role
in this relationship.51
Approval for the lease deal was announced by the Minister of Defence on
26 July 1999. Although the lease costs were to be the same as those announced
the previous December, at NZ$124.8 million (excluding GST) the start-up package
had increased by NZ$34 million to NZ$238 million. Nonetheless it was still
estimated that the deal would save some NZ$350 million compared with
purchasing new aircraft the following century. The 10-year lease agreement was
signed two days later in Washington, DC, by the Attorney General, the Right
Honourable Sir Douglas Graham. In commenting on the deal, the Minister of
Defence said: ‘It gives us a new aircraft at a price we simply couldn’t afford to
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pass up. … The lease is seen by Treasury as being “the least cost option” to
acquire this increase in air combat capability.’52
The following month the final version of Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000
was released. In this Report, the Committee echoed much of what had been
indicated in the Interim Report:
For us, the important criterion alongside affordability for setting priorities
for investment in the NZDF is the utility of the force elements that New
Zealand maintains. We see air combat forces as being of lesser utility,
given competing demands for scarce NZDF resources, than the other
force elements maintained by the NZDF.53
The Report recommended that, were the air combat force to be retained, the
possibility of down-sizing to a smaller force of better armed aircraft should be
considered, whilst reviewing the lease of the F-16s. Max Bradford, not
surprisingly, was opposed to the majority findings of the Report, indicating that
the recommendations, if implemented, would fundamentally change New
Zealand’s defence relationship with Australia, ‘which would be a matter of
serious concern’.54  Helen Clark, on the other hand, was strongly supportive of
the Report’s findings, and indicated that a Labour Government would adopt the
recommendations: ‘I’d be surprised if our policy when released didn’t fairly
closely shadow (the report).55
At a pre-election seminar held on 21 October 1999, Phil Goff reinforced this
view:
Labour opposes the decision to invest what will amount to $700 million
on the F-16 A/B jet aircraft. It also opposes the purchase of further
ANZAC frigates. Neither can be considered a priority if peace keeping
is to continue to be the focus of deployment of our armed forces.
In opting for frigates and F-16s, the National Government has put display
ahead of utility. It has been concerned more about pleasing military
chiefs in Australia and the United States, than about meeting the practical
needs arising from the responsibilities we are actually placing on our
armed forces.56
When Wayne Mapp spoke at the same seminar on National’s Foreign and
Defence Policy, he portrayed National’s diametrically opposing view, reinforcing
the importance of the development of the relationship with the United States:
The Air Force requirements are of a different character. Everyone accepts
the need for new strategic air transport and upgraded maritime
surveillance. The sharp differences settle on the lease of the F-16s. …
The Air Combat Force is not just about military utility. It is also about
restoring our Defence relationships, particularly with the United States.
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If we had failed to accept the extremely favourable lease arrangements
for the F-16s, our friends and allies would question our commitment to
the security of the region. Our overall relationship with the United States
would have been severely damaged.57
When Labour’s defence policy was released in November, it did in fact closely
follow the Report, and confirmed opposition to the lease of the F-16s. Geoff
Braybrooke, Labour’s defence spokesperson, said it was wrong to spend such a
large proportion of the defence budget on ‘showpiece’ items like the F-16s, whilst
the New Zealand Army was being sent into war zones such as East Timor with
obsolete equipment. As the two major parties entered the election race, they
provided the New Zealand public with two very clear and very different views
on defence, reflecting two different views of New Zealand’s role in the world.
Later that month the New Zealand public endorsed Labour’s view and Labour
came to power with a new Coalition government. Following the first meeting of
the new Cabinet in December, Helen Clark confirmed that there was insufficient
money available for increased spending for defence, and that removing the F-16
lease deal would assist with meeting other priorities: ‘We’d need to take advice
on that. That could be enough.’58
The Death of New Zealand’s ‘Flying Falcon’—The Final
F-16 Decision
In seeking advice on the lease deal, Clark turned to former ACT MP Derek
Quigley, the former chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee,
and author of Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. In that Report, Quigley raised
concerns about the difficulty the Committee had had in accessing adequate
information about the F-16 lease. On 20 December 1999, Cabinet determined the
terms of reference for an independent review of the proposal to lease the 28 F-16
aircraft, and Quigley was to have access to a much wider range of information
than had previously been made available to him. The Review was urgent as,
amongst other things, in Quigley’s own words, ‘the meter [was] running’.59
Throughout the debate on the lease of the F-16s, the Labour Party had been
opposed to their acquisition. However, there were many who were concerned
about the impact that the cancellation might have on New Zealand’s relationship
with Australia and the United States. Associate Professor Stephen Hoadley from
the University of Auckland commented that the F-16 lease deal was a cooperative
step, showing ‘both Washington and Canberra that Wellington is a good
international citizen and a serious team player’, and that ‘its cancellation risks
relegation of New Zealand to the margins of the diplomatic map’.60  John
Armstrong, the New Zealand Herald’s political editor, warned that ‘the Coalition
cabinet is on a collision course with Canberra and Washington’.61  He went on
to say that ‘cancellation would go down badly in Australia’.62 This sentiment
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was echoed on other pages of the New Zealand Herald that day, with Greg Ansley,
the Canberra bureau chief indicating that a cancellation of the lease would lead
to ‘anger and dismay’.63  Max Bradford of course felt the deal was essential to
maintain credibility with New Zealand’s neighbours.64
However, others were less concerned. The [Christchurch] Press saw the deal
as ‘ill-conceived in the first place’,65  and suggested that there should be no
surprise if Quigley advised that the decision should be reversed. The Prime
Minister indicated that she did not see any cooling in New Zealand’s relationship
with the United States.66  Professor Desmond Ball, from The Australian National
University in Canberra, said:
I don’t think anyone would worry about them getting rid of the F-16s
because there was no point in having them in the first place. Most of the
relevant areas in the (Australian) Department of Defence were
dumbfounded when the F-16s were acquired. … It was hard to
understand to begin with.67
The editorial in The Independent Business Weekly the following week reinforced
this view:
As for the reaction in Australia … let’s not forget officials there were
aghast when we announced the F-16 deal in the first place. Their belief
… is unlikely to be different now.68
The Review was published on 6 March 2000, and sought to provide advice
which would help the New Zealand Government determine whether the lease
deal should be cancelled, deferred, amended or confirmed. It also considered
whether the F-16 deal would have an adverse effect on other urgent defence
priorities, and whether the deal locked the NZDF into a capability that was of
significant cost and limited utility.
From the start, Quigley made the point that the review of the lease proposal
also ‘inevitably involved a much more fundamental consideration of New Zealand
defence policy and force capabilities’.69  He went on to suggest that the process
required the review to consider how New Zealand wished to see itself, and what
sort of tasks the nation wanted New Zealand defence forces to undertake. That
is, what was New Zealand’s role in the world? Reflecting upon the role of external
influences, Quigley observed:
The F-16 package involves more than merely upgrading a major combat
capability. It appears to reflect a conscious decision by the US
Administration to redefine defence relationships with New Zealand and
enable us to play—in its eyes—a more effective role in regional security.70
The Report noted that whilst funding had already been committed to the
F-16 aircraft—which had not been signalled in the 1997 Defence
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Assessment—there were still 11 outstanding projects which were deemed to be
Priority One in November 1998, and to which funds had yet to be allocated. Of
these projects, six were for the New Zealand Army, three for the RNZAF, and
two for the RNZN. They were:
• The balance of the Army Direct Fire Support weapons
• Army Anti-Armour Weapons




• Orion Upgrade (Project Sirius)
• Iriquois Life Extension
• C-130 Replacement/Upgrade
• Replacement of HMNZS Canterbury
• Conversion of HMNZS Charles Upham
Quigley was highly critical that there was no adequate process in place for
setting priorities, and that projects were approved, or not, when they came to
the top of the list after tendering—or if they were the subject, such as the F-16s
of an ‘opportunity purchase’.
In the Review, he also sought to clarify the Select Committee’s views on the
Army, highlighting that:
The majority of the Committee did not say that the Army should be given
permanent priority ahead of everything else. It said that given the ‘better
shape’ of some other force elements, deployable land force elements and
the other capabilities needed to support that, should be the top priority.71
Quigley added that ‘the (then) Government members on the Committee agreed
that “the development of a well-equipped motorised infantry force is the top
priority in the re-equipping of the NZDF”’.72
Whilst acknowledging that determining overall defence priorities was not
within the terms of reference of the Review, he noted that determining the impact
of the F-16 lease on other defence requirements was within the terms of reference.
The summary of the Review clearly stated the dilemma that was being faced by
the Government. At the time of the 1997 Defence Assessment, it suggested, an
extra injection of NZ$509 million was foreseen for the following 10 year period.
By the time of the Review, that figure had increased to NZ$1 billion, and did not
include an extra NZ$583 million required over the following three years to
proceed with replacing Army communications equipment, light armoured and
light operational vehicles, and Project Sirius. The Review made the point: ‘It is
against this background that the F-16 project needs to be considered.’73
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The Review went on to confirm the not-inconsiderable costs involved in the
project—NZ$1 billion of capital injection if the aircraft were leased, then
purchased, and received the recommended upgrades. Contrasted with this
additional cost, up to NZ$140 million per annum could be saved if the air combat
force was disbanded.
The recommendations that the Review made were significant. Quigley noted:
‘Clearly, New Zealand does not currently need 22 operational aircraft. After all,
the RNZAF coped with 14 Skyhawks from mid-1970 to the mid-1980s with no
visible diminution of effect.’ He further concluded:
The air combat capability also needs to be seen in a broader context. On
the one hand, it provides the Government with choice in responding to
international security and peacekeeping operations, particularly if the
capability is upgraded. On the other hand, the savings in operating and
capital costs from disbanding the air combat capability could be applied
to other more urgent NZDF priorities. What has become apparent,
however, is the feasibility of acquiring fewer F-16s to retain a core combat
capability.74
In light of this, and further analysis of the savings that could be made by
leasing a smaller number of aircraft, the recommendations of the Review were:
1. That the New Zealand Government consider approaching the US
Government with a view to renegotiating the current F-16 package to
include a lesser number of aircraft.
2. That all Defence projects be reviewed as a matter of urgency, on a project
by project basis, with a view to prioritising them on the basis of their
capacity—judged from an NZDF-wide perspective—to advance New
Zealand’s national interests.
3. That steps be taken to implement, as soon as practicable, all those aspects
of the 1998 National Real Estate Consolidation Strategy that are already
agreed by NZDF, and that decisions be taken on the remainder.
4. That those parts of the 1991 Review of Defence Funding as yet unimplemented
be urgently considered and, where relevant, adopted.75
On the day that the report was published, Helen Clark said it was clear where
the report was headed:
It will probably say something like this: “If major capital investment in
the airstrike arm of the Air Force was your top priority right now, and
if you could afford it, this might be a reasonable deal. But if neither of
these ifs applies, then the Government has every justification of looking
again”.76
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For several months Clark had made it clear that neither of the ‘ifs’ applied.
Two weeks after the publication of the Review, following a meeting of cabinet,
the Government announced that it would not be proceeding with the lease
arrangements. Clark released a statement on Monday 20 March 2000 clarifying
the reasons for the decision:
Mr Quigley made four recommendations … three of which the
Government will act on. The fourth recommendation in his report was
that the Government should consider approaching the United States
Government with a view to renegotiating the current F-16 purchase to
include a smaller number of aircraft. The Government has decided not
to take that course. We will be exercising New Zealand’s right to
withdraw from the lease arrangement. … While reducing the number
of F-16s would have alleviated the immediate funding problem inherent
in this acquisition, it would not have removed it. … In addition, such a
decision would have prejudged the broader question of whether New
Zealand should retain an air combat capability. That is a matter the
government wants to take more time to address.77
Whilst Clark did acknowledge that the lease arrangement for the F-16 seemed
a good one, she reiterated that this would only be the case if upgrading the air
combat capability was a priority: ‘The mere existence of a bargain at a sale is
not a reason for buying it.’78  In speaking to the Government’s decision, the
Prime Minister went on to say:
Mr Quigley’s report describes the Defence Force’s scal position as
parlous. Its capital expenditure requirement is unsustainable. It is also
experiencing cash ow problems which would require at least a doubling
of the capital injection contemplated in 1997. Unfortunately there is no
priority setting in the New Zealand Defence Force which eectively and
consistently links individual activities or projects to the government’s
most pressing national security concerns. Getting rationality and coherence
into defence planning and priority setting is now at the top of the coalition
government’s agenda.79
Planning for an aordable, well-equipped NZDF was clearly a priority for
the new Government; the lease of the F-16s, just as clearly, was not.
Disbanding the Air Combat Force
Interestingly, Derek Quigley had noted that in 1991 Wayne Mapp80  had argued
in an article entitled ‘Restructuring New Zealand’s Defence Force’ that the air
strike force ‘must be the rst element to be either eliminated or integrated into
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the Australian Armed Forces’.81  Mapp was clear at the time about what he felt
about the utility of the Air Combat Force:
From the New Zealand perspective, the force most suitable for reduction
is the air force. The strike role of the A4 Skyhawks is almost of no
relevance except in medium to high level operations. … The Orions serve
an important role. With suitable upgrading with Harpoon missiles they
could readily take over the full maritime strike role.82
Labour had given every indication that they agreed with these sentiments
regarding the strike role. In February 2001 the Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet produced a report, Review of the Options for an Air Combat
Capability, which spelt out three possible options for the future of the air combat
force. These three options were:
1. Retain the air combat force at present levels;
2. Retain a reduced air combat force of 14 strike aircraft; or
3. Disband the air combat force.
The Review noted that, with Option 2, there would be insufficient savings
realised for the rebuilding of the rest of the NZDF unless it was accompanied by
major cuts in other areas.83 With Option 3, it was anticipated that savings would
be produced which, ‘as well as the avoidance of further capital investment in
the air combat force, would assist in the rebuilding of the NZDF, significantly
reducing the need for additional funding’.84
Confirming Quigley’s assertion that ‘to cancel the F-16 contract … is
considered tantamount to disbanding the RNZAF’s combat capability’,85 on
8 May 2001 Clark confirmed that the New Zealand Government had decided to
disband the air combat wing.86 The response from some quarters in Australia
was stinging. The following day the Australian ran the headline ‘NZ abandons
Anzac tradition’. The article went on to note: ‘New Zealand yesterday abandoned
85 years of Anzac tradition by scaling down its military power,’87  although it
added that ‘John Howard refrained from criticising the move yesterday, saying
“What New Zealand does with New Zealand’s defence force is a matter for New
Zealand.”’88  Clark commented: ‘Nothing about anything we’ve done in Defence
should have been a surprise. It was all in the manifesto, as I keep pointing out.’89
Some commentators were pragmatic in their response to Labour’s decision.
Dick Gentles, former Deputy Secretary, Policy and Planning within the Ministry
of Defence said:
The Air Combat Force had very little utility to this government. The
opportunity cost was enormous, and the Skyhawks would never have
been seriously considered for deployment. I think it was probably the
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right decision—it was certainly a brave one. Mark Burton did, though,
get a $1 billion commitment for defence over the next 10 years.90
Stewart Woodman, Professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy at
the University of New South Wales, had been a significant critic of what he
considered a moribund approach to defence planning outlined in SONZD 97.91
He commented: ‘What utility would they really have had for the NZDF? F-16s
would look funny sitting at the end of a runway in the Solomons.’92
Lieutenant General Lloyd Campbell, Chief of the Air Staff, Canadian Air Force,
commented: ‘As a friend and ally (and also former fighter pilot) I consider this
(disbandment) most unfortunate. However, I also recognise the Government has
spoken and it is now time to salute and get on with life.’93
No. 2, No. 14 and No. 75 Squadron were officially disbanded at Ohakea on
13 December 2001.94 The last fully airworthy A-4 Skyhawk flew out of Ohakea
airbase on 30 July 2004, to join the rest of the mothballed fleet of Skyhawks at
RNZAF Woodburn in Blenheim.95
Summary
The 1997 White Paper indicated that the defence policy that had been set out
in the previous 1991 White Paper was still the most appropriate to guide policy
decision-making: ‘Self-Reliance in Partnership’ remained the cornerstone of
Defence Policy.96 There was a reaffirmation of the balanced force approach,
and the philosophy of incrementalism was reinforced:
The Government has concluded that for the near-to-medium term New
Zealand’s security interests are best served within the structural
framework that has evolved over the past several decades. This is an
acknowledgement that our Army, Air and Naval forces have served us
well, and with some shift in force configuration would continue to do
so.97
With regards to the future of the Air Combat Force, the White Paper was
unequivocal in its support. Taking account of New Zealand’s role in the world
and external influences it commented:
We require an air combat capability (sic) to deal with surface threats
and be capable of providing air support for both ground and naval forces.
It must be capable of operating as part of a larger force, either in support
of New Zealand naval and land forces, or as part of a combined force as
a New Zealand contribution to collective defence.98
The ‘opportunity purchase’ of the 28 F-16 A/B fighters, allowed for the
possibility of upgrading the air combat capability, whilst enhancing relationships
with both Australia and the United States. Trade-offs also played a part as it was
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a way of softening the blow of not purchasing a third ANZAC frigate. A further
trade-off though was to be further delays in re-equipping the New Zealand Army
(and this was where bureaucratic politics came in), and the air transport capability
of the RNZAF. In order to develop an enhanced air combat capability, the
National Coalition was prepared to once more delay Priority One projects and
set acquisition targets which Treasury clearly saw as unattainable within the
funding envelope.
When the Labour-led Coalition came to power, it was on the clear basis that
they would not support the F-16 purchase, and that the Government was intent
on following an independent policy on defence purchases. Whilst there were
many dissenting voices, there was nonetheless clear public support for Labour’s
position. In a parliamentary debate on the issue of the F-16s, Clark was able to
note public opinion saying: ‘I thought I saw last night that 68 per cent of people
did not want the planes bought.’99 When weighing up the options available
for future defence expenditure, the Labour-led Government quickly chose to
disband the air combat capability, redefining New Zealand’s role in the world
with its requirement ‘for well-equipped, combat trained land forces which are
also able to act as effective peacekeepers, supported by the Navy and Air
Force’.100  Labour viewed external influences and the world situation quite
differently from National, with Clark echoing the sentiment expressed by Norman
Kirk almost 30 years previously:
We’re quite widely respected for being an independent-minded small
Western nation. We don’t carry other people’s agendas … what matters
to me is that when people hear New Zealand speak they know that’s
New Zealand speaking, not something someone else just whispered in
its ear.101
To give substance to this outlook, the new Government committed itself to
rebuilding defence force capabilities to achieve a ‘modern, sustainable Defence
Force that will meet the government’s defence policy objectives’.102  New Zealand
was not to see F-16s in its skies.
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‘I see no submarines’—Upgrading the
Orions
Prior to the debate over the leasing of the F-16s, the New Zealand Government
had already committed itself to extending the structural life of the P-3K Orion
aircraft which provide New Zealand’s maritime air patrol capability. In the 1997
Defence White Paper, the Government acknowledged that New Zealand’s Orions
had far exceeded their planned service life, but the planning for refurbishment
and/or replacement of major structural components was well underway. However,
the White Paper also went on to note that:
There are serious deficiencies in the Orions’ sensor suite that impairs its
ability to carry out both surface and sub-surface surveillance tasks. These
will be addressed (Project Sirius) as one of the most important priorities
in the rebuilding of the NZDF’s capabilities.1
The re-winging of the Orions, Project Kestrel,2  was intended to extend the
life of the airframe for some 20 years. Project Sirius was intended to replace the
aircraft’s tactical system, in order to provide an effective maritime patrol
capability, with the ability to work alongside coalition partners.
Approval in principle to pursue the project was given by the National-led
Coalition Government in March 1998, with an estimated cost of NZ$236 million.
Following Labour’s return to power, the Minister of Defence sought direction
on the future of the Orion Maritime Patrol Force, and whether Project Sirius
should proceed. By this time, the costs associated with the project had more
than doubled to NZ$562.1 million.3 The Government rejected the proposal and
decided not to proceed with Project Sirius.
This chapter explores the events that led to the initial decision to proceed
with Project Sirius, and subsequent events that led to its cancellation. It then
goes on to examine the recommendations of the Maritime Patrol Review of
February 2001,4  and the decisions taken by the Labour-led Government in
relation to maritime air patrol three and a half years later, to proceed with Project
Guardian.5  Project Guardian is itself a comprehensive upgrade of systems for
the Orions, which is similar in many respects to the original Project Sirius. The
major elements which have had a bearing on the metamorphosis of Project Sirius
under National into Project Guardian under Labour will be highlighted.
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History and Background
In late 1944, the Government purchased for the Royal New Zealand Air Force
(RNZAF) its first four Short Sunderland Mark III flying boats.6 These aircraft
were based at Hobsonville and were used to transport freight into the South
Pacific. As part of the restructuring process following the Second World War,
the RNZAF in June 1953 took delivery of 16 refurbished Short Sunderland flying
boats for maritime reconnaissance. These were assigned to No. 5 Squadron based
at Lauthala Bay, Fiji, and performed a maritime reconnaissance and
anti-submarine warfare role. In the Defence White Paper, Review of Defence
Policy 1961, it was noted that the aircraft had first entered service some 25 years
previously, and were now an old design.7 There were no suitable replacement
flying boats available, and a suitable land-based aircraft was to be considered.
That aircraft was to be the Lockheed P-3B Orion.
The Chief of Air Staff appointed in June 1962 was Air Vice Marshal Ian G.
Morrison, who was to oversee the modernisation of the RNZAF. Morrison saw
the three elements of the Air Force—strike capability, transport, and maritime
patrol—as being of equal value, and sought improvements in aircraft in each
area. He sought a replacement for the Sunderlands and found it in the Orion. Five
new Orions were ordered in March 1964, and delivered to No. 5 Squadron at
Whenuapai between September and December 1966. The cost was to be NZ£8.7
million, including support equipment. In light of the contemporary debate about
Project Sirius, the comment on the purchase in the 1966 Defence White Paper
is noteworthy:
The Orion is the most modern and effective surveillance and
anti-submarine aircraft available anywhere, and will put the RNZAF on
a basis of full compatibility with the RAAF and the United States Navy
in this important role.8
The Orions proved to be a valuable asset, and over the next decade performed
their surveillance role with distinction. However, by the late 1970s it was clear
that their avionics suite had fallen behind recent improvements in capability
overseas, and the 1978 Defence Review foreshadowed a progressive upgrading
of capability to enhance their compatibility with allies and to improve their
effectiveness.9
A two-phase modernisation process, Project Rigel, was decided upon to
provide a comprehensive systems upgrade, and in July 1980 the Boeing Company
was awarded a contract for Phase One of the project. Phase One included
improved data systems, modernised tactical displays, and improved surveillance
and navigation equipment. A significant enhancement of radar capability and
night search capability was included, with a new infra-red detection system.
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The first modified aircraft was completed in November 1983, and the last in May
1984.10 The total cost for the first phase was NZ$42 million.11
The 1983 Defence Review noted that the project was nearing completion and
would provide ‘a capability for surface surveillance by day or night which will
be second to none’. It went on to say, though:
The need remains to improve the aircraft’s ability to detect and attack
submarines and to upgrade its effectiveness in electronic warfare. It is
intended to undertake a second phase of the Orion modernisation
programme for this purpose.12
This was not to happen however. With a change of government, the 1987
Defence White Paper spelt out the Labour Party’s priorities. There was still a
recognition that maritime surveillance was important, and that aircraft were
required to ‘provide the means for quick reaction, and for monitoring both
submarine and surface activity’. The White Paper acknowledged that improved
systems had been installed in the Orions and noted that ‘improved acoustic and
electronic capabilities for both the RNZN and the RNZAF will be considered’.13
Tenders were called for Phase Two in 1988, but the project failed to proceed
when the RNZAF was unable to get a commitment from the Government for the
proposal.
Project Kestrel
By the early 1990s the Orions had been in service for a quarter of a century, and
were amongst some of the most intensively used aircraft of their type in the
world. The fleet now consisted of six aircraft, a further aircraft having been
purchased second-hand from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in 1985, at
a cost NZ$19 million. In 1993 a fatigue analysis was undertaken, which showed
that the aircraft had been used to such an extent that their fatigue life index was
135 against a baseline index of 100. This was quite a remarkable figure compared
with the US Navy Orions, most of which were retired at fatigue life indices
between 60 and 80.14
By this stage it was clear that, in most circumstances, the most favoured
replacement for an old Orion was a new one, and amongst the options reviewed
was that of purchasing new aircraft. But, at a cost of NZ$1 billion, that was
unlikely.15  Other options then explored included the possible purchase of new
airframes and then transferring engines and sensors from current aircraft, at an
estimated cost of NZ$600 million; refurbishing second-hand aircraft purchased
from the United States; or undertaking significant structural refurbishment of
the current aircraft by replacing major structural panels.16  Engineering studies
were undertaken by Lockheed Martin, and these confirmed that it was possible
to replace significant structural portions of the aircraft with a low engineering
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risk associated with the project. Completion of the project would extend the life
of the aircraft by 20 years.17
Project Kestrel was to be a world first, and was truly an international project.
Wings, horizontal stabilisers, and engine nacelles were all to be replaced. The
outer-wing panels were to be manufactured in South Korea; the horizontal
stabilisers were built by British Aerosystems in the United Kingdom; and the
centre wing section lower skin came from Lockheed Martin in Georgia in the
United States.18  Engine nacelles were refurbished by Celsius Hawker Pacific in
Australia, and the installation of components and completion of the refurbished
aircraft was undertaken by Hawker Pacific in Sydney.19
Project Kestrel was, like Project Rigel a two-phase project. Unlike Project
Rigel, Kestrel was completed on time and on budget, with a total cost of less than
NZ$100 million—one tenth of the cost of new aircraft. Work had begun on the
re-integration phase on the first aircraft in November 1997, and the final aircraft
returned to RNZAF service on 21 August 2001. The Air Component Commander
at the time, Air Commodore John Hamilton, commented:
The concept is complex but has been built on the knowledge, innovation,
skills and abilities of Air Force engineering personnel—engineering and
design skills that were not readily available offshore except in the
aircraft’s original design office. It exemplifies what can be done by New
Zealanders with the right background and opportunities.
No-one, not even Lockheed Martin, had ever re-winged a P-5B Orion with
P-5C wings, the only ones now available new. The RNZAF project team worked
with Lockheed Martin to develop the interface design and the reassembly
protocol, and the project was a complete success. Air Commodore John Hamilton
added:
It has given the Air Force a significant extension in the life of the Orion
fleet at a reasonable cost. The Orion is now well placed to take on
upgraded sensors and equipment which will allow them to serve New
Zealand’s interests for another 20 years.20
Updating sensors and avionics equipment had never been completed under
Project Rigel. This deficit was intended to be rectified by the implementation of
Project Sirius.
Project Sirius
The 1991 Defence Review called for a review of maritime surveillance capability,
but the results of the policy study were classified and never released publicly.21
Having affirmed that ‘Self-Reliance in Partnership’ remained central to New
Zealand Defence policy, the 1997 White Paper emphasised the importance of
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maintaining force capabilities which would allow New Zealand to adequately
monitor and protect those areas which fell under New Zealand’s responsibility.
The White Paper made the point that the United States ‘has neither the power
nor the inclination to be the sole guarantor of the region’s security. It expects
others to carry a proportionate share of the burden.’22  In order to maintain its
share of the burden, New Zealand needed to maintain a capability for maritime
surveillance from the air, and Project Sirius was intended to provide that
capability. The latest Defence White Paper highlighted the impaired capacity
of the Orion’s tactical systems to undertake its maritime surveillance role, and
noted that the deficiencies would be addressed by Project Sirius. The previous
month, Cabinet had agreed with the Minister of Defence’s recommendation that
the Orions be equipped with updated sensors and communication suites, with
a subsequent decision to be made regarding implementation.23 The Government
subsequently gave approval-in-principle for Project Sirius to proceed, at a Cabinet
Meeting on 23 March 1998. This approval was seen by the RNZAF to be the
culmination of over a decade’s work, which had begun following the cancellation
of Project Rigel in the late 1980s. In commenting on the approval, the Chief of
Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal Carey Adamson said: ‘Yesterday’s decision was a
major milestone for the project; however, a continuation of this hard work will
be needed to bring SIRIUS to a successful conclusion.’24  In this, he was to be
proven to be correct.
The Invitation to Register (ITR), which the Ministry of Defence was to use
to identify potential prime contractors, was issued on 9 October 1998. The
Request for Tender was subsequently issued in February 1999, and Raytheon
was chosen as the preferred prime contractor. The request for a Best and Final
Offer was issued in November 1999, but by that time the Labour Party had
returned to power. The Ministry was to continue working hard to try and ensure
that Project Sirius did reach a successful conclusion; nevertheless Sirius, like
Rigel before it, was not to succeed.
The Failure of Project Sirius and its Metamorphosis into
Project Guardian
The Best and Final Offer price from Raytheon was indicated as being NZ$445
million,25  and the final decision on the offer was due on 28 May 2000. A briefing
for the Minister of Defence was conducted in April 2000, prior to the decision
going to Cabinet the following month. In the event, Raytheon extended its offer
until 25 August 2000, allowing somewhat more time for the issues involved to
be considered both by the Minister of Defence, Mark Burton, and by the
Government.
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The potential expenditure of almost half a billion dollars once more generated
significant media comment. Gordon Campbell, in an article in the New Zealand
Listener commented:
The F-16s were an easy call. In coming weeks, the Clark Government
faces a tough and diplomatically fraught decision over Project Sirius, the
hugely expensive upgrade of our six Orion maritime surveillance aircraft.
Secrecy rules. For the last couple of years, the cost estimates for Sirius
… have been kept under wraps.26
The Government subsequently released the Defence Policy Framework in June
2000. In the Introduction to the Framework, it was emphasised that a new
approach to defence was one of the Government’s major policies when it sought
election. Within the new framework it was still recognised that maintaining
effective maritime surveillance capabilities of the RNZAF remained one of the
greatest needs. The emphasis however, was to be ‘within the New Zealand EEZ
[Exclusive Economic Zone] and the EEZs of Pacific Island States’.27  Nevertheless
Cabinet, at a meeting on 12 June 2000, did allow for consideration of Project
Sirius before completion of the Maritime Patrol Review:28
(e) agreed that urgent acquisitions which are fully consistent with the
Government’s defence policy, goals and priorities may be considered
prior to the completion of the reviews referred to in paragraph (c)
above.29
By the time Project Sirius went to Cabinet for a decision in August 2000, the
costs however were only too clear. In a paper to Cabinet dated 14 August 2000,
the Minister of Defence proposed four possible options for the future of the
Orion Maritime Patrol Force:
• Do nothing and lose the airborne maritime surveillance capability;
• Retain the capability, and accept the Raytheon Project Sirius offer at
approximately NZ$562.10 million;
• Accept a reduced capability (without a sub-surface capability) at a cost of
approximately NZ$520 million; or
• Reduce capability by equipping for civil tasks only, and invite the
preparation of Terms of Reference for a new project study.30
The response, noted in the Cabinet Minutes of 21 August 2000, was brief and
to the point: ‘(b), agreed not to proceed with Project Sirius’.31
The response by Opposition parties to the announcement was swift, with
both ACT and National suggesting that the Labour–Alliance Coalition was
dragging New Zealand into an isolationist stance. Wayne Mapp, National’s
defence spokesperson, suggested that the focus on re-equipping the Army was
being used as a smokescreen whilst the Air Force was downgraded, ‘into some
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kind of “freight service.”’32 The response by the Australians was equally swift,
but muted, with their Minister for Defence, John Moore, saying: ‘We understand
the priorities assigned by the Government of New Zealand to upgrading the
capabilities of its army … we are disappointed though, by the New Zealand
government’s decision to cancel Project Sirius.’33
The United States was said to be highly concerned about the Cabinet decision
on Project Sirius, having indicated previously that approval would be a sign
that the Coalition Government was serious about regional security. However
Phil Goff, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, speaking on the eve of his
departure to the United States, said he did not expect a cool response from the
Americans over the decision. The Green Party, on the other hand, was very
pleased, and gave strong support to the Government’s decision. Wayne Mapp
went so far as to suggest that the Greens controlled defence policy. He
commented, ‘Labour has rolled over to extreme Green isolationist views’, and
added, ‘abandoning the upgrading of the Orions means we will no longer have
proper surveillance of our region.’34  However, Keith Locke was delighted to
see this apparent shift away from combat capabilities. He noted that the decision
would see New Zealand move away from operations such as those in the Persian
Gulf with the US-led task force simply because the Orions would no longer have
the sophisticated capability necessary to operate with US and coalition partners.35
Lending weight to the notion of the abandonment of a sophisticated upgrade
for the Orions, two days later the Prime Minister commented: ‘Anyone who
argues $560 million for the Orions when there is no evidence of hostile submarines
in our area would have to be barking.’36 Weighing up trade-offs was to be part
of the remit of the Maritime Patrol Review.37  However, Helen Clark commented
on this in an article in the RSA Review in October 2000, saying:
Defence purchasing is hugely expensive, and there are severe limits on
what the government can do without seriously affecting baseline
expenditure on and capital provision for other top priorities like Health,
Education and Infrastructure. The purchase of 105 armoured personnel
carriers and 1853 radios for the Army represents a very significant
increase in defence spending. It is not possible to accommodate that and
other high priorities as well as invest in the proposed $562 million Orion
upgrade.38
Notwithstanding the cancellation of Project Sirius, the Government had
signalled the importance of maintaining effective aerial maritime surveillance
in its Defence Policy Framework announced in June 2000. Defining what ‘effective’
meant was to be the task of a committee convened by the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet. At its meeting on 21 August, Cabinet had proposed
the establishment of a special group, chaired by the Prime Minister, to include
the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister of Defence, and Minister
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of Fisheries, consulting with other relevant Ministers. This group was to examine
how civilian requirements for maritime patrol could be best met, and whether
a military maritime patrol capability should be retained at all. They were to be
assisted in this task by the Officials Committee, whose report was to be completed
by February 2001.
At the time of the announcement of the cancellation of Project Sirius, the
Chief of Air Staff, Air Vice Marshal Don Hamilton, was pragmatic in his response.
In an article in Air Force News in September 2000, he said: ‘I too share your
disappointment, and we must simply now take the time to absorb the
Government’s direction and define the new role requirement.’39 The definition
of the new role requirement was once more to see the conventional role of the
Orions being questioned, with stinging criticism from a number of quarters.
Having been asked to examine whether a military maritime patrol capability
should be retained, the Review Committee, echoing somewhat the arguments
that had been put forward with regards to the air strike capability, commented:
While the Orions have provided military benefits in training and exercises
in the 35 years that the RNZAF has operated them, the reality is that on
no occasion have they been used in combat or peace keeping duties,
despite a willingness and capability to use them. It is the view of the
committee that New Zealand does not need to maintain a maritime patrol
force that includes an anti-submarine capability. In neither the arguments
we have heard in the course of our review, nor in past experience, have
we found compelling evidence that such a capability is essential for
national security.40
The Review Committee went on to say:
If anti-submarine warfare is no longer a priority, it could be argued that
there is less case for keeping the Orions, because ASW [anti-submarine
warfare] is the main thing they did markedly better than the alternatives.
We already own the Orions however, and the Air Force has accumulated
considerable expertise in their use. If the government wanted to retain
them for their long distance and long endurance capabilities, our
assessment is that they could be upgraded to do local tasks, civilian and
military, perfectly well at a modest cost per aircraft.41
The Government’s Defence Policy Framework had also clearly spelt out the
Government’s defence policy objectives and these were:
• to defend New Zealand and to protect its people, land, territorial waters,
EEZ, natural resources and critical infrastructure;
• to meet New Zealand’s alliance commitments to Australia by maintaining a
close defence partnership in pursuit of common security interests;
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• to assist in the maintenance of security in the South Pacific and to provide
assistance to New Zealand’s Pacific neighbours;
• to play an appropriate role in the maintenance of security in the Asia–Pacific
region, including meeting New Zealand’s obligations as a member of the Five
Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA); and
• to contribute to global security and peacekeeping through participation in
the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support and
humanitarian relief operations.42
However, in the somewhat benign environment of late 2000 and early 2001,
the Maritime Patrol Review, in reviewing the need for Military Maritime Patrol
Capabilities (MMPC), sought to concentrate on only the first four of the five
stated Government policy objectives. The Review effectively dismissed any
future global role for the Orions, with their observation that the Orions had never
been used in combat or peacekeeping duties, and their recommendation that the
maritime patrol force did not need an ASW capability.43 When it came to
anti-submarine capabilities, the Prime Minister was not convinced either: ‘We
would be most unlikely to spend on the anti-submarine warfare capability’, she
said in March, following the release of the Review. ‘We were being asked to
spend more than half a billion dollars to spot vessels which aren’t there and
haven’t been found to be there in the entire time we’ve been trying to spot
them.’44
There was a very real threat to the future of the Orions contained within the
Maritime Patrol Review. The Review Committee noted that savings of the order
of NZ$40-60 million could be made annually if the Orions were disposed of,
though they did acknowledge this might mean buying more C-130 Hercules to
take over the role. The committee found that, overall, a ten-fold increase in aerial
patrol was necessary to fulfil civil surveillance needs, but that much of this extra
effort was needed to cover mid-range contingencies, and suggested either the
use of commercial services, or using RNZAF King Air aircraft in conjunction
with pilot training. For long distance surveillance they suggested two options
also:
• retain some Orions as the long range aircraft for SAR [search and rescue] and
distant surveillance purposes; or
• utilise C-130s which have comparable capabilities (in range etc) by fitting
new sensors to some or all five aircraft in the RNZAF. This could require the
purchase of additional C-130 capacity, depending on whether the Government
wants to increase its South Pacific operations.45
The following month the Minister of Defence responded to the Review, in a
paper to the Cabinet Policy Committee, Sustainable Capability Plan for the New
Zealand Defence Force. In this paper the Minister noted that NZ$100 million had
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been spent on Project Kestrel, providing an effective aircraft for a further 20
years, and that it made no sense to look at alternatives. Everyone though agreed
that the sensors on the Orions needed to be replaced, but the capability that
would have been offered by Project Sirius was not required. The Minister
recommended instead: ‘65.7.2—A limited upgrade for the Orions be progressively
implemented with priority given to those systems that would give them an
appropriate and affordable suite of sensors to perform these tasks.’46
Cabinet agreed, almost. The Minutes of the meeting of 2 April 2001 record
the decision as follows: ‘1.7.2—A limited upgrade for the Orions, using good
quality commercial systems wherever possible be progressively implemented,
with priority given to those systems that will give them an appropriate and
affordable suite of sensors to perform these tasks.’47
The Government, however, was yet to define what ‘good quality commercial
systems’ actually meant.
Before the recommendations to equip the Orions with commercial surveillance
equipment could be implemented, however, international circumstances were
to change. On 11 September 2001, nine months after the Review was published,
the world we live in was to change. The destruction of the twin towers of the
New York World Trade Center, and the attack on the Pentagon in Arlington,
VA, was to help define a new focus for the Western alliance. The ‘war on terror’
was about to commence, and as US President George W. Bush said so clearly in
November 2001: ‘A coalition partner must do more than just express sympathy;
a coalition partner must perform … all nations, if they want to fight terror, must
do something.’ To underscore the importance of the message, Bush added what
were to become immortal words: ‘Over time, it’s going to be important for nations
to know they will be held accountable for inactivity. You are either with us or
against us in the fight against terror.’48
On this occasion New Zealand was with the United States, and was to make
a substantial contribution to the ‘war on terror’.
In May 2002 a proposal for a NZ$390 million upgrade was to have gone before
Cabinet, but the Prime Minister was said to have asked officials to come back
with a less expensive option saying ‘officials beaver away, but the Government
is not going to tolerate a reinvention of Sirius under another name’.49
During 2002, however, the Government’s attitude towards the Project began
to change. As the nature of the upgrade was investigated further, politicians
who had originally opposed the upgrade came to see its wider utility:
As we told them what was needed to meet the Government’s
requirements, although there was no requirement for an ASW upgrade,
almost every other piece of equipment to be upgraded met a clearly
identified need. What distinguished Project Guardian from Sirius was
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the amount of consultation undertaken. So many agencies had an interest,
and so many agencies wanted the upgrade. Project Guardian was very
much tailored to a whole of government solution.50
Ultimately the predicted costs in the Defence Long-Term Development Plan
published in June 2002 were set at NZ$150–220 million for the Missions Systems
Upgrade, with a share of a further NZ$320 million for the Communications and
Navigations Systems Upgrade, for a total of 11 Orions and Hercules.51
In November 2002 the Government announced its intention to send Hercules
and Orion aircraft to Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf to join Operation Enduring
Freedom.52 The country’s response to, and willingness to be involved in, the
‘war on terror’, as well as a growing recognition of security needs close to home,
clearly reinforced the need for an airborne surveillance facility of significant
ability.
That same month, with officials having continued to beaver away, the
Minister of Defence put forward a proposal for approval to go to tender for the
Orions’ Mission Systems Upgrade and Communication and Navigation Systems
Upgrade.53  In this paper the Minister put forward three options for the Mission
Systems Upgrade. In the attached Defence Long-Term Development Plan Update,
the Minister noted that, because of the differences in requirements for the Orions
and the Hercules Communications and Navigation Systems upgrade, the projects
had been de-coupled, and significant savings could be made on the Orion
upgrade.54 Approval to go to tender was given at a Cabinet meeting on
11 December 2002, and the Minister said that the cost of the upgrade would
probably be in excess of NZ$300 million, and that tender costs would go to
Cabinet at the end of 2003.
It was in fact January 2004 when the preferred tenderer was chosen, and
August 2004 when Government approval to negotiate was given. On 5 October
2004 a contract for NZ$352 million was signed for the upgrade package. In a
background paper attached to the media statement announcing the signing of
the Orion upgrade, the Labour-led Government’s goals and objectives were spelt
out:
The Orions play an important part in the surveillance of New Zealand’s
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and surrounding waters, the Southern
Ocean and the Ross Sea. The aircraft are also used to meet our South
Pacific search and rescue obligations and assisting with EEZ surveillance.
The Orions can also contribute to regional and global security, such as
their recently completed deployment to the Arabian Sea area in support
of the international campaign against terrorism.55
Without any change in the Government Defence Statement,56  the interpretation
of what was needed to meet the Government’s goals and objectives had moved
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significantly from what had been signalled in the Maritime Patrol Review—an
aircraft which ‘could be upgraded to do local tasks, civilian and military, at a
modest cost per aircraft’.57 What the Government clearly signalled when the
new upgrade contract was signed was a move to a level of sophistication and
capability, albeit without an upgraded ASW capability, that had been sought
under Project Sirius. As the Minister explained:
The Orions will have a similar suite of sensors to the maritime patrol craft
operated by our main security partners. They will also have a range of
communication systems capable of sharing information with other forces.
These capabilities will ensure that the aircraft are fully inter-operable
and able to work closely with our security partners.58
The Minister continued:
Maritime patrol aircraft, such as the Orion, have traditionally been used
primarily to conduct maritime surveillance operations. It is now
increasingly regarded as a multi-role aircraft. Once upgraded its ability
to support both maritime and land operations will significantly enhance
the NZDF’s ability to achieve a range of policy objectives.59
Wing Commander John Lovatt, the Commanding Officer of No. 5 Squadron
clarified some of the new capabilities in an article in Air Force News:
Increasingly we can expect to see the P-3 providing support to new and
emerging security threats, in particular transnational crime (including
illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and smuggling of endangered
species), the exploitation of natural resources and terrorism. … The Orion
will evolve from a maritime patrol aircraft into a multi-mission platform
that is able to effectively conduct, coordinate and participate in both
our traditional roles and evolving surveillance and reconnaissance
operations, spanning maritime, littoral, and overland environments.60
The Orions in Action
Although the Maritime Patrol Review had emphasised that on no occasion over
a 35-year period had the Orions been used for combat or peacekeeping duties,
all that was to change given the events subsequent to the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001. Following the Government’s announcement in November
2002 that RNZAF aircraft would participate in Operation Enduring Freedom, the
first rotation of the P-3K Orions left on 11 May 2003. The deployment of an Orion
to the Persian Gulf on Operation Troy provided the RNZAF with another
opportunity to demonstrate Kiwi ingenuity. The Orion required some major
upgrades to allow it to work in a coalition environment. Most notable were the
Link 11 communications system which was borrowed from a frigate; an FF 9000
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high frequency radio; a satellite phone for transmission of digital imagery; and
what was described as ‘other specialist mission equipment’.61
Initially the deployment was to have been for a period of six months, but it
was so successful that on 13 October 2003 the Government announced that the
deployment would be extended by three months. Four air crew rotations and
three support crew rotations were deployed throughout the nine months of the
mission, providing significant experience for No. 5 Squadron in a demanding
environment. Over the first five month period since initial deployment, No. 5
Squadron had flown over 600 hours and over 90 sorties, prompting the Minister
of Defence, Mark Burton, to comment that the level of operational tempo had
impressed Coalition partners. Indicating not only a change in the world situation
but also in geographical priorities and New Zealand’s role in the world, the
Minister added: ‘New Zealand is committed to working closely with others
globally to counter the continuing threat of terrorism to international security
and the extension of this deployment illustrates that commitment.’62
The Upgrade
The National-led Government of the late 1990s was very clear that it wanted an
Orion that could undertake both tasks to protect New Zealand’s sovereignty and
surface and sub-surface tasks in a collective endeavour with other forces. In
1996 the Ministry of Defence awarded a contract for a Project Definition Study
to the US firm Boeing. According to Boeing, the purpose of the study was to
obtain an independent assessment of what would be needed for an Orion upgrade,
based upon evaluation of a number of equipment and system options. This was
to take into account an analysis of operational scenarios. Project Sirius was the
outcome.
Some three years later Boeing was amongst the contenders for Project Sirius,
when the Request for Tender was called for in March 1999. At this point the
defence contractor DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (DASA) pulled out; Lockheed’s
proposal was unacceptable and Boeing and Raytheon were left as serious bidders.
Both were said to have tendered in the NZ$650–$700 million range.63  Raytheon
had in fact offered a trimmed-down version at NZ$450 million, but (as stated in
the Introduction to this chapter) the price quoted at the time the Labour
Government rejected the deal was NZ$562.1 million.
Wing Commander Carl Nixon, subsequently Commanding Officer of No. 5
Squadron, was a member of the Project Sirius team at the time tenders were
called for, and in discussing the project said: ‘I am very proud that back in the
late 1990s, the Air Force was part of re-defining acquisition processes to acquire
capabilities by defining outputs functionally, rather than specifying equipment
directly.’64
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The Key Capabilities were spelt out in a briefing to the Minister of Defence
in July 2000. The capabilities included:
• Data Management Function (DMF);
• Radar;
• Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM);
• Electro-optics;
• Acoustics;




No equipment was specified in the briefing, but Nicky Hager provided details
that same month, although he did not quote a source for the information. Details
were as follows:
• Surveillance Radar—Elta EL/-2022 (version 3);
• Signals intelligence equipment (Electronic Surveillance Measures)—Elta
EL/M 8300 system;
• Infra-red electro-optical system: Super Star SAFIRE system, made by FLIR
Systems Inc.;
• Anti-submarine acoustic processor: CDC UYS-970 (capable of processing data
from 32 sonobuoys), made by Computing Devices Canada Ltd; and
• Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD): CAE ASQ-504 made by CAE Electronics
Ltd, Canada.66
In a briefing to the Minister some three months previously in April 2000, the
point was made that, without the ability to detect, track and deal with
anti-surface threats, the Orion would only be able to make a limited contribution
to a combined force. (This same paper clearly stated that Project Sirius was fully
equivalent to Australian capabilities.) Nevertheless, with the Government’s
antipathy towards anti-submarine capability, by the time of the July 2000
briefing the Ministry of Defence had made provisional allowance for the removal
of the acoustics equipment and magnetic anomaly detector. They offered two
scenarios—(1) fitted for but not with the equipment, with a saving of some
NZ$12.9 million; or (2) none of these capabilities at all, leading to a combined
saving of NZ$33.16 million, or 7 per cent of the upgrade cost.
The Labour Government was adamant about the cancellation of Project Sirius.
However, what was clear though was that much of the capability that had been
sought under Project Sirius was inherent in Project Guardian. (‘It’s better
actually’, one well-placed source commented.) The successful tenderer was L-3
IS Communications Integrated Systems (L-3), the company which, trading under
its previous name of Raytheon Corporation, had been chosen as preferred
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contractor for Project Sirius.67  Project Sirius was to have cost NZ$562.10 million
(US$236 million at the then current exchange rate of US$0.42/NZ$ or US$229
million without a sub-surface capability). Project Guardian was agreed to in 2004
with a contract price of NZ$352 million (US$232 million at an exchange rate of
US$0.66/NZ$). The sophisticated radar, the ELTA EL/M–2022 (v)3 series, which
was sought for Sirius, is central to the upgrade. The electro-optics system, the
Wescam MX-20 infra-red camera, provides a significant capability; and central
to the Orion’s developing role is a Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI).
Handling the large volumes of information will be L-3’s Integrated Data Handling
System (IDHS). The result is ‘an optimised platform that can operate over land
and sea as well as providing air-to-air surveillance’.68
With the signing of the contract in October 2004, the Project Guardian
upgrade began in 2005 with the installation of the electro-optics system as a first
stage. The full upgrade was started on the first aircraft in 2006 at L-3’s base in
Texas, with system proving, testing and completion to be undertaken by 2009.
The remaining five aircraft are to be modified by Safe Air Ltd in Blenheim, to
be delivered by 2011.
Summary
Whilst bureaucratic politics and political influence had a part to play during
the decision-making processes of both National and Labour-led Governments,
trade-offs and judgement of utility and acceptable risks were increasingly
significant elements for both Governments as they struggled to modernise New
Zealand’s defence forces. For example, shortly after Labour was elected to lead
the Government in 1999, they proceeded with a number of policy reviews, the
Maritime Patrol Review being amongst them.69  In considering the judgement
of utility and acceptable risks, the Review questioned the need to retain any of
the Orions, but recommended that if they were to be retained they should use
‘good quality commercial systems wherever possible’.70 The radical change
recommended to the operational capability of the P-3K Orion reflected what was
seen at the time as an ‘incredibly benign strategic environment’.71
However, although the domestic aspects of decision-making were important,
the influencing elements of (1) external sources, (2) the world situation, (3) New
Zealand’s role in the world, and (4) geographical priorities (an international
focus) were more significant. These elements, coupled with timing, seem to have
been crucial factors in the ultimate decision to proceed with the upgrade. The
world situation was to change dramatically as a result of the events of
11 September 2001 and, along with it, a change to New Zealand’s role in the
world. Border security and EEZ protection took on new meaning in the changed
security environment. Whilst domestic concerns had a part to play, ultimately
it was the international situation and timing which played the most significant
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roles in the decision to proceed with a sophisticated upgrading of the Orion
aircraft.
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Chapter 7
Plotting and Sedition, or Necessary
Acquisition? The LAV IIIs
At the time of the publication of the 1997 Defence White Paper, it had become
apparent that the New Zealand Government was being faced with a range of
decisions which it needed to take to overcome the widespread obsolescence of
major items of military equipment. Whilst previous chapters have focused on
some of the major needs of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) or the Royal
New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF), or, as in the case of HMNZS Charles Upham
joint service requirements, this chapter will focus on one central requirement
necessary for re-equipping the Army—Light Armoured Vehicles, or LAVs.
The 1997 White Paper noted that ‘immediate priorities include the replacement
or upgrading of the current fleet of M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers’.1  At a
Cabinet Meeting the previous month, it had been agreed that upgrading the
Army’s combat capability was a priority ‘to overcome current shortcomings in
its ability to undertake the more likely short term tasks, particularly peacekeeping
missions’.2 The following year Cabinet approved in principle the expenditure
of NZ$180 million to acquire armoured vehicles, comprising both Armoured
Personnel Carriers (APCs) and Fire Support Vehicles (FSVs). The funding was to
provide sufficient armoured protection for the deployment of an infantry
company group, replacing the 77 M113s and eight Scorpion FSVs which were
then being operated.
Just over a year later, the Cabinet Strategy Committee approved a major
change to the operational concept of the Army, agreeing that it become a
motorised infantry force. This move to motorisation of the Army was to require
a significant increase in the number of armoured vehicles required, and, as an
interim measure, approval was given for the expenditure of NZ$212 million,
which it was estimated would provide sufficient lift for one battalion group,
and for one company from the second battalion. Cabinet approved both the
change in operational concept and funding at a meeting on 24 May 1999.
With the return of a Labour-led government later that year, a commitment
to re-equipping the Army was reinforced. The Government’s Defence Policy
Framework, released in June 2000, noted:
Priority will be given to the acquisition and maintenance of essential
equipment. Our core requirement is for well-equipped, combat trained
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land forces which are also able to act as effective peacekeepers, supported
by the Navy and Air Force.3
Two months later at a meeting on 21 August 2000, Cabinet approved in
principle the purchase of 105 Light armoured vehicles at a projected cost of
NZ$611 million. This was to be a significantly controversial acquisition project
decision, leading to no less than four official reviews or inquiries.4
This chapter briefly explores the development of the use of armoured vehicles
in the New Zealand Army and then examines the events that led to National’s
initial decision in 1997 to proceed with acquiring new armoured vehicles. The
subsequent decisions to approve the motorisation of the Army, and increase the
amount of funding available shall then be reviewed, before exploring the
decisions of the Labour-led Government which led to the purchase of 105 fully
equipped LAV IIIs, and, finally, commenting on their introduction into service.
History and Background
New Zealand’s first armoured regiment was the Divisional Cavalry Regiment,
formed during the Second World War. The Regiment was despatched overseas
in three echelons, the second of which was diverted to England to assist in its
defence during the Battle of Britain. The Regiment operated a variety of tracked
and wheeled armoured vehicles, and saw action in Greece, Crete, the Middle
East, North Africa and Italy.
Following the war, for several decades the New Zealand Army operated both
wheeled scout cars and armoured cars (predominately made by Daimler), as well
as tanks. Valentine tanks were introduced in 1941 and served until 1960.
Centurions were operated between 1950 and 19685  , whilst the last tank operated
by the Army, the M41 light tank, ten of which were introduced from 1960 on,
was officially withdrawn from service in 1983.
By this time, the Army was operating two main types of armoured vehicle,
the venerable M113A1 APC, and the Scorpion FSV. Designed in the United States
in the mid-1950s, the M113 had entered New Zealand Army service in 1969, and
over the next few years 77 were delivered in total. The M113 proved to be
reliable for many years, and it saw service overseas in both Bosnia and East
Timor. The last of the M113s were formally withdrawn from service on
19 November 2004. The Scorpion, which entered service in 1983, was a somewhat
different proposition.
The 1978 Defence Review indicated that New Zealand could no longer afford
main battle tanks, and that the M41s would be replaced with a ‘cost effective
alternative’,—the Scorpion.6 The first Scorpions, built by Alvis Limited of
Coventry, were delivered to the British Army in 1972. Designated a Combat
Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) or CVR (T), the Scorpion was fitted with a
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76mm gun, and a militarised 4.2 litre Jaguar petrol engine. Twenty-six Scorpions
were delivered to the New Zealand Army from August 1982 onwards. Major
General Piers Reid, former Chief of General Staff, was scathing about the vehicle:
‘We bought the Scorpion—that was a bad decision. It was a disastrous vehicle,
built for Autobahns. It fell apart in the matter of a decade.’7 These sentiments
were echoed by officials:
The Scorpion light tank is currently in use as a reconnaissance and fire
support vehicle. It is not well-suited to the fire support role. It has
experienced recurring mechanical problems which have attracted high
maintenance costs and have forced the withdrawal of all but eight of the
original 26 vehicles.8
The Scorpions were finally withdrawn from active service in July 1998.
Equipping an Expeditionary Force—Lessons from Bosnia
Ever since the first contingent of New Zealand troops left for the Boer War in
October 1899, New Zealand has had a tradition of developing and maintaining
expeditionary forces.9 This is no less important today than it was over a century
ago. As the Chief of Defence Force highlighted in 2004, ‘New Zealand’s
geo-strategic position and reliance upon international trade fundamentally
influences the way NZDF doctrine is derived and applied. As a result NZDF
doctrine focuses upon our need to develop and sustain expeditionary forces’.10
When 250 New Zealand troops arrived in the former Yugoslavia in September
1994, their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Graeme Williams, described
the deployment of Kiwi Company as ‘the largest number of troops in one
deployment that the Government has committed to active service since the
Korean War of the 1950s’.11  Unlike the 8000 horses which served the New
Zealand contingent during the Boer War, the main mount for Kiwi Company
was to be the M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carrier. Twenty-six M113s were
despatched to Bosnia, but undertook major modifications before arrival ‘in order
to deploy safely to Bosnia’, as a Cabinet Committee paper in March 1998 indicated.
The paper did go on to acknowledge that adding further armour to the vehicle
to improve crew survivability adversely affected the vehicle’s mobility and
performance in roles such as convoy protection. Speaking in Parliament later
that year, Helen Clark was more direct with her concern: ‘The Army was sent
to Bosnia with armoured personnel carriers from the Vietnam War and those
men were endangered.’12  Cabinet papers the following year underscored this
point:
The deficiencies in the NZ Army’s capabilities were confirmed by the
Kiwi Company deployment to Bosnia. This deployment showed that the
NZ Army, with its current equipment types and method of operation,
would be incapable of operating effectively in anything other than a
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benign environment, without imposing significant risk on the wider
force within which it would work.13
Whilst the deployment of three contingents of troops to Bosnia was an
enormous public relations success, both politically and for the NZDF, there was
clearly a large amount of risk involved. Brigadier Roger Mortlock commented:
The M113s were slow—as they were re-armoured they became very
slow. The initial British brigadier gave Kiwi Company the safest area to
patrol, but he was still worried that he wouldn’t get to them in time if
they were in real trouble.14
The nature of the operational area was underscored by Captain Marcus Culley
of Kiwi II Company:
With the increase in size of the company’s area of responsibility as a
result of the deployment of United Nations Task Force Alpha, the
workload on soldiers has increased. … Fortunately the danger has not
increased, with the Vitez pocket remaining one of the quieter places in
Central Bosnia.15
The former Secretary of Defence, Gerald Hensley, also commented on their
limits: ‘In 1994 I said they were old and worn out. Deployed on a mission they
were on the limits of their capability.’16 The limits on the capability of the
M113s meant that there was also a severe limit on the utility of New Zealand
forces. In order to have a minimum level of acceptable protection, NZ$3.2 million
had been spent on modifying the M113s before they left for Bosnia. In addition,
belly armour for mine protection, and sponson armour to protect against shrapnel,
was borrowed from Australia. The result of the modifications was such that,
‘although the level of protection of these vehicles was improved, their mobility
was severely compromised’.17 The significant constraints this placed on Kiwi
Company were emphasised in a paper arguing for the motorisation of the New
Zealand Army:
This (deficiency) has implications for the value that our traditional
defence partners place on New Zealand’s peacekeeping efforts. Bosnia
highlighted that the Army lacks the means to be able to move and
manoeuvre its forces with the necessary degree of protection and speed
to ensure the survivability of the force while it completes the assigned
tasks in a timely manner.18
In order to ensure any meaningful place for a New Zealand contribution, remedial
action was clearly necessary.
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From Armoured Personnel Carrier to Infantry Fighting
Vehicle—The Motorisation of the New Zealand Army
With the experience of Bosnia fresh in everyone’s minds, the 1997 Defence
Assessment identified that priority should be given to upgrading the combat
capability of the Army. The subsequent 1997 White Paper acknowledged that
there were major deficiencies which needed to be addressed:
The Government’s first priority will be to rectify the most critical
deficiencies in those capabilities where there is more likely to be a need
in the short term, that is re-equipping the Army so that it can undertake
the more demanding peace support operations.19
Here the White Paper also noted the changing nature of peace support
operations. The history of peacekeeping for over 40 years had been one requiring
lightly armed forces, usually deployed at the agreement of both parties to a
conflict. During the 1990s that had changed, and the White Paper acknowledged
this:
Since the end of the Cold War, however, peace missions have increasingly
been launched during hostilities. The consent of the warring parties has
been neither complete nor continuous. These peace enforcement missions
are a higher-order task than peacekeeping as they involve conventional
high-intensity operations.20
Along with the change in the nature of peacekeeping, it was acknowledged
that there had been significant advances in technology, and that the capabilities
of New Zealand’s security partners had continued to grow. This had resulted in
a capability gap between New Zealand and its potential partners. The White
Paper acknowledged: ‘Because others are now better able to perform
peacekeeping tasks, New Zealand’s ability to offer operationally useful
contributions to peacekeeping is diminishing.’21 This had significant implications
for New Zealand, a country which took pride in its contribution to peacekeeping
efforts throughout the world. The White Paper went on to add: ‘As the
deployment of land forces on peacekeeping operations is the most likely task to
be assigned to the NZDF in the short term, these upgrades are a top priority in
the investment plan.’22
Some five months later, on 23 March 1998, Cabinet approved in principle
the purchase of armoured vehicles at an estimated cost of NZ$180 million.
Indicative costings were based on a new fleet of armoured vehicles composed
of 69 APCs and 12 FSVs. Consideration was being given at the time to either
purchasing new APCs, or upgrading the M113A1 to current M113A4
configuration, but officials made it clear that a new FSV, preferably sharing the
same hull as the APC, would be required.
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James Rolfe, a former Army officer, commented that the Army tried to identify
its requirements during 1996 and 1997, but had problems deciding whether
wheeled or tracked armoured vehicles were most appropriate.23  Gerald Hensley,
Secretary of Defence at the time, was more direct:
In attempting to define the problem ‘How do we replace the APCs?’ there
were two fundamental issues to be addressed: ‘What sort of vehicles did
we want, and how many would we need?’ Each of these questions was
to prove difficult to answer. Our battles with the Army were great. The
basic question was do we have wheeled or tracked vehicles? The Army
was riven by factions. The Armoured Corps people felt if they gave up
on tracks that would be the end of the Armoured Corps—they delayed
the procurement by up to a year. The answer eventually came back that
in 80% of cases wheels were better than tracks.24
Before the end of 1998, as discussed in previous chapters, the Minister of
Defence sought the opportunity to purchase F-16 strike aircraft, and a third
ANZAC frigate. Supporting papers at the time indicated that ‘there have been
changes in project timings … (with) an extended delivery of armoured
vehicles’.25 The paper went on to say that the extended delivery period reflected
‘the availability of the likely preferred option’, and noted that it was planned
that the NZDF would cooperate with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) on the
possible joint purchase of armoured vehicles.
The following month, in December 1998, a Project Team of two Ministry of
Defence officials and four New Zealand Army personnel visited Australia to
discuss the ASLAV—Australian Light Armoured Vehicle—project. Australia
was in the process of deciding on orders for further ASLAVS for 1999 and, in
the spirit of Closer Defence Relations, the opportunity was taken to explore
whether a joint order might be desirable. The project team also visited the
manufacturer of the base vehicle, the LAV II, General Motors Defense (GMD) in
February 1999. (In fact, familiarisation with the ASLAV project had begun in
1996 with a visit of two officers from the Queen Alexandra’s Mounted Rifles
(QAMR) to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (Reconnaissance), Royal Australian
Armoured Corps.)
However, by May 1999 it was clear that the operational requirements of the
two armies were different. By this stage the New Zealand Army had sought
approval to change the operating concept of the Army to that of a motorised
infantry. Whilst the Army had for some years based its doctrine on that of
manoeuvre warfare, it was clear from the experience in Bosnia that the equipment
available to the Army did not support the Army’s doctrine. The change in
operating concept was a significant change, which would see the whole of a
battalion being capable of being transported to the battlefield in vehicles with
armoured protection. Having previously sought approval to purchase
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approximately 69 APCs and 12 FSVs, it was ‘now suggested that approximately
127 Infantry Mobility Vehicles (IMVs) and 24 FSVs would be required. This
could cost up to $408 million (excluding Goods and Services Tax (GST)). The
Defence Capital Plan (DCP) has funding provision of NZ$212 million (excluding
GST).’26
Three options were therefore put to Cabinet at this point:
1. Buy all of the required vehicles in one tranche through an increase in funding.
2. Buy all of the required FSVs and sufficient IMVs to equip one full battalion,
plus sufficient for one company of the second battalion. This option was said to
fall within the already approved budget envelope.
3. Buy the vehicles required to fully equip two battalions in two tranches, the
first purchase as in option (2), and the remainder at a later date.
The Ministry indicated that the first option was the preferred option if
funding was not a constraint, but this was considered to be unrealistic. The
second option, which the Government approved, was not favoured either. The
Ministry was concerned that this option would have long-term training
implications for the Army, as it would have battalions training for two different
types of operations. It was also concerned that there would be a negative impact
on the training of reinforcements, and that there would be an increased risk of
being unable to maintain a sufficient force of vehicles in theatre. ‘It is therefore,’
the Ministry contended, ‘the weakest of the three options.’ The Minister’s
preferred choice was option three—to purchase in two tranches. In the short
term the implications were the same as option two, but in the long term this
option would simplify training, whilst also simplifying reinforcement and rotation
problems. The Ministry’s assessment was: ‘This option provides a balance
between risk and operational effectiveness, when considered over the longer
term.’27
At the time of its decision, National were once more wanting to enhance
relationships with Australia and the United States and were committed to using
New Zealand forces in peace support roles. Whilst they had indicated support
for new wheeled armoured vehicles, trade-offs were in the equation as they were
also committed to Project Sirius and the F-16s, and remained officially committed
to a third surface combatant. Max Bradford said: ‘We had other equipment to
replace.’28 The Auditor-General’s Report commented: ‘Cabinet had
considered—and rejected—an option of equipping two battalions, either in the
present or in the future.’29  Perhaps, not surprisingly, Cabinet on 24 May 1999
approved the second option.
The Cabinet paper on Motorisation of the NZ Army had noted: ‘A review of
recent technological developments together with discussions with our immediate
allies on the concept of operations led to the conclusion that the characteristics
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of wheeled armoured vehicles would better suit New Zealand’s requirements
than tracked vehicles.’30
The paper went on to comment on the changing nature of both warlike and
peace support operations, with a strengthening of weapons capability amongst
protagonists in disputes. The possession of increasingly lethal weaponry and
vehicles with greater levels of armour and mobility had led to New Zealand’s
traditional defence partners taking serious account of these developments as
they re-shaped their own forces. They had therefore either already developed
infantry battalions with armoured mobility, as in the case of the United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom, or as in Australia’s case were moving towards
such a capability.31 The importance of interoperability with allies had been
stressed already in a previous paper.
The increase in the size of operational areas being assigned to infantry
battalions was also stressed. This had been made possible by motorisation, and
the formidable task allotted to Kiwi Company as a result was used as an
illustration of the difficulties New Zealand faced with its current equipment and
operational doctrine:
A force one third the size of a battalion was assigned an area 12.5 times
larger than that a complete battalion would reasonably be given, based
upon traditional foot mobility. Therefore, the effective increase in the
size of operations, when compared at battalion level, is a factor of 36
times.32
The annex attached to the paper (and a similar annex attached to the Light
Armoured Vehicle Project paper the following year) made much of the capability
of wheeled IMVs to self-deploy, and having the ability to cover ground quickly
and reliably when compared to tracked APCs.
In June 1999, speaking at Trentham Army Camp, the Minister of Defence,
Max Bradford, indicated that a total of 104 wheeled vehicles (not 81) would
replace the M113s. These would comprise the 24 FSVs previously approved,
and approximately 80 IMVs. Bradford indicated that ‘the choice of wheeled over
tracked vehicles had been made after careful thought. They were more reliable
over long distances and could be more easily upgraded over their 25 year service
life.’33
Assessing the Alternatives
Also in June 1999, the Acquisition Division of the Ministry of Defence had
decided that an independent reviewer should examine the service specifications
which had been developed for the tender documents. They engaged HVR
Consulting Services (HVR) in the United Kingdom to provide an independent
opinion on the validity of the specifications. An initial finding of HVR’s report
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was that it appeared that the specifications were based on one vehicle—the LAV
III. This was despite the fact that the tender documents had specifically sought
a mix of FSVs and IMVs, on a ratio of 1:5. The LAV III was manufactured only
as an FSV. HVR recommended that if the Ministry were to go to tender, it should
change the specifications to make them more open to a wider range of vehicles.
Those changes were subsequently made. However, the report considered that
the specification of the LAV III ‘was so far ahead of the competition that HVR
recommended that the Ministry of Defence should consider direct purchase,
rather than conducting a tender’.34
At the same time as asking HVR for their independent review, the Ministry
of Defence had also issued a request for registration of interest to over 70 potential
suppliers. Sixteen responses were received; those 16 respondents offered between
them 17 vehicles, and HVR reviewed each of them against 10 of the key criteria
that were required for the vehicle. HVR reviewed the vehicles for consideration
and, apart from its consideration that the LAV III was the outstanding vehicle,
found that only one other came close, ‘but that it had almost reached the end of
its development life’. HVR suggested that if the Ministry was determined to go
to tender, it should remove the requirement for air transportability by the C-130
Hercules, thus allowing two, and potentially four, other vehicles to compete in
the tender process. One of those other alternatives was the FOX 6x6, or FUCHS
as it was known in Germany, where it was manufactured by Henschel
Wehrtechnik. Early in October 1999 the New Zealand agent for the FOX, H.W.
Munroe, wrote to the Ministry of Defence expressing its concern about the
tender process, saying: ‘A careful examination of the User Requirements shows
that the LAV III vehicle is the only vehicle that meets all essential criteria.
Therefore, we must ask why any other vehicle manufacturers were issued with
tender documents?’35
Later that month the Ministry of Defence called a conference of tenderers,
and at this time agreed to a system of waivers. This was to allow those tenderers
whose products did not meet the essential requirements to ask for an exemption,
or a series of exemptions, to allow them to proceed. When the tenders closed in
December 1999 only two vehicles were in contention, the LAV III and the FOX
6x6. At least one company had decided not to bid from the outset, as it knew
its product was unable to meet all the essential criteria.
Tenders had been sought for a total of either 102 or 152 vehicles, 26 FSVs
and 126 IMVs. Whilst seven tenderers had been approached for possible pricing,
only three responses had been received. These indicated a choice of two vehicles:
the Canadian-built LAV III 8x8, and the German-built FOX 6x6. Significantly,
neither the LAV III nor the FOX 6x6 complied with all of the tender requirements.
However, the Ministry of Defence indicated that the areas of non-compliance
on the LAV III were minor. Furthermore, because of its FSV configuration, only
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two thirds of the original number estimated would be required to equip both
battalions. The FOX on the other hand was found to have significant
shortcomings. Perhaps the most important of these was that the proposed FSV
turret had never been fitted to a FOX before. At the time of assessing the tenders,
it was considered that the FOX would have cost 15–20 per cent more for the total
project. With the shift in exchange rates by August 2000, this expense had
increased by 5–10 per cent, despite an individual vehicle cost of NZ$3.4 million
for a specially upgraded FOX, as opposed to about NZ$6 million for a LAV III.36
Preference was given to the LAV III, a recently designed third-generation vehicle
fitted with a turreted weapon system and able to carry a crew of three and a
section of seven troops. Whilst the LAV III was only available in turreted form,
fitted with a stabilised 25mm cannon, 7.62mm machine gun, and eight smoke
grenade launchers, it combined the functions of an FSV and an IMV. This allowed
a reduction in the numbers of vehicles required from 152 to 105.
Controversy and Accusation—The Purchase of the LAV IIIs
When the Labour-led Government came to power, they had already declared
that they would, in large part, be following the recommendations of Defence
Beyond 2000. One of those options was ‘an Army force structure based on two
highly mobile light infantry battalions’.37  After coming to power, the new
Government set up a series of reviews of defence priorities. The impact of some
of those reviews has been explored in earlier chapters; taking account of New
Zealand’s role in the world, the judgement of utility, and trade-offs, decisions
were made not to proceed with the conversion of HMNZS Charles Upham; not
to proceed with a third frigate; to cancel the lease of the F-16s, and to disband
the Air Force strike wing. The light armoured vehicle project was identified as
a high priority purchase. The question remained, how many to purchase?
The Secretary of Defence briefed the Minister in June 2000, and advised that
the LAV III had been identified as the most suitable vehicle, and that 105 would
fulfil all requirements. However, the Secretary went on to note that this number
would cost significantly more than the NZ$212 million budgeted by the previous
Government, and advised two options. The first of these was to buy 35 LAVs,
which would fit within the previous budget envelope; the second was to buy
55 LAVs at a likely cost of NZ$337 million, with the suggestion of buying the
other 50 at a later date.38 The Auditor-General’s Report indicated that the
Minister felt that these options were insufficient, and the Secretary was asked
to prepare a draft Cabinet paper.
In another reflection of bureaucratic politics, the Ministry of Defence
produced a draft paper in July 2000, which gave three options:
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1. The recommendation of the Army to purchase 105 Light armoured vehicles
for delivery over a 5-year period;
2. The recommendation of the MoD (with which the NZDF concurred) to
purchase 55 light armoured vehicles with an option of 50 further
vehicles—the purchase decision on these latter vehicles would depend
upon the outcome of the land force capability review that had been
commissioned under The Government’s Defence Policy Framework; or
3. A third option—to purchase 75 light armoured vehicles (delivered over a
3–4 year period), with the option of 30 more later.39
Following this the Minister asked for a briefing from the Chief of Defence
Force (CDF), who asked the Army to provide one. The Chief of General Staff
(CGS) provided the briefing on 1 August 2000. On 9 August the Minister met
with the Secretary of Defence and the CDF, and was specific about the options
he wanted to be included in the paper. Despite the Army’s strong objection, the
Ministry of Defence included the following paragraph in the final Cabinet paper:
In its desired requirements the Army indicated a preference for a common
body shell type for the FSV and IMV. This commonality introduces
operational, logistic, training and maintenance advantages. One common
vehicle type can limit flexibility, and may be initially more expensive.
For instance having one battalion equipped with the LAV III and the
other equipped with an upgrade[d] M113 APC or similar may be a cheaper
and more versatile combination. This concept has not been tested.40
This statement effectively supported a fourth option, namely to ‘redefine the
project requirements’. The Army had pointed out that a combined fleet was
outside the Force Development Proposal of May 1999, and the Minister of Defence
had previously indicated that it would restrict the tender process to wheeled
vehicles.
Three options were put to Cabinet in August 2000, with a recommendation
for approval in principle of the procurement of the LAV III. Options put forward
were:
1. Purchase 75, to be delivered over a 3–4 year period at a cost of NZ$472
million, with an option to purchase 30 later;
2. Purchase 55, to be delivered over a 3-year period at a cost of NZ$389 million,
with an option to purchase a further 50 at a later date; or
3. Redefine the project requirements entirely.41
Major General Piers Reid commented: ‘The ultimate question was should we
buy the vehicles in tranches, or should we buy them all at once? Treasury said
“Buy them all at once”.’42  In commenting on the proposal, Treasury said:
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If 105 vehicles were purchased, then Ministers would be able to deploy
one three-company battalion offshore for six months, while a further
similar battalion remains under training in New Zealand. Having a second
battalion under training in New Zealand means that a fully trained
equivalent unit can replace the Army battalion that is deployed offshore.
This involves a considerable deepening of the Army’s current capability.
… If Ministers want the capability outlined above, it will be cheaper to
purchase the 105 vehicles in one batch.43
Even after allowing for the GST component, Option 3, at a net cost of NZ$340
million, was over 50 per cent more costly than the NZ$212 million approved by
the National Government. However, having made much of defence
decision-making as an election issue, it was now time for the Labour Government
to front up with the money. At a meeting on 21 August 2000, Cabinet approved
in principle the purchase of 105 Light armoured vehicles for delivery over a
5-year period at a cost not to exceed NZ$611,764,613 (GST inclusive). Later that
week, an Editorial in the New Zealand Herald commented:
The Army of course is the big winner in the Government’s
decision-making. The $611 million to be spent on 105 new light armoured
vehicles could reasonably be described as lavish. The Army’s present
M113s date back to the Vietnam War, have proved an embarrassment
in Bosnia and East Timor, and clearly need replacement urgently. The
Canadian-built LAV III is the Army’s choice and, with its ability to fill
both troop-carrying and fire-support roles, it will be a considerable
morale-booster. Yet in its wildest dreams, the Army could not have
guessed that its request for such a large number of vehicles would be
granted.44
However, when the Prime Minister, Helen Clark, announced the purchase
of the LAV IIIs following the Cabinet decision in August 2000, she was clear
about the importance of replacing the M113s, saying:
The equipment the Army has been putting up with just isn’t good enough
for the tasks it is asked to do. The deficiencies of the existing Armoured
Personnel Carriers (APCs) … have been clear in recent deployments. …
In Bosnia and East Timor the APCs haven’t been up to the job.45
Following Cabinet’s approval-in-principle, a contract was signed on
29 January 2001 with General Motors of Canada Ltd for 105 LAV IIIs.
The Army’s ‘big win’ was to hit the headlines long before any of the new
vehicles arrived in New Zealand. In November 2000 the Secretary of Defence,
Graham Fortune, had asked the Auditor-General to undertake a review of the
processes used for the acquisition of the LAVs. The Auditor-General’s Report
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was published in August 2001. The findings of the Report were damning, and
included concerns that:
• from the start, the project was poorly defined;
• the changing project definition led to a lack of clarity of the number of
vehicles required;
• the approach to research of the market was deficient;
• the scope for competition was restricted;
• there was no strategic management of the project;
• in at least two instances the MoD failed to consult appropriately;
• relationships between the MoD, the NZDF and the Army were dysfunctional;
• pursuit of the project diverged considerably from Cabinet approvals in a
number of respects;
• the longer the acquisition was delayed, the more expensive it became;
• there was insufficient documentation of some key decisions; and finally
• the significant capability requirements associated with the acquisition of
105 LAV IIIs were inadequately assessed before the decision was made to
acquire the vehicles.46
The political fall-out was immediate. Earlier in the month there had been a
Parliamentary debacle as questions were raised about the suitability of the LAV
III for operating in areas such as East Timor. ACT MP Rodney Hide had tabled
a written question asking whether an LAV III could have reached the area where
Private Leonard Manning was shot in a firefight. The Minister, Mark Burton,
in his reply suggested that the noise of the vehicle would have put off potential
attackers. However, Hide obtained a copy of a draft response which said that
using the LAV ‘would not have been practicable’, but that in fact an M113 had
got within 30 metres of the scene of the incident. With the publication of the
Auditor-General’s report, Hide took the opportunity again to attack the Minister:
The process was dysfunctional, the tender screwed, and Cabinet was
sidelined. It’s inconceivable that such a process would hit the jackpot
and reach the right decision. Heads should role (sic). The first head on
the pike should be Minister of Defence, Mark Burton’s.47
Hide went on to call for fewer wheeled armoured personnel carriers, and an
upgrade of the M113s. By contrast, the Green Party’s Defence Spokesperson,
Keith Locke, took a different perspective:
Acquisition of armoured vehicles was paralysed as the Army tried to
overcome resistance from defence dinosaurs who still put priority on air
and naval combat. … The report shows the Defence Force wanted to go
ahead with the purchase of only 50 LAVs, presumably to free up money
for the navy or air force.48
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The week following the debacle in Parliament, Max Bradford demanded a
broader investigation of ‘the whole scene’. He was himself, it was reported, in
an embarrassing situation as he had recommended the purchase of LAVs in 1998,
‘but now he says important information was withheld from him at the time’.
The same article which had commented on Bradford’s wish for a broader inquiry
also noted: ‘Something else that is interesting is the amount of information Hide,
Bradford and New Zealand First MP Ron Mark, a former Army officer, are
receiving. It obviously comes from military sources.’49
During the same month in which the Auditor-General’s Report was released,
a letter (which was to become known as ‘The Gordon Letter’50 ), was tabled in
Parliament, a copy having been given to Bradford by Robin Johansen, who had
previously been Deputy Secretary for Defence Acquisition in the Ministry of
Defence.51 The letter, which Lieutenant Colonel I.J.M. Gordon indicated was
triggered by the Army’s embarrassing experience with its equipment in Bosnia,
was described by the Leader of the Opposition, Jenny Shipley, as ‘seditious’.52
In the letter, Gordon encouraged the Army to open a ‘second front’ in its war
with the Defence chiefs. The New Zealand Herald commented:
Over the next few days, the impression left by the Gordon letter was
reinforced with leaks about private briefings and a dinner attended by
the Army high command and Defence Minister Mark Burton of which
the Chief of Defence Forces was unaware. … The leaking of the Gordon
letter finally pushed the Government into ordering an investigation.53
The Auditor-General’s Report had, as we have seen, commented strongly on
the dysfunctional nature of the relationships between the Ministry of Defence,
the NZDF and the Army. Less than three weeks after the Report was published,
the Minister of Defence announced the following major review and two inquiries:
1. A review of accountabilities and structural arrangements between the
Ministry of Defence and the NZDF—the Hunn report;
2. An inquiry into standards of behaviour, the leaking of documents and the
inappropriate use of information and position by NZDF personnel—the
White and Ansell report; and
3. An inquiry through the office of the Judge Advocate General into the
propriety of a letter allegedly generated from within the Army and an e-mail
allegedly generated from within the RNZN—the Carruthers report.
The first of the reports to be completed was the White and Ansell report,
published on 20 December 2001. There were two aspects to the report, the first
concerning standards of behaviour more generally, and the second regarding
the leaking of information. The report’s authors analysed 62 possible
‘unauthorised disclosures’, and found that 30 might be classified as ‘probable
leaks’, that is ‘the deliberate and improper covert release of official information
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to advance a particular agenda or embarrass’.54  Of particular significance to
this chapter was the finding of four probable leaks during August 2001, the
month in which the Auditor-General’s Report, with its many critical findings,
was published. White and Ansell in commenting on the leaks said:
We were not asked to identify the individuals responsible for these
deliberate ‘leaks’ and, as we have made it plain, there is no clear evidence
of culpability. We were guided in most cases by the weight of opinion
in the responses to our inquiry. Nevertheless it became apparent to us
that they probably came largely from factions in the Army. … It is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the ‘leaks’ which occurred were
originally designed to advance the interests of the Army, primarily
against the interests of the other Services. Subsequently the ‘leaks’ were
designed to counter the influence of a faction in the Army by causing
personal embarrassment to the CGS.55
Robin Johansen, former Deputy Secretary–Acquisitions commented: ‘It is
my view that there was a concerted effort by Army to step outside established
processes to achieve goals which were not shared across the whole of the defence
community.’56
Some months later, in February 2002, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Committee published a further report, saying that ‘the Army’s purchase of
105 Light armoured vehicles (LAVs) is a “sorry chapter” for major capital
acquisition projects in New Zealand.’57 This time it was the National MP Max
Bradford who said the Minister should reconsider the LAV purchase: ‘The world
has changed and, with it, the appropriateness of the LAV purchase.’58 There
was, though, to be no change.
By May 2002 the first LAV, NZLAV001, was close to completion. Having had
its gun turret fitted in California, it was shipped to Arizona for gun performance
and vehicle testing.59  In June 2002 a group of 15 Army personnel were visiting
Canadian forces to learn about the Canadian experience with the LAV.60  By
January 2003 a Transition Training Team (TTT) had been set up at Waiouru to
conduct training for instructors and crews; it was intended to disband the TTT
after crews for both the 1st Battalion Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment
(RNZIR) and 2nd/1st Battalion had been trained.61 The first batch of seven
NZLAVs arrived in New Zealand in August 200362  and, just as in August 2001,
the LAV once again became the focus both of media and political attention.
The Introduction into Service of the LAV IIIs
At the end of July 2003, National MP Simon Power had said: ‘It has also been
suggested that the Army will struggle to man the new Light Armoured Vehicles
(LAV3s) that are due for delivery in September.’63 That was to be confirmed a
week later, when NZDF papers obtained under the Official Information Act 1982
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indicated that the Army was particularly concerned about shortages of crew,
mechanics and electronics technicians for the LAVs. The New Zealand Herald
went on to note that the NZDF papers said that ‘there are already shortages in
these trades and the nature and complexity of the Lav (sic) will exacerbate them’,
though added that the Minister’s Office had said that ‘its latest advice is that
the Army is on track to fully crew the vehicles’.64
Late in August 2003 a television documentary about the LAVs screened on
the Sunday program on TV One.65 This program challenged the purchase of the
LAV IIIs yet again and reopened the ‘wheels versus tracks’ debate. Politics were
also present again, with New Zealand First MP Ron Mark commenting that the
purchase of the LAVs ‘is a $1 billion bungle—I wrote to the Prime Minister
personally to ask her to stop the project’.66  Major General Jerry Mateparae,
Chief of General Staff, not surprisingly said: ‘It’s money well spent.’67
The issue of ‘wheels versus tracks’ was raised in relation to both the utility
of the LAVs and trade-offs. A soldier in East Timor was quoted as saying: ‘I’m
currently serving as a crew commander in East Timor. You just won’t get a LAV
where we go. In a country like this the M113 is ideal—keep the LAV for the
desert.’68  However, another experienced M113 commander, Captain Dougal
Baker, who had been deployed to both Bosnia and East Timor, said:
The LAV is a far superior machine. Of course there are areas you can’t
go through with wheels, but you can go to 95% of the places you’d go
with tracks. For the rest—you can travel around the obstacle faster than
a tracked vehicle can go through it.69
A week after the television program aired, I met with Major General Piers
Reid. Concerning the politics he said: ‘Ron Mark is using the vehicle to keep up
his profile. Max Bradford has used it for his political survival.’ As regards utility
he commented: ‘There’s probably only 1 or 2% of an area where you can get an
M113 where you can’t get an LAV III.’ He then added:
You’d get the impression from Ron Mark that an M113 could go over a
mine—it can’t. The design of the LAV III is excellent for protection
against mines. A mine will blow a wheel off, but the tub will protect the
occupants.70 The occupants will also be protected by the 25mm gun,
which will deal with armoured vehicles.71 The M113 has a 12.7mm
machine gun.72
Rod Vaughan, the television program’s commentator, said:
Off road, the M113 has the edge. It’s amphibious and light enough to be
air-dropped by parachute. Ron Mark says the bulky LAV will prove to
be a lemon. … Getting to the battlefield is a real challenge. The original
specifications called for transportability in a Hercules.73  At 14 tonnes
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it’s almost twice the weight of an M113. … The Army rejected the
possibility of upgrading the M113s in Australia for a third of the price.74
The Minister of Defence, Mark Burton, replied: ‘Upgrading the M113s would
have given an 8-10 year life extension. In the end we had to make a decision,
and I’m confident we made the right decision here.’75 The first deliveries took
place in August 2003, and Burton formally accepted delivery at a ceremony at
Waiouru on 24 October 2003.
Teething problems
Just three months after the LAVs were officially accepted, reports of mechanical
breakdowns surfaced. ‘Breakdowns plague Army’s new vehicles’ ran a headline
in the New Zealand Herald on 21 January 2004. The article went on to say that
mechanical faults had struck the first batch of LAVs, listing faults in a heater,
turbo unit, and auxiliary power unit. Two days later the manufacturers were
reported as having responded that the faults were all minor and easily repaired.
In July 2004 criticisms of the vehicle were levelled by National MP Simon Power,
who asked if the vehicles were a ‘bottomless pit’ of extra costs after the Army
had sought an extra NZ$6 million for spare parts. (The request was declined.)
And in December 2004 it was reported that four LAVs out of the 18, which had
been sent to Australia for Exercise Predators Gallop, had been put out of action
for several days after hitting tree stumps. Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson, Chief of
Defence Force, responded to the concern saying: ‘Our loss of vehicles for that
reason was not greater than the Australian loss of vehicles.’76  Perhaps of more
concern than the vehicles’ capabilities is the ability of the Army to provide
sufficient personnel to both crew and maintain the vehicles.
Addressing trade-offs, Robert Ayson, a strategic and defence studies specialist
at The Australian National University, and former adviser to the Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade Committee, raised the following questions: ‘I wonder why
they bought so many LAVs? I wonder about the Army’s ability to sustain them?
Have the Government replaced one display capability, the strike wing, with
another?’77
Jennie Derby, Senior Advisor to the Minister of Defence, noted: ‘Labour was
determined to reverse the trend of National. … Timing is everything. Labour
had said in its manifesto that they would re-equip the Army. With the benefit
of hindsight would they order 105 again?—yes they would.’78 The Chief of
Army, Major General Jerry Mateparae, was unequivocal in his support for the
decision to buy 105 LAVs, saying that he was ‘sure that the New Zealand Army
needs all 105 NZLAV. Any less and we will compromise our ability to deliver
and sustain a motorised light infantry battalion group’.79
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In June 2004 the Chief of Defence Force, speaking at the Royal New Zealand
Returned and Services’ Association (RSA) Conference in Wellington, warned
that the NZDF was undermanned, saying:
What I’m doing right now—it’s being done independently—is a review
of what I think we need in resources, basically personnel, and what
Government expects in outputs. There is a gap in my view right
now—it’s the expectations of what defence forces need to do and my
capacity to meet them.80
In addressing the issue of utility, the following month, reporting in the NZDF
Annual Report, the CDF said:
There remain some risks with the project, as while the NZDF is on track
to introduce the NZLAV, the development of the motorised battalion is
a complex task. … 1 RNZIR [is] expected to become operational at the
end of 2005. With the current operational tempo and the challenges of
recruitment and retention the NZDF faces, the delivery of a complete
second battalion capability will be delayed until sufficient personnel are
available to be assigned.81
Recruitment and retention were a concern, with an attrition rate of 16.5 per
cent to 17.5 per cent over the previous two years.82 Then, in December 2004,
the CDF was reported as advising the Foreign Affairs and Trade Select Committee:
The Army has changed its mind about motorising both the regular force
infantry battalions using the LAV3s. Instead the Burnham-based 2nd/1st
Battalion would provide back up for the Linton-based 1st Battalion, a
unit which is kept at a higher state of readiness.83
Colonel Mark Wheeler in March 2005 noted that there were no factors which
were limiting constraints on the timed introduction into service of the LAVs,
commenting:
Two LAV battalions was a limiting factor for operations. We have
structured as a heavy motorised battalion (1/1), and a light battalion with
LAV support (2/1). 49 LAVs will go to 1/1 at Linton, with a further 14
to combat support and logistics there. QAMR will have 30 at Burnham,
where 2/2 has been organised into two companies and 12 will go to
training establishments at Waiouru and Trentham.84
Wheeler was pleased that the required levels of capability for crewing the
LAVs were in fact ahead of schedule, with 64 operational crews to be trained




Whilst the first batch of vehicles were on their way, the Minister had said:
‘We expect the first company group of LAV3s to be deployment ready for
December 2004, with the first full battalion group of up to 51 LAV3s ready for
overseas deployment by December 2005.’86  In the event, 2 LAV Platoon and
Victor Company of 1st Battalion RNZIR were ready for deployment to Australia
in June 2004.87  By this stage, 91 LAVs were in New Zealand, with 57 in service
with the Army. The final batch of vehicles was delivered on schedule in
November 2004,88  though the contract price had increased to NZ$653 million.89
In November 2005, a battalion group of 800 soldiers and 51 LAVs took part in
Exercise Silver Warrior, demonstrating the capability of both the LAV III and
1st Battalion RNZIR and drawing forth the comment from one of the Exercise’s
senior observers, Lieutenant Colonel Phil McKee, that ‘the NZLAV performed
better than anyone’s wildest expectations’.90
Summary
The acquisition and introduction into service of the LAV IIIs brought about one
of the most contentious periods of debates about defence equipment since the
hue and cry over the original ANZAC frigate decision in 1989. Important issues
for both National and Labour-led Governments were the number of new armoured
vehicles to buy, whether to purchase new vehicles or upgrade the existing
M113s, and what the implications of these decisions would mean for other
acquisitions. The whole notion of ‘balanced forces’ was put under the spotlight;
National wished to retain the ‘balanced force’ concept, whilst Labour chose to
emphasise the importance of well-equipped land forces. Yet though this chapter
has outlined how much criticism was levelled at the Government when the
decision to purchase 105 LAVs was taken, a battalion was made operationally
ready within the agreed timeframe. How the LAVs perform on operational
deployment will, however, remain the litmus test for this particular acquisition
decision. In exploring the events surrounding the decision-making process for
this particular case, it is strongly apparent that the decision to procure the LAV
IIIs provided fertile ground for much political argument and debate within the
New Zealand context. The purchase price was considerable, and the additional
investment to ensure the ongoing operational capability of a motorised battalion
continues to be significant. However bureaucratic politics, with the observation
that relationships between the Ministry of Defence, the NZDF, and the Army
were dysfunctional, and above all timing, with the election of a Labour-led
Government, were ultimately the dominant factors as the decision-making process
for the acquisition of the LAV IIIs unfolded.
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Chapter 8
Politics and Processes: Reflections on
the Characteristics of the
Decision-Making Process
By the 1980s New Zealand’s defence forces were facing the prospect of block
obsolescence of many major military platforms. The six case studies described
and analysed in this volume provide an insight into the way defence
decision-making processes have been undertaken since this time. This chapter
now outlines the processes involved in defence decision-making activities, and
identifies those factors which have had most impact on the development of the
decision-making process in the recent New Zealand context. In so doing, the
chapter answers the two questions posed at the beginning of this volume, namely:
(1) What are the processes involved in New Zealand defence acquisition policy
decision-making activities?; and (2) What factors are brought to bear to influence
the decision-making process? In particular this chapter draws out the role
personalities have played in individual cases, as well as the role of officials in
providing free and frank advice to Ministers. Finally, the chapter concludes
with further observations on the nature of the decision-making process, drawing
particular attention to the importance of politics and timing in the process.
The Characteristics of the Decision-Making Process
Each of the influencing elements identified in the case studies has had greater
or lesser significance at various points throughout the process. The contemporary
situation, which includes how New Zealand sees its role in the world and the
influence of external actors (particularly the United States and Australia) along
with the world situation, is particularly relevant at the beginning of the process
when goals and objectives are being set. The influence of external factors then
consistently has an impact until a decision on choice has been made. The analysis
suggests that timing is most critical both early in the process and ultimately
when a decision on choice is being made. Considered judgement nonetheless is
also apparent every step of the way.
Politics (including governmental politics and bureaucratic politics) and public
opinion both have their place. Public opinion was most influential during the
time of the first ANZAC frigate decision, and played its part during subsequent
decisions about ANZAC purchases, but has continued to have an influence on
other decisions at times. Bureaucratic politics has been demonstrated to often
have a part to play from time to time throughout the process. It is at the time of
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deciding whether to choose a particular platform or upgrade when political
influence and judging political side effects most strongly come to the fore.
Notwithstanding those influencing elements which have already been
identified, another practice which has impacted on the decision-making process
has become apparent during the case studies, namely incrementalism.
Incrementalism
Incrementalism, or the method of successive limited comparison, was identified
by Charles Lindblom many years ago as the regular practice of public servants
in approaching decision making.1  Here the decision-maker identifies few
alternatives, none of which are radically different from those which have gone
before. In the event, it is clear that this approach has been used in every case
but one under discussion in this volume. (The exception was HMNZS Charles
Upham, and this was because the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) had never
operated a logistic support ship (LSS) previously.) For example, although David
Lange indicated ‘we are not in the frigate business’, the specification of the
ANZAC frigates was clearly based on the development of a modern warship,
rather than an ocean patrol vessel. When the lease of the F-16s was under
consideration, Derek Quigley raised questions about the role expected of new
aircraft observing that:
It seems likely that the policy requirement for an air combat force to
perform the three specified roles … arose simply because there is already
a fighter attack force in being, those are the roles that the air combat
force is capable of performing, and the RNZAF is keen to maintain a
fighter capability.2
With the Orion upgrade, Project Sirius was intended to update the aircraft’s
systems so that it could continue with its customary role of surface and
sub-surface surveillance. When that project was cancelled, it took careful and
sustained work to convince Cabinet of the utility of an upgrade under Project
Guardian which was similar in so many respects to Project Sirius. Further, whilst
the 105 LAVs were to allow the introduction of a new concept, that of a motorised
infantry, they were nevertheless replacing a previous total of 103 APCs and fire
support vehicles.
Whether the incremental method has sufficient dynamism to allow
organisations to conceptualise decisions that are sufficiently innovative for a
rapidly changing environment has been open to question. It might be argued
that incrementalism has been successfully challenged by the intervention of the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet with the Maritime Patrol Review
and the introduction of new capabilities to be made possible by the completion
of seven new vessels under Project Protector, but in the case of those capabilities
under review in this study incrementalism has remained a powerful feature.
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The role of individuals
In this section further reflection is offered on the roles individuals have played,
and this is most clearly illustrated in the first four of the case studies. In the case
of the ANZAC frigates it was Geoffrey Palmer who ultimately had to weigh up
the relative importance of external interests, public opinion and politics and
political side effects. He had a clear picture of how he and senior colleagues
Russell Marshall and Bob Tizard saw New Zealand’s role in the world, and he
was determined that the frigate purchase would proceed. His recent appointment
as Prime Minister was used to advantage to lever influence with Cabinet and
Caucus colleagues to ensure the acquisition went ahead in the face of what had
previously been strong opposition.
The Prime Minister of the day was to play an important role in developments
concerning the purchase and plans for conversion of HMNZS Charles Upham.
The 1997 Review of acquisition and proposed conversion had noted that, as early
as 1993, the Prime Minister’s Department had indicated that the project to acquire
an MSS should not be pursued with any vigour. Warren Cooper, at the time
Minister of Defence, made it clear that Jim Bolger was not at all enthusiastic
about the proposal to buy and convert the Charles Upham. Once the ship had
been purchased, Jim Bolger then sent David Jack from the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet to warn officials in Defence that conversion work
on the Charles Upham ‘would not happen’. When Winston Peters became
Treasurer following the 1996 election, he was just as determined that money
would not be spent on the ship, and it never was.
Peters again loomed large in the debate over the second frigate decision. He
had made it known at the time of the election that his Party was against
purchasing further frigates. As Treasurer and Deputy Prime Minister, he declared
his opposition once more when the matter was under discussion in October 1997.
The day after this assertion, Bolger announced that no decision on further frigate
purchases would be taken before the next election.
Just two months later, in December 1997, Bolger himself was ousted from
his position as Prime Minister and replaced by Jenny Shipley, with Paul East
being replaced as Minister of Defence by Max Bradford. Bradford was determined
to see the decision-making process for the ANZAC frigates rekindled. Knowing
that a new-build ANZAC was going to be unacceptable to his colleagues in
Government, Bradford worked hard with the Australians to ensure the prospect
of a second-hand ANZAC being made available, which the Australians would
themselves replace with a new vessel. Opposition to the purchase came from
both within and outside the Party. Bill English, who was to become Leader of
the Opposition, led a group who were against the purchase of the frigates
apparently because they were ‘poll driven’.3 The ACT Party, United Future and
a number of independent MPs were also against the purchase, yet their support
153
Politics and Processes: Reflections on the Characteristics of the Decision-Making Process
for the Government was critical to ensure its survival. In the end, the need for
political survival overcame any perceived need for a third ANZAC and the
decision not to proceed with the purchase was made.
There were essentially three people who were central to the decisions
surrounding the lease of the F-16s. The first of these was Secretary of Defence
Gerald Hensley, who was the first to be approached (by American Deputy
Secretary Kurt Campbell) about a possible lease deal. The second was Max
Bradford, who championed the lease and saw the debate through a difficult time
in Cabinet to an apparently successful conclusion. Helen Clark was the third
actor, voicing determined opposition to the lease as leader of the Labour Party
prior to the election, and demonstrating just as much determined opposition as
Prime Minister after the election in 1999. Whilst Bradford suggested that Major
General Maurice Dodson, Chief of General Staff, played a significant role in
arguing that the lease of the F-16s would starve the New Zealand Army of funds,
it would seem that Clark and her Cabinet colleagues had already been attracted
by the recommendations of the Quigley Report. In March 2000 the decision not
to proceed with the lease was made.
The roles played by individuals in the final two case studies are somewhat
less clear. Clark was adamantly against a sophisticated upgrading of the Orions,
and for a time the future of the P-3s was clearly in doubt. In the end however
a sophisticated upgrade was agreed to. Whilst Graham Fortune spelt out that
the utility of the upgraded aircraft to meet the combined needs for the military
and for civilian agencies was a convincing factor, it still remains unclear just
what constellation of events occurred during 2002 to bring about such a change
in attitude.
Much was made of the attempts by Army to influence the Government over
the LAV decision. Charges were made in the White and Ansell report that ‘leaks’
from the Army had been used to advance the Army’s interests over those of
other Services. Yet again it was clear that the Labour-led Government was
determined from the outset to ensure that the Army did receive significant
support for new equipment. Opportunities remain to explore at some future
point the personal influence of Helen Clark as Prime Minister and Mark Burton
as Minister of Defence on this particular acquisition.
The role of officials
In these final reflections, I want to comment on the role of officials in the
decision-making process. The insistence, persistence and foresight of officials
in providing robust advice to Ministers have been essential in ensuring that
New Zealand retains a credible Defence Force. When first undertaking research
for this book, I suspected that I might find a bureaucracy riven with factions,
endeavouring to control the decision-making process in classic ‘Mandarin’
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fashion. Whilst there has been clear evidence that at times there have been
factions and divisions between the three Service branches, and those Service
branches and the Ministry of Defence, nevertheless it remains apparent that
officials have endeavoured to work with rigour over time to provide the best
judgement and advice possible to assist politicians in determining the most
appropriate decisions for the cases under review. Three out of six of the case
studies which have been analysed, the ANZAC frigates, the upgrade of the P-3
Orions and the LAV III, have been or are in the process of successful
implementation. In each case, officials have worked to ensure that they provided
the Government of the day with the most appropriate advice upon which to
base decisions despite that advice not always proving popular.
Perhaps not surprisingly, homeostasis is sought when major decisions are
being considered. No single individual or organisation wants to face massive
change, and incrementalism has been attractive within Defence as it helps ensure
that those changes which do take place are not too dramatic. Whilst this may
have limited innovative thinking at times (and prompted the involvement of
the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet), nevertheless incrementalism
has also had demonstrated success. For example, the availability of two ANZAC
frigates has provided a capability which the Government has been able to use
to advantage to pursue New Zealand’s policy goals. Whilst David Lange said
that no one could tell him how the frigates would be used, the deployments to
the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Enduring Freedom clearly underscore
the frigates’ utility. The other asset which the Government has deployed to the
Persian Gulf has been the P-3K Orion, yet another platform which drew criticism
because of its high cost and lack of previous operational deployment. Whilst
the deployment required the Royal New Zealand Air Force to borrow equipment
from the Royal New Zealand Navy to enable its aircraft to operate in a coalition
environment, nonetheless it was possible, and the aircraft and their crews
performed with distinction. Officials are charged with providing the Minister
of the day with free and frank advice. In the case of the ANZAC frigates,
insistence on them having upgraded facilities initially, and more sophisticated
equipment than some politicians might have been comfortable with, has helped
ensure that they remain a credible and viable platform in today’s operating
environment. Had the Naval Combat Force been abandoned and replaced only
with patrol boats, successive governments would have had severely limited
options available to them to help implement policy. Had there been less
persistence on the part of officials to ensure a credible upgrade of the Orions,
once again policy options would have been severely curtailed. One has only to
review the marginal utility of the M113s in Bosnia to see the danger of forces
becoming irrelevant if forced to operate with outdated or inadequate equipment.
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Conclusion
In reviewing each of the case studies, as indicated above, it is clear that there
are a myriad of factors influencing the decision-making process at any given
time. How New Zealand views the world; external sources of influence,
particularly the pressures brought to bear by the United States and Australia;
public opinion; and bureaucratic politics—all these factors have played a
significant part. Most recently, international developments regionally and
globally have been of great importance. However, in each case study I have been
particularly struck by the clear importance of both politics and timing in the
decision-making process. The change in the voting system to Mixed Member
Proportional (MMP) representation had its own impact. Whilst the politics of a
given situation can be subject to manipulation by individuals involved in the
process, there is somewhat less possibility for controlling timing. The
juxtaposition of events and correlation of forces surrounding a process may be
less subject to individual control, but a skilled leader will recognise when the
time is right for a particular course of action, as Geoffrey Palmer did during the
ANZAC frigate decision process. As Palmer said:
‘Timing in politics is everything’
In each of the cases under review in this book, that has clearly been the case.
ENDNOTES
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Appendix 2: ANZAC Ship Baseline
Characteristics
Major Characteristics
The ship shall exhibit the following major characteristics:
• a range of 6000 nautical miles at 18 knots with no fuel remaining;
• a minimum endurance for logistic supplies of 30 days;
• a propulsion system consisting of two cruise diesel engines and a gas turbine
capable of a maximum speed of at least 27 knots and capable of continuous
slow speed operation down to 5 knots in calm seas;
• sea keeping qualities that will enable weapon, crew, sensor, replenishment
and helicopter operations in sea state 5;
• the ability to operate and hangar the Seahawk helicopter, and to maintain a
medium sized (up to 10,000kg) helicopter including a simple helicopter
securing and traversing system;
• reduced magnetic, acoustic, radar and infra red signature levels; and
• damage control measures to combat flood, fire, smoke and shock.
Fitted Equipment
The following equipment shall be fitted on board:
• a 76mm gun with magazine capacity for a minimum of 600 rounds of
ammunition, with an option for a 127mm gun in lieu of the 76mm;
• an austere point defence missile system (PDMS) with an 8 cell vertical launch
system (VLS);
• a target indication/fire control system shared between the gun and the PDMS;
• a two-dimensional air surveillance radar with integral Identification Friend
or Foe (IFF);
• an electronic support measures (ESM) system providing a surveillance and
anti-ship missile warning capability over the frequency range 0.1 to 18 GHZ
and a communication intercept/DF system covering the frequency range of
1 to 500 MHz;
• a chaff dispensing system;
• a hull mounted sonar;
• a torpedo decoy system;
• a modern, modular and proven command and control system compatible
with the above equipment, and capable of modification as necessary to
accommodate any or all of the equipment in 1.3 and 1.4; and
• a communications transmission, reception and message handling system, for
which the MF/HF communications sub-system shall be broadband.
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Provision for Fitting of Equipment
1.3 Fit for But Not With (FFBNW)
• a towed array of the 2031 type or a derivative thereof; and
• a ship launched torpedo system compatible with Mk 46 and Stingray
torpedoes.
Allowance for Fitting of Equipment
Space and Weight (S&W) allowance shall be made for the later fitting of the
following equipment:
• a Close in Weapon System (CIWS);
• an electronic countermeasures (ECM) system covering the frequency range
7.5 to 18 GHz;
• an anti-ship missile defence (ASMD) decoy; and
• anti-ship capable missiles in canister configuration.
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Appendix 3: User Requirement
Defence’s evaluation and subsequent purchase of Mercandian Queen II was based
on the document ‘MILITARY SEALIFT SHIP (MSS): USER REQUIREMENT
Version as at 6 Dec 92’, which is summarised below.
Primary Purpose
The fundamental requirement is for ship to be able to transport a range of Ready
Reaction Force stores, vehicles and equipment, plus up to 150 troops, and
autonomously unload alongside an unimproved wharf.
General Requirements
Roll on/roll off type vessel, of not less than 5000 DWT, with a quarter or stern
slewing ramp:
• To be maintained in Lloyds class and to statutory requirements including
firefighting and lifesaving (65 crew) for a cargo RoRo vessel
• To comply with passenger RoRo ship intact and damaged stability
requirements
• Size of vessel not to exceed Calliope Dock capacity
• Speed not less than 15 knots, range of at least 6000 miles, and autonomous
endurance of at least 40 days (65 crew)
• Ship’s hull, main machinery, and vital systems to have life expectancy of at
least 25 years, based on 4850 hrs pa at sea and 2100 hrs pa in harbour
• Ability to manoeuvre unaided and loiter offshore
• Vessel motions such that ship is capable of operating in Sea State 5, with
restricted flying operations in Sea State 4
• Main machinery to UMS standard, with adequate emergency electrical
generators for specified equipment
Cargo
• At least 1000 lane metres for vehicles plus space for 30 TEU (10 refrigerated)
of general stores and 10 TEU of explosives
• Ability to autonomously embark and disembark the above dry cargo, and
noting that cargo may be stored on the flight deck
• Vehicle decks to have adequate strength for 20 t axle loads, 5 m deck height,
and vehicle lifts of 40 t capacity to all decks
• Specified capacities and transfer facilities for dieso, avcat, water and
lubricants
• Petrol to be carried in containers or tankers
• Quarter or stern slewing ramp for a access to unimproved wharf with working
load of 60 t
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• Storerooms as specified for dry and refrigerated foods and stores and spares
for general ship use
• Three 15 t per day reverse osmosis fresh water plants
• Light jackstay rigs for underway replenishment, and ability to replenish
liquids to a vessel berthed alongside
Accommodation
• Accommodation for 65 naval crew to normal standards, plus reduced standard
accommodation (and military lifesaving gear etc) for 150 additional persons
• Two sewage treatment plants, sized for peak load but either to be able to
handle normal crew of 65
• Single galley sized for peak load (215 persons) plus separate messes
• Laundry facilities for 65 persons on self help basis
• Two berth sick bay and supporting first aid equipment
• Offices and workshops as specified
• Air conditioning (tropical standard) for work and accommodation spaces
plus heating and ventilation for hangar and vehicle decks
• Specified restrictions on hazardous materials and products
Aviation and Boats
• Facilities to operate and hangar two medium helicopters, with main and
emergency landing spots
• Ability to land a Chinook, with a suitable Vertrep point
• Facilities to carry and operate one RNZN rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB)
• A crane with 25 t capacity at 7 m for aircraft recovery
Military Items
• Pintles for 4 machine guns and small arms magazine
• Provision for 4 SRBOC (decoy) launchers and supporting ESM facilities
• Normal navigation and command facilities, with some facilities for training
and provision for a briefing room
• Naval communications and signalling equipment as specified with associated




Appendix 4: Recommendations of the
Final Report of the Air Combat
Capability Study—October 1998
Recommendations
This study recommends that the Secretary of Defence:
• note that this study has confirmed the White Paper requirement for New
Zealand to retain an air combat capability.
• note that an air combat capability has high utility in contributing to New
Zealand’s defence strategy of self-reliance in partnership, including low level
security challenges to New Zealand sovereignty, our security relationship
with Australia, and supporting regional and global security.
• note that the study has confirmed the three operational roles of Close Air
Support, Air Interdiction and Maritime Strike, as the best match with New
Zealand’s security requirements.
• agree that the capability of the A-AK Skyhawk with the upgrades identified
in the White Paper, while broadly satisfactory, has a number of operational
and policy limitations which will increase as the Skyhawk approaches the
end of its life.
• agree that other broad capability options such as Surface-to-Surface missiles,
Long-range Artillery, Fighter-Bomber Aircraft, and Surface Combatants are
not suitable for meeting New Zealand’s air combat capability requirements,
and should not be considered further.
• agree that New Zealand should not consider further an Attack Helicopter
or Light Attack Aircraft as a replacement for the A-4K Skyhawk. We should
also not consider the P-3K Orion as the sole maritime strike capability.
• agree that the operational performance and policy value of a current
production fourth generation multi-role fighter aircraft such as an F-16C/D
makes it the only capability option for meeting air combat capability
requirements over the longer term.
• note that an initial production fourth generation multi-role aircraft, such as
an F-16A/B, with suitable upgrades, offers opportunities for New Zealand’s
replacement of the A-4K.
• note that the indicative through-life cost of a current production fourth
generation multi-role fighter used for the purposes of this study was that of
a new F-16C/D at NZ$1.8B.
• note that consideration should be given to acquisition strategies that
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Further Correspondence
I was fortunate to have access to significant amounts of business correspondence
regarding the frigates through the Christchurch office of the Foundation for
Peace Studies Aotearoa-New Zealand and, as follows, through archival material
at the University of Auckland:
Letter from Ian Bradley to John Matthews, 22 August 1989
Letter from P. Glente to Bob Tizard, 5 April 1989
Letter from P. Glente to Gerald Hensley, 10 March 1989
Letter from David Lange, Prime Minister, to J.B. Matthews, 6 June 1989
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Memorandum from Harry Duynhoven to All Cabinet Members, 20 August 1989
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